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Few if any industries have a history as 
dramatic and exciting as the cotton textile 
industry of Lancashire, England, which be­
tween the middle of the eighteenth century 
and the early years of the twentieth under­
went a spectacular and unprecedented 
growth, only to enter a sharp and disastrous 
decline following the First World War that 
led to its eventual collapse. 
The industry was one of the first to success­
fully employ machinery and mechanical 
power in the manufacturing process, and in­
deed it can be argued that it was the world's 
first modern industry. Some have seen it as 
the major factor in Great Britain's emergence 
as the world's leading industrial power, and 
there is no question that a causal relation­
ship existed between the health of the indus­
trial economy and the state of the empire 
and nation. During the period in which the 
industry flourished, it brought a general 
prosperity to the entire British economy; 
and when it began to fail, severe depression 
afflicted the whole of society. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, little serious 
criticism of the cotton textile industry was 
voiced during the period of its success. 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
the charges of contemporary observers were 
limited to allegations of social abuse: the in­
humane treatment of the women and children 
who worked in the mills, the length and 
hardships of the working day, and the 
absence of adequate sanitary facilities for the 
workers. It was only in the last quarter of the 
century, when the economic slowdown had 
obtained for some time and the political threat 
posed by Imperial Germany had become 
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PART I

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY 

1 
INTRODUCTION 
Few if any industries have a history as interesting and exciting 
as that of the Lancashire cotton textile industry. * Over one 
hundred and fifty years of spectacular and usually steady growth 
was, after World War I, followed by an even more spectacular 
and steady decline. Shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in two centuries. 
Both in its rise and in its decline, the Lancashire cotton 
textile industry was of great importance not only to the British 
economy but to the whole world. Indeed, it can be argued 
cogently that it was the world's first modern industry. Certainly 
it was one of the first industries successfully to employ machinery 
and mechanical power. As for the industry's role in the emer­
1
 Throughout this study, the Lancashire cotton textile industry and the British 
cotton textile industry are referred to as if they were identical. Strictly speaking, 
of course, they are not, and never were, the same thing. It is true that Lancashire 
has persistently dominated the British cotton textile industry. The concentration 
of activity in Lancashire increased throughout the nineteenth century, reaching 
a peak just before World War I. In 1838, 59% of all British cotton textile workers 
were employed in the county of Lancashire; by 1898-99, this figure had increased 
to 75.7%. If the neighboring county of Cheshire is included, the figure for 1838 
increases to 73% and that for 1898-99 becomes 82.2%. As a percentage of all 
cotton workers in England and Wales (i.e., excluding Scotland), the combined 
county figures were 86.1% in 1838 and 87.1% in 1898-99 (S. J. Chapman, The 
Lancashire Cotton Industry, p. 149). This joint figure for England and Wales reached 
a high of 89.8% in 1911 (R. Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 31). 
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TABLE 1 
BRITISH CONSUMPTION OF RAW COTTON AND EXPORTS OF COTTON

TEXTILES IN VARIOUS YEARS

Cotton Con- Cloth Exports
sumption Exports (millions % of All (millions (millions of Exports 
of lbs.) linear yds.) of £) 
1760 3.4 n.a. 0.3 3 
1781-83 8.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1800 52 65.5 n.a. n.a. 
1810 124 212.2 n.a. n.a. 
1814 74 192.3 20.0 43.9 
1820 120 251.0 16.5 45.3 
1830 248 441.6 19.4 50.7 
1840 459 790.6 24.7 48.1 
1850 588 1,385.2 28.3 39.6 
1860 1,084 2,776.2 52.0 38.3 
1870 1,075 3,267.0 71.4 35.8 
1880 1,361 3,724.6 75.6 33.9 
1890 1,664 5,125.0 74.4 28.2 
1900 1,737 5,031.7 69.8 24.0 
1910 1,632 6,017.6 105.3 24.5 
1913 2,178 7,075.3 126.5 24.1 
1920 1,726 4,435.4* 401.4 30.1 
1930 1,272 2,490.5 87.6 15.3 
1939 1,317 1,426.4 49.1 11.2 
1955 778 533.9 116.8 4.8 
SOURCES: Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, pp. 331-35 and P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic 
Growth, 1688-1959, p. 185. Cotton yarn exports were generally growing faster than raw cotton imports 
but less rapidly than cloth exports. See Robson. 
•Square yards. 
gence of Great Britain as the premier industrial power in the 
world, Walt Rostow has given it the singular honor of being 
the "leading sector" in the world's first "take-off."2 Although 
the usefulness of Rostow's categories has frequently been 
questioned, his choice of a leading industry for Great Britain 
is generally accepted.3 
The data presented in Tables 1 and 2 are intended to give 
the reader some idea of the rapid rate at which the British 
cotton textile industry grew between 1760 and 1913 as well 
as of the industry's importance to the British economy as a 
2W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, pp. 52-55. 
3
 A possible exception can be found in P. Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic 
Growth, 1688-1959, esp. pp. 290-99. These authors seem to be undecided between 
the rival candidacies of the iron and cotton industries. 
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TABLE 2 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY

IN VARIOUS YEARS

(in thousands of workers)

Factory Handloom 
Year Workers Weavers 
1810 100 200 
1814 110 216 
1820 126 240 
1830 185 240 
1840 262 123 
1850 331 43 
1860 427 10 
1870 450 
1880 483 
1890 529 
1901 523 
1907 577 
Insured 
Workers 
1923 568 
1929 555 
1933 500 
1936 421 
1939 378 
SOURCE: B. R. Mitchell (with the collaboration of P. Deane), Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp. 
187-88. 
whole. Roughly speaking, British cotton consumption increased 
fifteen times between 1760 and 1800. It then further increased 
nine times between 1800 and 1840 and doubled between 1840 
and 1860. After stagnating during the 1860s, largely as a result 
of the American Civil War, cotton consumption once more 
doubled by 1913. During this period, the most rapid rate of 
growth was achieved during the years between 1780 and 1800. 
The most important growth probably occurred between 1820 
and 1850, however, since this was the period during which 
all the processes of the industry were brought into the factory. 
After 1860, the rate of growth of cotton consumption was 
clearly lower than it had been earlier. Nevertheless, the growth 
rate was certainly respectable all the way up to World War 
I. 
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The export figures are in some ways even more spectacular 
than the cotton consumption figures. The rate of increase in 
the yardage of cloth and the poundage of yarn exported was 
generally higher than the rate of growth of cotton consumption. 
As for the share of cotton goods in total British exports, the 
figures are impressive, to say the least. This is true despite 
the fact that the relatively high import content of cotton textile 
exports tends to exaggerate the importance of these exports.4 
British cotton textile exports reached their relative high point 
in 1830. In that year, they constituted no less than 50.7% of 
all British exports. That was the only year that their share 
was above one-half, but even in 1913 it was almost one-quarter. 
Since cotton textiles was the first industry to be converted 
to modern factory production, the share of cotton factory 
employment in total British factory employment has been de­
creasing almost from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. 
Nevertheless, a very large, if declining, percentage of all British 
factory workers were engaged in the cotton textile industry 
throughout the nineteenth century. For most of the period 
leading up to World War I, cotton textiles was the leading 
British industry in terms of value added. It was only toward 
the end of the period that it was passed by the combined 
engineering trades.5 
Just as rapid growth and prosperity in Lancashire gave the 
whole British economy a boost, so depression in cotton textiles 
was a terrible drag. The suffering experienced during the 
"cotton famine" that occurred during the American Civil War 
was largely confined to the cotton-producing areas,6 but the 
depression of the interwar period (i.e., the period between 
the two World Wars) affected the whole economy. This time 
the depression was permanent and required a major reallocation 
4
 During the nineteenth century, the cost of the imported raw cotton represented 
an average of about 40% of the value of the industry's final product (Deane 
and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 187). Such a large import content was probably 
a good deal higher than the average for all British exports. Thus, cotton textile 
exports represent a somewhat smaller percentage of British value added exported 
than of total British goods exported. For most purposes, the former percentage 
is a better measure of economic importance than is the latter percentage. 
5Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 192.

6W. O. Henderson, The Lancashire Cotton Famine, 1861-1865, chap. 2.
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of capital and labor. This reallocation proved to be a very 
drawn-out and painful process. To a large extent, of course, 
the difficulties of readjustment were a result of the concentration 
of the industry in Lancashire and Cheshire. The problem was 
further exacerbated by the poor performance of Britain's other 
staple industries: in particular, wool textiles, coal mining, and 
shipbuilding. Indeed, the poor performance of the entire British 
economy during the interwar period can largely be attributed 
to cotton, wool, coal, and shipbuilding. 
As was the case with British industry in general, the economic 
performance of the cotton textile industry was not seriously 
criticized by contemporary observers at least until the end of 
the nineteenth century. During most of that century, attacks 
on the cotton industry and its leaders were limited to its 
treatment of women and children, the length of the working 
day, sanitary conditions, and other basically social problems. 
The competence of British management and the superiority 
of British workers was taken for granted. It was only after 
the economic slowdown (or "climacteric") of the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century had persisted for some time and 
the economic and political threat from Imperial Germany had 
become obvious that Britain began its pre-World War I orgy 
of economic self-criticism. Even then, however, the cotton textile 
industry and its managers, workers, and trade unions were 
treated relatively gently. Thus, for example, E. A. Pratt in 
his stinging indictment of the economic behavior of the British 
trade unions does not have a single critical word to say about 
the cotton textile unions; this despite the great numerical and 
economic strength of these unions.7 Similarly though Melvin 
Copeland noted that British cotton firms were not adopting 
ring spinning and automatic weaving at anything near the 
American rate, he did not take this as a sign of managerial 
ineptness or technological conservatism.8 
To a large extent, this relatively favorable treatment was 
7E. A. Pratt, Trade Unionism and British Industry. This book is principally a 
reprinting of a series of articles Pratt had published in the London Times between 
18 November 1901 and 16 January 1902. 
8
 See M. T. Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, 
chap. 4. 
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undoubtedly a result of the industry's continued expansion 
and success. Thus, it is not surprising that the attitude of 
journalists, economists, and economic historians all hardened 
as they watched the industry flounder and eventually collapse 
during the interwar period. This disaster made it much more 
interesting and fashionable to search for a villain. 
As far as economists and economic historians are concerned, 
an important turning point occurred in 1933 with the publica­
tion of G. T. Jones's book Increasing Returns.9 Jones argued 
forcefully that there had been no improvement whatsoever 
in the manufacturing efficiency of the Lancashire cotton textile 
industry between 1885 and 1910. Indeed, he maintained that 
efficiency had actually declined somewhat between 1900 and 
1910.10 In Massachusetts, on the other hand, Jones found 
considerable improvement in cotton-manufacturing efficiency 
between 1885 and 1910.n I believe that these findings, which 
to my knowledge have gone completely unchallenged for 
thirty-six years, were of the greatest importance in causing 
economic historians to reassess the performance of the British 
cotton textile industry in the period between 1880 and World 
War I. In particular, they came to the virtually unanimous 
conclusion that British entrepreneurs and managers were 
seriously at fault in not following the example of their American 
brethren in a wholehearted adoption of ring spinning and 
automatic weaving. Indeed, this failure was now taken as a 
sign, not to say proof, of irrationality and technological back­
wardness. The explicit, or sometimes implicit, conclusion of 
this line of analysis is that Britain would have been able to 
improve her efficiency significantly, as America had done, had 
she adopted the new American machines. This in turn, would 
have helped stem the relative decline (in terms of her share 
of total world production and total world trade) of Lancashire 
between 1880 and 1913, and would have resulted in at least 
a somewhat better performance during the interwar period. 
9G. T. Jones, Increasing Returns. The work was edited by Colin Clark, Jones 
having been killed in an automobile accident in 1928. 
10
 Jones, Increasing Returns, pp. 117, 274. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 289-90. 
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This claim that there was poor management in the cotton 
textile industry is part and parcel of a more general attempt 
to explain Britain's relative economic decline after circa 1870 
in terms of "entrepreneurial failure." This explanation was 
introduced into the scholarly world by the distinguished trio 
of Marshall, Veblen, and Hobson.12 Its essence has been 
succintly expressed by T. H. Burnham and G. O. Hoskins 
in their study of the British iron and steel industry. After 
a highly subjective and definitely qualitative evaluation of the 
extenuating circumstances, they concluded that "if a business 
deteriorates it is of no use blaming anyone except those at 
the top."13 Clearly, this is the economic equivalent of the political 
call to "throw the rascals out." 
The most influential current exponents of the entrepreneurial 
failure theory are David Landes and Derek Aldcroft.14 Aldcroft 
in particular has presented a broad indictment of late nine­
teenth-century British businessmen. He accuses them of five 
failures: 
1. They did not adopt the best available techniques of 
production in many industries. Prominently mentioned 
among these non-adopted techniques are ring spinning 
and automatic weaving in cotton textiles. 
2.	 They neglected science and research. 
3.	 They put their money into the old staple industries and 
neglected new industries with a better future. 
4.	 They were bad salesmen. 
12See A. Marshall, "Fiscal Policy of International Trade" in Official Papers, 
p. 405, Principles of Economics, p. 298 ff., and Industry and Trade, p. 86 ff.; T. 
Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, p. 128; and J. Hobson, 
Incentives in the New Industrial Order, pp. 78-83. 
13T. H. Burnham and G. O. Hoskins, Iron and Steel in Britain, 1870-1930, 
p. 271. 
14
 See esp. D. S. Landes, "Some Reasons Why," pp. 553-84, in "Technological 
Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750-1914," chap. 5 in H. J. 
Habakkuk and M. Postan, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 
6, reprinted with revisions and extensions in Landes, The Unbound Prometheus. 
Also D. H. Aldcroft, "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914." 
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5.	 They did not do enough to establish international cartels 
to extract monopoly profits from the world at large.15 
The first part of this book is an attempt to see whether 
in fact British cotton textile firms were irrational and "tech­
nologically backwards" in the period after 1880. A secondary 
question is the extent to which any mistakes they may have 
made concerning the new technology could have affected 
Lancashire's competitive position. 
The criteria for rationality will be cost minimization and profit 
maximization. That is, given the technology available at the time 
and making reasonable assumptions about future economic and 
technological developments, could the British cotton textile 
managers have lowered their costs, and thereby raised their 
profits, by adopting machinery or techniques that they in fact 
neglected? A similar question is: Did they invest in machinery 
and other equipment that yielded a lower rate of return than 
did other available but neglected investment opportunities? 
Efficiency and rationality are thus defined strictly in an econo­
mic, not a general, sense. A faster or less labor intensive machine 
is not necessarily more profitable than its slower or more labor 
intensive alternative. Furthermore, what is most profitable at 
one time and in one place is not necessarily most profitable 
at a different time and in a different place. 
In looking at the performance of the British cotton textile 
industry, I am limiting myself to the aggregate results. Did 
the industry taken as a whole act in a rational way? The bahavior 
of individual entrepreneurs and firms is of little or no concern; 
any industry is bound to contain some firms that are being 
mismanaged. As long as there are a substantial number of 
firms who make the right decision, however, even if it is a 
result of pure luck, and the industry is reasonably competitive, 
strong forces will be at work to make the industry as a whole 
behave properly. The growing profits of those who choose 
15
 Aldcroft, "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy," pp. 116-18 and 121-23. 
For a review of the literature and a longer discussion of the issue of entrepreneurial 
performance in late Victorian and Edwardian England, see D. N. McCloskey and 
L. G. Sandberg, "From Damnation to Redemption: Judgments on the Late Victorian 
Entrepreneur." 
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the right alternative must give other firms a good reason for 
emulation. As for those who cannot be persuaded by potential 
profits, bankruptcy and forced exit is a likely result. 
In case the reader should object that I am cheating by looking 
only at aggregate behavior, let me defend myself by pointing 
out that it is exactly this kind of aggregate rational behavior 
that the adherents of the entrepreneurial failure hypotheses 
deny, both in the British economy as a whole and in the cotton 
textile industry. Indeed, David Landes explicitly considers, and 
then rejects, competition as a major force for ensuring aggregate 
technological rationality.16 
The first problem examined in the book concerns spinning 
technology. I begin by trying to determine if the difference 
in choice of spinning technique made by British and American 
manufacturers when they were installing new equipment in 
the period just before World War I can be explained by differing 
economic conditions. I have included American, as well as 
British, behavior in this study for two reasons. First of all, 
most critics of British investment policy contrast it unfavorably 
with American behavior. Second, and more important, a model 
that can explain differential behavior in two different countries 
is much more convincing than one that deals only with a single 
country. 
The analysis presented in chapter 2 leads me to conclude 
that both British and American cotton manufacturers, at least 
as a general rule, were rational in their choice of spinning 
techniques. In chapters 3 and 4, I then go on to examine 
whether differing economic conditions can explain the dif­
ference in British and American behavior with regard to the 
junking of old, mule-type spinning equipment and with regard 
to the choice between plain (power) looms and automatic looms. 
Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered as authori­
tatively as the previous one. The difficulty arises because these 
later decisions come down to whether or not to make a capital 
investment. These investment opportunities were more fre­
16See Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, pp. 354-55. Landes points to the "long 
run" nature of adjustments in competitive industries and then repeats Keynes's 
quip that "in the long run we are all dead." 
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quently accepted in America than in Great Britain. In order 
to judge the rationality of these actions, I estimate the rate 
of return on the investment opportunities present in the two 
countries. The range of the results, as well as the probable 
size of the errors of measurement, however, makes it impossible 
to state with complete confidence that everyone acted in an 
entirely rational manner. On the other hand, the evidence by 
no means proves, or even indicates, irrationality. Furthermore, 
the data clearly show that if the British should in fact have 
acted differently, their failure to do so could not possibly have 
played a major role in Lancashire's decline. 
Chapter 5 deals with over-all technological improvement in 
Lancashire and Massachusetts. Basically it is a reassessment 
and correction of Jones's calculations. I have no serious criticism 
of his calculations of efficiency improvement in Massachusetts, 
but I believe that his results for Lancashire are very misleading. 
My reworking of his model and his data leads me to conclude 
that efficiency in the Lancashire cotton textile industry did 
in fact increase between 1885 and 1910, although not as rapidly 
as it did in Massachusetts. In particular, I replace the decrease 
Jones found for the 1900-1910 period with a rate of increase 
similar to that he reported for the 1885-1900 period. This 
difference in findings is partly the result of defects in Jones's 
model. The most important change, however, results from the 
fact that he incorrectly spliced a price series for cotton cloth 
at the turn of the century. 
In addition to considering over-all efficiency, I also estimate 
the change in output per unit of labor input for both Lancashire 
and Massachusetts. As was to be expected, these labor produc­
tivity series show more improvement in both regions than do 
the over-all efficiency series. As in the case of over-all efficiency, 
labor productivity increased more rapidly in Massachusetts than 
in Lancashire. I argue, however, that the more rapid rise in 
both over-all efficiency and in labor productivity in Massachu­
setts can be explained by economic factors without recourse 
to theories of technological backwardness or managerial in­
competence in Lancashire. 
Chapter 6 contains a brief survey of investment, or rather 
disinvestment, in Lancashire between the World Wars. The 
INTRODUCTION (13 
general conclusion is that the choice of which type of equipment 
to junk was made in a reasonable manner. 
Chapter 7, which concludes Part I of the book, contains 
some final observations on technological change and entrepre­
neurship in Lancashire. 
Having examined and rejected the hypothesis that managerial 
and technological failure were principal causes of Lancashire's 
fall, I devote Part II of the book to the alternate theory. That 
is, Lancashire's decline, and eventual fall, was principally the 
result of a decline in exports brought about by forces outside 
Lancashire's control. Chapter 8 consists of a survey of Lanca­
shire's export experience between 1815 and the outbreak of 
World War I, and chapter 9 examines the period from 1914 
up through 1938. 
The gist of the argument presented in these chapters is that 
Lancashire's relative decline after 1880 and her virtual collapse 
during the interwar years were both the result of two separate 
developments. The first of these was the rapid spread of cotton 
manufacturing to all parts of the world. In most cases, this 
spread was accompanied and encouraged by tariff protection 
and other forms of government assistance. In addition, national 
governments virtually without exception showed a strong deter­
mination not to allow imports to endanger the position of a 
previously established domestic cotton textile industry. 
The second development was a shift in comparative advantage 
in cotton textiles away from highly industrialized countries 
toward areas that were just beginning to industrialize. On the 
international scene, this movement consisted principally of 
Britain's losing her dominant position as a cotton textile 
exporter to countries such as Italy, India, and especially Japan. 
At the same time, a similar movement was occurring within 
the highly protected American market. Here the new cotton 
industry of the previously unindustrialized southern states was 
gaining the upper hand over the long-established New England 
cotton textile industry. 
Chapter 10 attempts to explain these trends in terms of 
economic variables. It is argued that they can in fact be explained 
by a number of characteristics of the manufacturing process 
involved in cotton textiles. The most important of these are 
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low transportation costs (both differential and absolute), limited 
economies of scale, and low capital and skill intensity. 
Finally chapter 11 contains a few concluding remarks on 
the study as a whole. 
AMERICAN RINGS AND 
ENGLISH MULES 
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of alternative spinning 
techniques, it seems appropriate to interject a very brief de­
scription of the principal steps required to convert raw cotton 
into finished cloth.1 
FROM RAW COTTON TO CLOTH: A DIGRESSION 
Raw cotton arrives at the mill in bale form. The cotton seeds 
have been removed by a cotton gin, but there is generally 
a good deal of dirt mixed in with the fibers. The bale is normally 
picked apart by hand and is fed into a machine called a bale 
breaker. It is common practice to mix the cotton from several 
bales at this stage by putting in armfuls first from one bale 
and then from another. The purpose of this is to get the mixture 
of cottons that is necessary to achieve the desired product. 
This chapter is a revised and considerably expanded version of my paper 
"American Rings and English Mules: The Role of Economic Rationality," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, February 1969. 
"For a somewhat more detailed account, see L. H. C. Tippett, A Portrait of 
the Lancashire Cotton Textile Industry, chap. 3; or Robson, The Cotton Industry in 
Britain, chap. 1. 
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It is possible, however, to delay the mixing until the immediately 
succeeding steps. 
The bale breaker, as well as the succeeding machines—the 
opener, the scutcher, and the card—work on the general 
principle of pulling the cotton through sets of spikes. Some 
of these spikes are set in place and some are attached to revolving 
cylinders. The principal effects of passing the cotton through 
these machines are to open the cotton fibers, to allow the dirt 
to fall out, and to remove extremely short and broken fibers. 
When the cotton emerges from the scutcher, it is called a 
lap. A lap can best be visualized as a very wide, very thick, 
and very loose blanket. This lap is fed into a card, which 
continues the process of cleaning and separating the fibers. 
In addition, the card stretches the lap in a ratio of about 100 
to 1, making it more compact. The result is called a card sliver. 
This card sliver is put into a drawing frame. The drawing 
frame consists simply of sets of rollers (or cylinders) moving 
at different speeds. As the sliver passes through the machine, 
it is stretched, thereby straightening the cotton fibers and 
causing them to lie parallel to each other. In order to increase 
the uniformity of the sliver, a given drawing frame is simulta­
neously fed a number of card slivers. By setting the relative 
speeds of the first and last sets of rollers equal to the number 
of card slivers being fed into the machine, the resulting product 
(a draw frame sliver) will be of the same thickness as the original 
card slivers. A different speed ratio will, of course, result in 
a different thickness. Repeating the process of drawing results 
in a more uniform thickness and in straighter and more parallel 
fibers. 
At this point, it is possible to spin the cotton directly. The 
usual procedure, however, is and long has been to convert 
it into roving before spinning. This is done on a speed frame, 
which continues the attenuating process and, in addition, 
imparts a small amount of twist to the cotton. 
The next step is spinning. In this process, the roving (or 
draw frame sliver) is further attenuated and a great deal of 
twist is imparted. The degree of stretching and the amount 
of twist are, of course, two of the principal determinants of 
the type of yarn that results. 
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This yarn may be bleached and dyed before further process­
ing. This is usually done with yarn destined for knitting. Most 
yarn that is to be woven into cloth is not so treated at this 
stage, however. Instead, it is directly prepared for the loom. 
The first step in this process is to rewind the yarn. At this 
stage, it is possible to remove inferior sections of yarn. 
After rewinding, the treatment of the yarn differs, depending 
on whether it is to be used as warp or woof (filling) in weaving. 
The yarn to be used as woof is wound onto small bobbins 
that will fit into the loom shuttles. The warp yarn (which is 
going to be stretched in the loom) is wound onto loom beams 
and sizing is applied to protect it from the friction and pulling 
to which it will be subjected during weaving. This process uses 
machines called beamers, tapers, and slashers. 
In the loom, the warp is stretched out in parallel and the 
woof is introduced between the strands of warp by moving 
the shuttle back and forth through the warp. The result of 
this process (assuming that unbleached yarn is used) is called 
gray cloth. Some of this cloth may be sold directly to consumers 
(e.g., the North Chinese peasants have used it to make their 
familiar padded winter clothing), but most is subjected to further 
processing (or finishing). This may include bleaching, dyeing, 
or some form of printing. 
Of these processes, spinning and weaving are by far the most 
important. The United States Tariff Board in its 1912 report 
on the cotton textile industry found that in Great Britain, in 
a new set of mills converting raw cotton into gray cloth, 63.7% 
(by value) of the required textile machinery consisted either 
of looms or spinning frames. Even more striking is the fact 
that 74.7% (by number) of the total labor force required to 
operate these mills was directly involved in operating the 
spinning and weaving equipment. This last percentage is even 
higher if general maintenance and supervisory personnel are 
excluded from the total.2 Roughly speaking, spinning and 
weaving thus account for two-thirds of the processing required 
to make gray cloth out of raw cotton.3 This dominance, together 
2
 United States Congress, House of Representatives, United States Tariff Board, 
Cotton Manufactures, pp. 808-14 (hereacter cited as "U.S. Tariff Board"). 
3
 The mill in question used plain power looms. Had automatic looms been used 
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with the fact that the most important technical innovations 
in the cotton industry during the period being studied occurred 
in spinning and weaving, justify the great stress I put on these 
particular processes. 
SPINNING TECHNIQUES 
Since the second half of the ninetheenth century, two different 
types of machines have been widely used to spin cotton yarn.4 
These are the mule—or more properly, the self-acting mule— 
and the ring (see Figure 1). The mule was invented by Samuel 
Crompton in 1779. It was given the name mule because it 
combines the spinning-with-rollers principle of Richard 
Arkwright's water frame with the moving carriage of James 
Hargreave's spinning jenny. 
The mule consists of a bank of rollers (or cylinders) that 
are fixed in place and a movable carriage on which the spindles 
are located. The drawing or stretching begins when the roving 
is passed through sets of rollers going at different speeds, just 
as they do in the card. More stretch is added by having the 
carriage move away from the bank of rollers. While the carriage 
is thus moving away from the rollers, the spindles on the carriage 
are rapidly revolving, thus imparting twist to the yarn. When 
the carriage has reached the end of its track, the spinning 
stops and the finished yarn is wound onto a bobbin as the 
carriage returns to its original position. 
The mule was an almost instant success, even in its original 
hand-operated version. Its desirability became even greater after 
the invention of the self-acting mule by Richard Roberts in 
1825. This new machine made the various actions of the mule 
automatic, thereby greatly increasing the number of mule 
spindles per operator. In addition, it reduced the level of skill 
necessary to operate the mule. In this new version, the mule 
instead, the machinery percentage given above would have been somewhat larger, 
but the employment percentage would have been somewhat smaller. 
4
 For a technical description of mule and ring spinning, see J. Jewkes and E. 
M. Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, chap. 1; or 
J. E. Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs. 
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Figure 1. The Principles of Mule and Ring Spinning 
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SOURCE: Tippett, A Portrait of the Lancashire Textile Industry,  p. 
61. Permission to reprint granted by Oxford University 
Press. 
came to dominate world factory cotton spinning around the 
middle of the nineteenth century.5 
The dominance of the (self-acting) mule was, however, soon 
challenged by the development of ring spinning. The ring is 
essentially an improved verion of the throsle which, in turn, 
is an improvement of Arkwright's water frame. After leaving 
the rollers, which have stretched it, the yarn goes to the spindle 
located directly below the rollers. Each spindle has a ring around 
its base and on each ring there is a not-quite-closed wire loop 
called a traveler. The ring itself is nothing more or less than 
a track for the traveler. The yarn passes through this traveler 
and is then attached to a bobbin which, in turn, is attached 
to the spindle. As the spindle, and the attached bobbin, turn 
(the ring remaining in place) the impetus of the yarn makes 
the traveler race around on the ring (its track). The rotation 
of the spindle imparts a twist to the yarn. The tension of the 
twisted yarn, however, puts drag on the traveler causing it 
5
 Even in the United States the mule was more important than the ring before 
the Civil War (see Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States 
p. 68). 
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to move slightly slower than the spindle and bobbin. This 
difference in speed determines the rate at which the yarn is 
wound onto the bobbin. Thus, if the traveler is completing 
1% fewer rotations than is the spindle in a given period of 
time, then every turn of yarn collected on the bobbin will contain 
99 twists. 
Three major differences between ring and mule spinning 
immediately come to mind: 
1. Mule spinning (even on the self-acting mule) requires 
more skill and strength than ring spinning.6 
2.	 Mule spinning results in a softer yarn than does ring 
spinning. 
3.	 Mule spinning is intermittent, whereas ring spinning 
is continuous. 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE RINGS 
Not only was ring spinning invented and perfected in the 
United States,7 it was also in the United States that this technique 
first rose to economic prominence. As early as 1870, ring 
spinning had become the most important form of spinning 
in the United States. In that year, there were a total of 3.7 
million ring spindles and 3.4 million mule spindles installed 
in the United States.8 Since, for a given fineness (count)9 of 
yarn, output per ring spindle exceeds output per mule spindle, 
a comparison of the numbers of the two types of spindles 
installed tends to understate the importance of ring spinning. 
By 1905, of the 23.1 million installed spindles in the United 
States, 17.9 million were rings.10 This trend, of course, contin­
6
 The particular trick is to mend broken threads while the carriage is in the 
process of backing away from the rollers (see Tippett, A Portrait of the Lancashire 
Textile Industry, p. 62). 
7
 It was invented in 1831 by a certain Mr. Jenks (see Copeland, The Cotton 
Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 9, 66). 
8Ibid., p. 70. 
9
 The "count" of a yarn is defined as the number of hanks, at 840 yards each, 
per pound. 
10
 Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 70. 
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ued; and by the outbreak of World War II, mule spinning 
was virtually extinct in the United States. 
Ring spinning was also introduced into other parts of the 
world, but at a slower pace than in the United States. If modern 
cotton industries outside the United States are divided into 
three general groups—non-European (principally those in 
Japan, China, and India), continental European, and British— 
then the percentage of ring spindles installed at any given 
point in time decreased in the order listed above. That is, 
Great Britain, with the largest cotton industry in the world, 
was last among all important cotton industries in the introduc­
tion of ring spindles.n As late as 1913, there were 45.2 million 
mule spindles but only 10.4 million ring spindles in Great 
Britain.12 
Although some contemporary observers, notably M. T. 
Copeland,13 pointed out that Great Britain had certain special 
advantages in mule as opposed to ring spinning, the British 
lag in ring spinning has usually been taken as a sign of 
technological conservatism, not to say backwardness. The list 
of recent economic historians that are more or less critical 
of Britain's lag in ring spinning includes Rockwood Chin, 
Charles P. Kindleberger, Roland Gibson, A. L. Levine, A. E. 
Musson, and R. S. Sayers.14 
This view has been reinforced by subsequent developments, 
in that ring spinning has proved indeed to be the wave of 
nRobson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 355; for other references, see chap. 
4. 
12
 Ibid. 
13Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 71-73. 
14
 R. Chin, Management, Industry, and Trade in Cotton Textiles, p. 85; C. P. 
Kindleberger, "Foreign Trade and Economic Growth: Lessons from France and 
Britain, 1850-1913," p. 297, and Economic Growth in France and Great Britain, 
1850-1950, p. 273; R. Gibson, Cotton Textile Wages in the United States and Great 
Britain, p. 76; A. L. Levine, Industrial Retardation in Britain, 1880-1914, p. 34; 
A. E. Musson, "The Great Depression in Britain, 1873-1896: A Reappraisal," 
p. 207; R. S. Sayers, A History of Economic Change in England, 1880-1939, p. 
101. 
An interesting recent opponent of this position is R. E. Tyson. Tyson, however, 
does nothing beyond summarizing the unfortunately rather general and qualitative 
argument made by Copeland in 1912 (see R. E. Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," 
in D. H. Aldcroft, ed., The Development of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 
1875-1914, p. 122). Nevertheless, Tyson's argument (or rather, Copeland's) has 
been accepted by his editor, D. H. Aldcroft (ibid., p. 34). 
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the future and in that the British cotton textile industry has 
experienced a sharp decline ever since the end of World War 
I. Neither of these later trends, however, in any way proves 
that the British made a mistake, or were irrational, in not 
introducing more ring spindles before World War I. Under 
the conditions then prevailing with regard to factor costs, as 
well as the technical capabilities of the ring spindles then being 
built, the British may well have been acting rationally. 
The question whether the difference in the ratio of rings 
to mules in Great Britain and the United States in some given 
year was justified by differing factor costs and market conditions 
is, however, extremely difficult to answer. Phrased in this form, 
the question presents several formidable obstacles to quantitative 
analysis. First of all, as will be discussed below, the relative 
efficiency of ring and mule spindles varied for different counts 
of yarn. Thus, a detailed knowledge of the counts of yarn 
spun in the United States and in Great Britain would be needed. 
Although it is generally presumed that Great Britain devoted 
a larger percentage of her spindles to high-quality yarn than 
did the United States,15 no sufficiently detailed information 
is available for the pre-World War I period. Furthermore, 
installing rings when a new plant was built, or when old mules 
were physically worn out, was quite a different thing from 
throwing out technically well-functioning mules and replacing 
them with rings. Thus, the optimal mix of rings and mules 
depended not only on the distribution of counts spun but also 
on the past rate of expansion of the industry. The faster the 
recent rates of expansion had been, the more rings one would 
expect. The rate of expansion in earlier (pre-ring) years would 
also play a role, but not an easily quantifiable one, because 
it would influence the rate of physical obsolescence of previously 
installed mules. Finally, the situation is further complicated 
by differences in factor costs in the two countries. These 
differences mean that the profitability of replacing mules by 
rings on a given count differed in the two countries. Not only 
does this mean that the same count might sometimes rationally 
have been spun by different methods in the two countries, 
15
 See, for example, Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United 
States, p. 71. 
AMERICAN RINGS AND ENGLISH MULES (23 
but also that mules would be judged ready for the scrap heap 
at different ages in the two countries. There is, thus, no doubt 
that in the pre-World War I period it paid to keep old mules 
longer in Great Britain than in the United States. Any calculation 
of this effect on the optimal combination of rings and mules 
in the two counries would require a detailed knowledge of 
the distribution of mule spindles by age in the two countries, 
as well as a huge amount of information about the effect of 
age and obsolescence on the costs of mule spinning. In addition, 
of course, the unavailable information on the distribution of 
counts spun would be needed. Clearly these obstacles require 
that the original question be rephrased in a more convenient 
form. 
Because it is clear that rings were considered more suitable 
for low- as opposed to high-count yarn, I have decided to 
concentrate my attention on the counts at which new investment 
generally shifted from mules to rings in each of the two 
countries. That is, the central question of this chapter will be: 
Can rational economic forces explain why American firms 
generally installed rings to spin all yarns up to count X while 
British firms shifted to the installation of mules at count Y, 
lower than X? 
The years for which this question will be investigated is the 
period immediately preceeding World War I. This period has 
the advantage that a good deal of information is available for 
it. Unfortunately, some of the information on the technical 
characteristics of mules and rings needed for this analysis is 
only available for a later period. This later period is not a 
good one for the study as a whole, however, principally because 
of the chaotic state of the British cotton textile industry that 
has prevailed ever since the end of World War I. The extremely 
depressed conditions that have existed since then are clearly 
not conducive to a study of investment behavior and tech­
nological change. 
It must be admitted, however, that the problem as I have 
rephrased it leaves something to be desired. It concentrates 
attention on "up-to-date" firms that are in fact installing new 
spindles, but says little about the possibility that there were 
more firms in Great Britain than in the United States that 
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held on to uneconomical mule spindles past the time when 
they should have been replaced. (This problem, however, will 
at least implicitly be considered in chapter 3.) Another, although 
somewhat less important, problem is that there may have been 
more mules installed for counts below the "cutoff" point that 
is established for mule installations in Great Britain than was 
the case in the Unitd States. 
ACTUAL OBSERVED INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR 
The first problem of this analysis is to determine if there 
really were fairly sharp cutoff points between rings and mules 
when new spindles were being installed in the United States 
and Great Britain, respectively, and if so, at what counts these 
cutoff points occurred. In his excellent study of the American 
cotton textile industry published in 1912, Melvin Copeland 
reports, "Not much yarn finer than 40's, and very little higher 
than 60's is produced upon the ring-frame in Europe, whereas 
practically all warp yarn, even up to 120's, is spun upon that 
machine in America."16 
This statement is well supported by other evidence available 
from the same period. The works by Uttley and Young are 
full of examples of high-quality yarn spun on rings in the 
United States.17 Not only is this true with regard to warp, but 
it also seems to be the case for weft,18 although the references 
to high-quality weft being spun on mules are somewhat more 
common than the same situation with regard to warp yarn. 
On the other hand, there are no references to any yarn below 
40 being spun on mules.19 
As for new installations, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
reports that, between 1900 and 1914, only 981,023 new mule 
16Ibid., p. 301. 
17T. W. Uttley, Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the United States of America, 
pp. 9, 11, 16, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34, 49, 54, 56, 60; and T. M. Young, The 
American Cotton Industry, pp. 10, 16, 18, 19, 24, 35, 61, 68, 73, 86, 88, 97, 110. 
18Warp, also known as twist, is the yarn that is stretched in the loom. Weft, 
also known as filling, is the yarn inserted into the warp by means of the shuttle. 
Warp has to be stronger than weft. 
19
 See previous references in Uttley, Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the 
United States of America; and Young, The American Cotton Industry. 
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spindles were installed in the United States as opposed to 
11,888,587 new ring spindles.20 Further confirmation of the 
low number of new mule spindles being installed can be obtained 
from the U.S. Census of Manufactures for 1914, where it is 
stated that "the installation of these [mule] spindles has practi­
cally ceased."21 It is also clear that the small number of mules 
still being put in were intended to make very-high-quality yarns. 
In fact, the 1905 Census of Manufactures concluded that the 
only reason any mules at all were being installed was that "there 
are some [high] qualities of yarn which cannot be made 
successfully by ring spinning."22 
There is equally good evidence that there was little or no 
yarn of a count above the lower 40s spun with rings in Europe 
in general or in Great Britain in particular. Thus, the various 
available descriptions of ring spinning costs generally go up 
to, but not above, the middle 40s.23 Perhaps the most important 
evidence that rings were indeed being installed in Great Britain 
for yarns up to the lower 40s but very seldom above that range 
comes from the Universal Wage List for Ring Spinning, which 
was adopted in 1912 and which covered virtually all British 
ring spinning.24 Because the number of spindles tended by 
a spinner increased as the count of the yarn spun increased, 
the list was designed to give a lower piece rate per spindle 
as the count spun increased. This accommodation is made for 
counts up to and including 43, but then stops abruptly. This 
is true despite the fact that the tendency toward more and 
more spindles per spinner continued on past the 40s and that 
the adjustment would have created no great computational 
problems.25 The only reasonable conclusion is that the list ends 
because there were virtually no spinners working on higher 
counts. 
20
 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, The Cotton Spinning Machinery Industry, Miscellaneous Series, No. 37. 
p.	 77. 
21
 United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1914, 2:38. 
22
 U n i t e d States B u r e a u of t h e C e n s u s , Census of Manufactures, 1905, 3 :42 . 
23
 See, for e x a m p l e , W. A. G. Cla rk , Cotton Fabrics in Middle Europe, B u r e a u 
of	 Manufactures, Special Agents Series, No. 24, p. 130. 
24Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, 
pp. 117, 128. 
25
 Ibid., p. 121. 
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The evidence thus presented makes it clear that at least some 
rings were being installed for counts up to the lower 40s, but 
virtually none for counts above that. This is of little value, 
however, unless it can at least be shown that installations below 
40 were not unusual occurrences. Ideally, it would be desirable 
to be able to answer exactly the questions raised above about 
the extent to which firms did not install rings for counts below 
the cutoff point (that is, below the vicinity of 40 to 43) and 
to what extent firms held on to economically obsolete mule-
spinning equipment. Although it is not possible to answer these 
two questions definitely, I do believe there are enough data 
to show that in this period it was the general practice in Great 
Britain to install rings for the spinning of counts up to around 
40 when new capacity was, in fact, being created. 
Between 1907 and 1913, the number of installed mule spindles 
in Great Britain increased from 43.7 million to 45.2 million, 
and the number of ring spindles increased from approximately 
8.3 million to 10.4 million.26 The implications of this information 
depend largely on the distribution of counts being spun. 
Unfortunately, even a rough indication of yarn qualities spun 
cannot be made for any period before 1924. Information, 
however, is available for that and subsequent years. Of the 
total of 1,395 million pounds of yarn spun in 1924, 1,022 
million pounds were of a count below 41, 314 million pounds 
between 41 and 80, 56 million pounds were between 81 and 
120, and 3.6 million were above 120.27 Combining this data 
with what appear to be reasonable assumptions about the 
distribution of yarn within the above categories28 and taking 
account of the lower output per spindle achieved at higher 
26
 T h e 1907 figure is based on extrapolat ion of exact figures on type of spindles 
received on about 80 percent of all spindles in the 1907 census of product ion. 
In all probability, this p rocedure gives a slight upward bias to the n u m b e r of 
r ings installed in 1907, thus biasing downward the n u m b e r of new rings installed 
between 1907 a n d 1913. See British Census Office, Census of Production, 1907, 
1:293. T h e source of the 1913 figures is Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, 
p. 355. 
27
 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p . 343. 
28
 It is assumed that the category u p to 40s can be replaced with the single 
count of 20, and the succeeding categories can be replaced with the single counts 
53 , 93 , and 140, respectively. 
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counts, the division of "mule equivalent"29 spindles used to 
spin yarn above and below a count of 40 would be 65% and 
35%, respectively. 
If this spindle division is applied to the 1907-13 period, 
together with the assumptions that capacity grew at the same 
rate for all counts and that all new spindles designed for a 
count of 40 or below were rings, the result is that enough 
new rings were installed to replace about 15% of the mules 
that were being used for sub-40 yarn in 1907. Given the 
well-known physical endurance of the mule frames and the 
general prosperity of the British cotton textile industry during 
this period, such a rate of replacement seems very reasonable. 
This calculation, however, has some serious limitations. First 
of all, the assumption made about the distribution of yarns 
within the count categories might be somewhat off the 
mark. An even more serious problem arises from the data 
themselves. The year 1924 was not in the period 1907-13, 
and it takes some pretty strong assumptions to switch data 
from one to the other. It is quite possible that the average 
count of yarn produced in 1907-13 was lower than the average 
count produced in 1924. I have no direct evidence on this. 
It might be noted, however, that in the years following 1924 
there was almost certainly a reduction in the average count 
30 spun.
This problem of a change in the average count spun raises 
yet another question. My calculation assumed that capacity was 
increasing at an equal rate for all counts. This, of course, need 
not have been the case. The average count spun may either 
have been increasing or decreasing, just as well as remaining 
constant. Any such change in the average count spun would 
naturally throw my calculations off the mark. Here again, little 
direct evidence is available. My own studies, however, have 
allowed me to compute a quality index for British cotton goods 
29
 In accordance with the accepted practice of this period, a ring spindle is 
assumed to be the production equivalent of 1 1/3 mule spindles. As will be 
shown below, this is not strictly correct because the ratio of the two varies with 
the count spun. For purposes of this rough calculation, however, this assumption 
seems good enough. 
30Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 343. 
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(yarn and cloth) exports for this period. This index indicates 
that there was little or no change in the average quality of 
British cotton goods exported during the 1907-13 period.31 
During the years in question, exports amounted to over three-
fourths of total British cotton goods production.32 
One final problem with this calculation should also at least 
be mentioned. The question is, if rings were more profitable 
than mules at low counts, why were not the mules employed 
on low counts converted to higher counts, thus eliminating 
the need for new investment in mules to increase high-quality 
capacity, and replaced with new rings? The principal answer 
to this question is that a mule designed for low counts is not 
the same machine as a mule designed for high counts. In 
particular, low-count mules have longer "draws," 33 making them 
inappropriate for high-count work. 
This is not to say that there was no shifting of mules to 
higher counts when rings were introduced. Mules designed 
for counts at or just below 40 may well have been shifted 
up a bit. There is no reason, however, to expect this to have 
been happening in the 1907-13 period. The conditions that 
made it profitable to install rings up to at least a count of 
40 had existed for some years before this period, and there 
was no reason to postpone such a shift until after 1907. 
These limitations on the above calculations mean that it cannot 
be claimed that in the 1907-13 period virtually every new spindle 
installed to make yarn up to a count of 40 in Great Britain 
was a ring and that the mules being used for low counts were 
being depreciated at a relatively brisk rate. What can be 
maintained, however, is that a very large percentage of the 
spindles installed for counts up to 40 were rings and that virtually 
no rings were installed at counts above the low 40s. 
31L. G. Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," 
pp. 1-27. 
32
 See the annual trade returns in the Trade and Navigation Accounts of the 
British Parliamentary Papers, and Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, Table 
1. 
33Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, 
p. 5. 
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THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF RINGS OR MULES 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 
The purpose of this section is to examine the differences 
that existed in the benefits to be derived from replacing mules 
with rings in the United States and the benefits to be derived 
from doing so in Great Britain. The discussion will be divided 
into two parts, the first dealing with factor costs and the second 
with such problems as the role of labor unions and the 
technological interrelationships between ring spinning and 
automatic weaving. 
Factor Costs 
Labor Costs. The principal advantage of ring as opposed to 
mule spinning was that the former used unskilled or semiskilled 
female labor whereas the latter used highly skilled males. In 
addition, there were differences in the amounts of spinning, 
preparatory, and auxiliary labor34 used in the two methods. 
Good estimates of the spinning labor costs of the two methods 
of producing yarn in this period are available for both the 
United States and Great Britain in Copeland's book. Copeland 
presents a range of spindles per operator and a range of wages 
per operator.35 I have focused attention on the high estimates 
for both the number of spindles tended and the weekly wage. 
In fact, it would not matter very much if I had used the lower 
estimates for both, or if I had chosen a middle position. I 
chose to use the upper limits because these figures are most 
likely to apply to the new equipment in which I am principally 
interested.36 
34
 Preparatory and auxiliary labor principally carded and roved the cotton before 
it was spun and collected (doffed) and handled the yarn after spinning. 
35Copeland, The Cotton Textile Industry of the United States, pp. 298-300. 
36
 In the calculations below, I shall be implicitly assuming that the wage rates 
per hundred spindles per week that I calculated from Copeland's data are applicable 
to work of a count around 40. Fortunately, in mule spinning the number of 
spindles tended per worker and the pay per spindle tended is virtually independent 
of the count spun. This assumption is, therefore, automatically satisfied for mule 
spinning. The number of rings tended and the wage per ring spindle, however, 
clearly tend to decrease with increasing counts. Thus, some error may enter if 
30) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
Taking account of the difference in ring spindle speed in 
the United States and Great Britain and allowing for the 
difference in productivity between ring and mule spindles at 
a count of around 40, the spinning labor cost for ring spinning 
turns out to have been about 50 cents per week, per hundred 
"mule equivalent"37 spindles in both countries. For mule spin­
ning, the cost was around $1.65 per hundred actual mule 
spindles per week in Great Britain and $2.15 in the United 
States. This in turn implies that, at a count of 40, ring-spinning 
labor cost per pound of yarn was about 1.6 cents lower in 
Great Britain and about 2.4 cents lower in the United States 
than the cost of mule-spinning labor. 
Although rings generally required less actual spinning labor 
than did mules, rings did require a little bit more roving and 
doffing labor.38 This difference, however, is a very small fraction 
of the difference in spinning labor, especially if measured in 
terms of wage payments, amounting to perhaps a mill (one-tenth 
of a cent) per pound of 40 yarn. Furthermore, it is by no 
means clear that there was any important difference in the 
cost of providing these services in the United States and in 
Great Britain. These costs can thus safely be ignored in analyzing 
the relative advantages of ring and mule spinning in the United 
States and Great Britain. 
Capital. Mule and ring spinning appear to have been of 
almost exactly the same capital intensity per unit of output 
my figures really apply to some count other than 40. In the case of Great Britain, 
the error can hardly be very large because I used the top of the scale in number 
of spindles tended and there was virtually no ring spinning done above 40. In 
the United States, however, ring spindles were used at higher counts, and I again 
took the top of the scale. In fact, however, not very much really high-quality 
yarn was spun in the United States by any method, and the testimony of 
contemporary observers indicates that the high number of spindles per operator 
that I used for the United States was reached at counts not far exceeding 40 
(see Young, The American Cotton Industry; and Uttley, Cotton Spinning and Manufac­
turing in the United States). It is unthinkable that this error could have underestimated 
ring spinning costs in the United States by more than 10 or 15%, and it would 
take an error of the order of 100% to affect my conclusions. 
371 have converted ring spindles into mule equivalents so that the cost comparisons 
can be based on equal quantities of output. 
38Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 69; and 
Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 213. Winterbottom 
was lecturer in cotton spinning at the Municipal School of Technology in Manchester 
during the period covered in this study. 
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in the production of yarns of a count around 40.39 Below 
this count, mules tended to be more capital intensive; and 
above it, rings were more capital intensive. This rough equality 
around 40 was the result of higher machinery costs for ring 
spinning, including some extra roving equipment, offset by 
the space-saving achieved in ring spinning.40 In view of this, 
it is difficult to believe that any difference in interest rates 
could have had much to do with America's greater propensity 
to install rings. Certainly, if rings stopped being profitable in 
Great Britain at a count of 40, no reasonable change in the 
interest rate could have made them profitable. 
It does seem apparent, however, that mule-spinning ma­
chinery was more expensive relative to ring-spinning machinery 
in the United States than in Great Britain. Evidence for this 
comes primarily from the fact that between 1900 and 1914, 
77.6% of all new mule spindles installed in the United States 
were imported from Great Britain, but only small quantities 
of other types of cotton textile machinery were imported.41 
This, of course, was not due to any inherent inefficiency in 
mule manufacturing in the United States, but rather to the 
fact that so few mules were being installed that it was not 
profitable for American producers to make mule-spinning 
frames.42 It is difficult to tell how much of a difference there 
was in the relative prices of the two types of machinery, but 
this must have given some further impetus to ring spinning 
in the United States. On the other hand, it should be remem­
bered that ring spinning tended to save capital in the form 
of buildings and required extra capital for machinery. In view 
of the fact that construction was relatively cheaper than machin­
ery in the United States as compared with Great Britain,43 
this would tend to favor the use of the "construction intensive" 
mule process in the United States. 
Fuel and lubricants. Here again, the costs appear to be virtually 
3 9 Win t e rbo t t om, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p p . 213 , 272, 273 . 
4 0
 Ibid. 
The Cotton Spinning Machinery Industry, Tab l e 44 , p . 77. 
42
 Because America was a high-cost, protected producer of textile machinery, 
there was no hope of capturing an export market for mule frames. 
43
 Y o u n g , The American Cotton Industry, p . 9. 
41
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the same for the two methods. Sources can be found that 
disagree about which method saved fuel.44 In any case, the 
difference was very small when expressed in terms of cents 
per pound of yarn. This means, of course, that any effect 
of different fuel prices in the two countries on the choice of 
spinning technique must have been infinitesimal. 
Transportation. Transportation is treated as an input because 
the yarn had to be moved before it could be woven into cloth. 
The difference in transportation costs between rings and mules 
arises because mule yarn was spun either on a bare spindle 
or on a paper tube, whereas ring yarn had to be wound on 
a heavy wooden bobbin. Fortunately, the warp yarn could be 
rewound. The weft, however, had to be shipped on the bobbin.45 
Copeland quotes with approval an estimate that the paper tubes 
added only 10% to the freight costs, whereas the wooden bobbins 
added 200%. Furthermore, the bobbin had to be returned.46 
The reason this difference in transportation costs affected 
Great Britain and the United States differently is that the 
American industry was vertically integrated whereas the British 
industry was not. Thus, much more yarn transportation was 
required in Great Britain than in the United States. In addition, 
Britain had a large export trade in yarn. 
Fortunately, a good estimate can be made of the level of 
these extra transportation costs. Reliable information is available 
on the cost of shipping yarn in Lancashire in 1907 over the 
average distance yarn was in fact shipped.47 If the 200% 
cost increase figure is used together with an allowance for 
the extra cost of returning the wooden bobbins, it appears 
that shipping ring weft within Lancashire cost about three mills 
more per pound of yarn than shipping mule weft. This cost 
differential, of course, did not apply to yarn produced in 
integrated plants. 
44Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, pp. 272, 273; and 
W. A. G. Clark, Cotton Textile Trade in the Turkish Empire, Greece, and Italy, Bureau 
of Manufactures, Special Agents Report No. 18, pp. 89, 90. 
45
 Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 69, 72. 
46Ibid., p. 69. 
47
 W. Whittam, Report on England's Cotton Industry, Bureau of Manufactures, 
Special Agents Report No. 15, p. 32. 
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It is impossible to give a single cost estimate for exports, 
since it depended on the destination of the yarn. This extra 
cost of exporting ring rather than mule weft, however, could 
clearly be very high or even prohibitive. Nevertheless, the effect 
of this cost differential is severely limited by the fact that in 
this period only 10 to 15% of total British yarn production 
was being exported.48 This means that no more than 5 to 
8% of all the yarn produced was weft for export. Since there 
were many more mules working at all counts than were needed 
to produce this percentage, there was probably little effect on 
investment behavior. Presumably, the export transportation 
disadvantage of ring weft resulted mainly in the concentration 
of the production of sub-40 weft for export on mules installed 
in the pre-ring period. 
Other Factors Affecting the Choice of Spinning Method 
Labor Unions. The literature on the history of the American 
cotton textile industry is full of statements to the effect that 
the disruptive and belligerent attitude of the American mule 
spinners' unions was a major factor in encouraging the shift 
to ring spinning. Thus, it is reported that it was after the 
strike of January 1898 (led by the mule spinners) that the 
treasurer of the highly efficient and well-managed Pepperell 
Manufacturing Company, of Biddeford, Maine, "made plans 
to get rid of all the mule frames eventually and to put in 
ring frames."49 Earlier, the cotton manufacturers of Fall River, 
Massachusetts, had been "particularly anxious to introduce ring 
spindles" as a result of the strikes of 1870 and 1875.50 A more 
general comment to the same effect appears in the 1905 Census 
of Manufactures: 
But there are reasons, not unconnected with the labor prob­
lem, which render manufacturers desirous of using frames [i.e., 
48See Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 333. 
49E. H. Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress, p. 171. 
50
 R. Smith, The Cotton Textile Industry of Fall River, Massachusetts, p. 100. See 
also R. K. Lamb, "The Development of Entreneurship in Fall River, 1813-1859," 
p. XII-8. 
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rings] rather than mules whenever it is [technically] practical
to do so.51 
These observations must, however, be viewed with at least 
some reservations. In all cases there were other good reasons 
for introducing rings. Furthermore, the manufacturers had 
every interest in making the workers fear that aggressive union 
action would result in technological unemployment. Neverthe­
less, there can be no doubt that American manufactures had 
a strong aversion to unions and that the mule spinners were 
probably the most efficient and powerful cotton textile union, 
at least until the absolute number of installed mule spindles 
started to decline around 1900. It is also clear that the mule 
spinners union tended to encourage at least temporary organi­
zation among the other workers and that it was largely responsi­
ble for many strikes.52 Thus, the desire to break the power 
of the union by replacing the obstreperous mule spinners with 
docile girl spinners probably did have at least some effect in 
encouraging the adoption of ring spinning in the United States. 
In the case of Great Britain, there was also a sharp contrast 
between the powerful and well-organized mule spinners and 
the weakly organized ring spinners.53 The British employers, 
however, appear to have been better adjusted to the fact of 
having to face unions than were American employers. The 
British mule spinners' union was far from the only strong British 
cotton union.54 Even more important, the British mule spinners 
were mainly dedicated simply to raising their own wages. To 
the extent that they succeeded in this endeavor, they may, 
of course, have helped the cause of ring spinning; but any 
such effect has already been considered in the section on relative 
wages. 
Relation of ring yarn to automatic looms. The period under 
discussion in this paper was also a period during which large 
51
 Census of Manufactures, 1905, 3 :42 . 
52
 K n o w l t o n , Pepperell's Progress, p p . 1 7 0 - 7 1 ; a n d Smi th , The Cotton Textile Industry 
of Fall River, Massachusetts, p . 100. 
53
 See H . A. T u r n e r , Trade Union Growth, Structure, and Policy, p . 143 . 
5 4 E . g . , C o p e l a n d , The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p p . 3 0 6 - 8 , 
291-92. 
AMERICAN RINGS AND ENGLISH MULES (35 
numbers of automatic looms were installed in the United States. 
Automatic looms, however—or at least these automatic looms— 
required the greater strength of ring as opposed to mule yarn.55 
This complementarity between ring spinning and automatic 
weaving meant that the existence of ring spinning made the 
introduction of automatic looms more appealing and, similarly, 
plans to install automatic looms depended on the availability 
of ring spinning.56 There may have been, therefore, some 
American manufacturers for whom a desire to introduce auto­
matic looms made ring spinning relatively more advantageous 
as compared with mule spinning than would otherwise have 
been the case. For the most part, however, ring spinning clearly 
preceded automatic weaving.57 With regard to Great Britain, 
this interdependence between ring spinning and automatic 
looms can be ignored for purposes of this paper because 
automatic looms did not begin to appear there in significant 
numbers until the 1930s.58 
The Role of Cotton Prices 
This discussion of factor costs and other considerations has 
shown that in virtually every category the advantage of replacing 
mules by rings was greater in the United States than in Great 
Britain. This situation combined with the generally accepted 
fact, to be discussed in greater detail below, that the relative 
advantage of ring as opposed to mule spinning declined as 
the count spun increased, generally accords well with the 
observed fact that Great Britain stopped installing rings at a 
count of about 40, but the United States continued installing 
rings at much higher counts. It says very little, however, about 
whether the British cutoff line logically should have been drawn 
exactly where it was drawn. Some information on this problem 
can be obtained from the structure of cotton prices. 
5 5 1 . Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles, 1894-1914: A Study 
of Diffusion of an Innovation," p. 331. 
56Ibid., p. 333. 
57
 See C o p e l a n d , The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p p . 7 0 , 
87 ;	 a n d Robson , The Cotton Industry in Britain, p . 3 5 5 . 
58
 In 1937, only 3% of all British cotton looms were automatic (Robson, The 
Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 210). 
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Cotton prices played an important role in the choice of 
spinning technique because of the technological fact that, for 
a given count of yarn, ring spinning required a longer cotton 
staple than did mule spinning. Figure 2 is designed to show 
what lengths of fiber were "suitable" for different counts.59 
Clearly, this chart is not exact for all conditions, nor is the 
lower limit for fiber length as exactly defined in fact as it 
is in the diagram.60 Thus, for example, humidity can affect 
the staple length needed. More important, to some limited 
extent lack of staple length can be compensated for by lowering 
the spindle speed, increasing the skill and/or the quantity of 
the labor used, and by accepting a lower-quality product.61 
All of these alternatives involve increased costs, however, and 
can only increase the maximum count for a given staple length 
by a limited amount. Thus, Figure 2 certainly represents a 
useful approximation of staple length requirements. 
Unfortunately, the compiler of the information used to 
produce Figure 2 considered only ring twist, mule twist, and 
mule weft; he neglected to include ring weft. This could be 
interpreted to mean that ring weft required the same staple 
length as ring twist. This was almost certainly not true, however. 
Most observers were of the opinion that, for a given count, 
a shorter staple could be used to produce weft than was needed 
for twist, both on mules and rings.62 Indeed, the evidence 
seems to indicate that the difference in length was pretty much 
the same regardless of the spinning method used.63 If this 
is correct, it means that the mule twist requirements would 
be the same as the ring weft requirements. I will, therefore, 
treat the difference between the staple length needed for mule 
59
 W i n t e r b o t t o m , Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p . 236 . 
60
 In fact, Figure 2 is based on the following simplified equations: 
Length of staple in inches, for ring twist = 0.35"\^count. 
Length of staple in inches, for mule twist = 0.325\^count. 
Length of staple in inches, for mule weft = 0.30^count. 
See Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 236. 
61
 The principal reason for needing longer staple on rings than on mules was 
that the former put more strain on the yarn, thus increasing breakages (see 
Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 68). 
6 2P. H. Nystrom, Textiles, pp. 71-72. 
63
 Ibid. 
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Figure 2. Cotton Staple Lengths "Suitable" for the

Spinning of Various Yarns
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Source: Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations 
and Yarn Costs, p. 235. 
twist and mule weft as representing the difference between 
ring weft and mule weft. 
This difference in the required staple length enters as a 
factor in the choice of spinning technique because the price 
of cotton generally increased as its staple length did. This is 
shown in Figure 3, which contains cotton prices in New Orleans 
on 1 April 1913. This year and date were deliberately chosen 
as representing a season and period when the market was 
"normal."64 In particular, the compiler of these data reports 
that the big jump in price occurring between staple lengths 
64Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 234. It would 
have been better, of course, had this data referred to Liverpool prices. Because 
cotton brokerage was a competitive business (see for example, G. C. Allen, British 
Industries and Their Organization, pp. 204-5), however, the price difference between 
New Orleans would only reflect transport and Liverpool handling costs. The only 
reasonable differences in these costs would be higher insurance and inventory 
costs (interest) on the more expensive types. This would tend to slightly increase 
the absolute price differentials as the cotton was moved from New Orleans to 
Liverpool. 
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Figure 3. Prices of Various Cottons by Quality

and Staple Length, New Orleans,

1 April 1973
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of 1 1/6 inches and 1 1 /  8 inches was "common at all times."65 
The exact size of the price-jumps between different staple 
lengths must have varied somewhat, depending on harvest 
conditions as well as peculiarities of final demand for cotton 
products; but Figure 3 can certainly be taken as representative 
of the period just preceding World War I. 
Figure 3 does not include the very longest staple cottons. 
5
 Ibid. 
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It should thus be added that at the very top of the scale the 
jump was from cotton of about 13/4 inches to about 2 inches, 
with virtually nothing in between, and an increase in price 
amounting to around 5 or 6 cents per pound at July 1914 
prices.66 
Combining Figures 2 and 3, it is possible to compute the 
differential cotton cost in spinning with rings as opposed to 
mules. A literal application of the technical information in Figure 
2 results in Figure 4 for ring twist versus mule twist and Figure 
5 for ring weft versus mule weft. 
It must be noted that the results obtained above are based 
on the price differentials existing for cotton of a quality, 
independent of staple length, listed as "medium" or better. 
For cotton of a lower quality, the differentials shown in Figures 
4 and 5 would have been somewhat smaller. In all probability, 
however, only limited amounts of poor-quality cotton were used 
for yarns finer than 40. There seems to be little point to using 
such poor material for such fine yarn and cloth. Indeed, this 
lack of demand probably is the reason why the staple price 
differential on poor cottons was so small. Nevertheless, it may 
well be that this small differential on poor cottons has something 
to do with those few rings that were used to spin yarns above 
40 in Great Britain and in Continental Europe. 
It is clear that Figure 2, and therefore Figures 4 and 5, are 
primarily based on technological rather than economic consid­
erations. Since cotton prices were not quoted continuously by 
length, but by steps of 1/16 inch, rational producers would 
be prepared to accept somewhat higher costs in order to avoid 
the next step on the staple progression. Rather than immediately 
going to the longer staple when the count they were spinning 
required it if they were to continue with the exact production 
methods used at a slightly lower count, they would try to keep 
on using the lower staple by altering their production methods 
somewhat. They would presumably keep doing this for higher 
and higher counts until the extra cost of these production 
changes equaled the cost of using the more expensive longer-
staple cotton with the more efficient, regular production meth­
66J. A. Todd, The World's Cotton Crops, p. 17. 
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Figure 4. Extra Cost of the Longer Staple Needed 
for the Ring Spinning of Warp (Twist) 
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od. That is, they would substitute other inputs for fiber length 
until it became more economical to raise the fiber length. 
Another possibility might be to mix cottons of different staple 
lengths. 
This possibility of using a shorter staple than was tech­
nologically ideal means that the cost differential that occurs 
at a count of 28 in Figure 4 might indeed have started to 
appear at that count, but it would have been the extra cost 
of not using 1 1/16-inch cotton on rings. Only once the cost 
of not using 1 1/16-inch cotton equaled the difference in cost 
between 1- and 1 1/16-inch cotton would the producer switch. 
This means that the cost differential would only reach the 
one cent per pound figure, which occurs immediately at a 
count of 28 in Figure 4, at some higher count. The next step 
in staple length, from 1 1/16 inch to 1 1/8 inch, would 
be delayed even longer, both when using rings and when using 
mules, because it involved an even larger increase in cotton 
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Figure 5. Extra Cost of the Longer Staple Needed 
for the Ring Spinning of Weft 
3 
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price. The possible mixing of different cottons would give similar 
results. 
It is thus clear that diagrams of the extra cost imposed on 
ring spinning because of the need for a longer staple would 
in fact differ somewhat from Figures 4 and 5. The following 
differences would certainly be involved: 
1. The cost differences would still start at approximately 
the same counts, but they would rise gradually, not 
perpendicularly. 
2.	 The peaks on the diagrams would be pushed out to 
somewhat higher counts. This would be particularly true 
of the two-cent and three-cent peaks. This, of course, 
is because these peaks depend on a change-over from 
1 1 /16- to 1 1/8-inch cotton, the step producers ration­
ally must have wanted to delay the most. 
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3.	 Generally speaking, the peaks will be lowered and the 
troughs raised. Thus, the diagrams would generally be 
smoothed out. 
It is possible to draw some conclusions of relevance to this 
analysis from these rather general comments. First, the dif­
ferential in cotton costs between rings and mules for warp 
yarn probably starts to appear at a count of about 28 and 
then increases to a peak somewhat below three cents per pound, 
probably in the vicinity of 45 to 50. In all probability, the 
difference reaches two cents in the low 40s. Second, the cost 
differential does not drop significantly below two cents again, 
at least not in the range shown in Figure 4. As for weft, the 
cost differential starts at about a count of 35 and rises to more 
than two cents in the 50s. It probably reaches two cents in 
the upper 40s. The differential then stays at least as high as 
one and one-half cents for higher counts. 
The discussion so far has only dealt with counts below 100. 
This is the area relevant for Great Britain. In the United States, 
however, the only count range where mules appear to have 
been installed was above 100. The question thus arises as to 
whether cotton price differentials can explain at least the partial 
return to mules at very high counts. 
On the whole, it can be expected that price differentials 
of two or even three cents continued out well beyond a count 
of 90. This continued gap resulted from the need to resort 
to Egyptian and "regular" Sea Island cotton for ring twist in 
the 80 to 100 range.67 Above that range, however, it eventually 
became necessary to use "Best Sea Island" cotton. In view of 
the very large difference in the count that could be spun by 
the two methods at these high counts,68 the differential must 
at some point have been between using Best Sea Island on 
rings or distinctly inferior types of cotton on mules. The cost 
differential can be estimated to be five or six cents per pound 
and sometimes even more. Once the count is high enough, 
however, even the mule would require Best Sea Island. After 
67
 Ibid. 
68Ibid.; and Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 52. 
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this point, the cost differential would be very much reduced, 
at least if the ring was physically capable of spinning such 
extremely fine yarn. This evidence appears to be consistent 
with rational manufacturers installing both mules and rings 
for very high counts. 
Relative Factor Costs as a Function of Counts Spun 
I have repeatedly stated that expert opinion in the period 
being studied unanimously held that ring spinning was relatively 
less suited to high than to low counts. It is now necessary 
to look at this proposition in more detail. Changes in the relative 
advantage of ring and mule spinning as the count increases 
can be expected to result from changes in the relative cost 
of the raw material and other inputs on the one hand and 
the quality of the product on the other hand. 
Input Costs. In the previous section, the relative costs imposed 
by the cotton needed for ring and mule spinning were studied 
as a function of the count of the yarn spun. It appears that 
this cost difference did increase with the count, at least in 
moving from low to medium and high counts. 
The other important inputs to be examined are labor and 
capital. It is quite clear from all contemporary evidence that 
labor input per pound of yarn increased faster on rings than 
on mules as the count increased. Even with a constant capi­
tal/labor ratio, this would also imply that the capital cost of 
ring spinning increased faster than that of mule spinning. In 
fact, however, the capital/labor ratio increased faster in ring 
than in mule spinning.69 In ring, unlike mule, spinning, the 
number of spindles per operative increased as the count 
increased. The difference in capital costs thus increased even 
faster than implied by the changing ratio of spinning labor 
input. 
Before jumping to the conclusion that this evidence proves 
that the cost of ring spinning increased faster than the cost 
of mule spinning, it must be remembered that mule spinners 
69Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, 
p. 121. 
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were more expensive than ring spinners. Thus, an equal 
percentage increase in the number of spinners' hours per pound 
of yarn would increase the saving per pound of yarn to be 
derived from using rings rather than mules. 
Although a good deal of vague information on the relationship 
between the count of yarn spun and labor input is available 
for the pre-World War I period, careful studies of this relation­
ship were only carried out in a later period. Two such studies, 
one based on interwar conditions and one based on 1949 
conditions, are available.70 Happily, the two studies present 
almost identical results with regard to the relationship of output 
per man-hour in spinning and the count of yarn spun. I 
therefore used the results of these studies to calculate cost 
differentials. 
It is, of course, unfortunate that these studies do not refer 
to the exact period under study. Encouragement, however, 
can be taken from the fact that no noticeable change occurred 
between the 1930s and 1949. More important, virtually all the 
mules studied, and the great majority of the rings, were in 
fact installed before World War I. If there is any bias in using 
these past period studies, it is probably in underestimating 
the labor required on high-count rings.71 
In addition to an estimate of output per man-hour, I also 
needed an estimate of changes in the spindles-per-man ratio 
in ring spinning. I obtained an estimate of this from the structure 
of piece rates in the British Universal Ring Spinning List of 
1912.72 This structure was specifically designed to reflect the 
fact that spinners working on higher counts were able to tend 
more spindles. On the basis of this information, I calculated 
the saving per pound of yarn in spinning labor and capital 
charges that resulted at various counts from using rings instead 
of mules. Assuming a waste rate of 5 to 10%, the saving per 
pound of cotton used would be 5 to 10% less than the results 
shown in Table 3. 
70
 See Bri t ish Ministry of P roduc t ion , Report of the Cotton Textile Mission to the 
United States of America, a n d Product iv i ty T e a m , Cotton Spinning. 
71
 Such a bias might be expected because technical change on the ring generally 
is credited with making it effective at higher and higher counts. 
72Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, 
p. 121. 
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TABLE 3 
DIFFERENCE IN LABOR AND CAPITAL COSTS 
(in U.S. cents) 
Great Britain 
United States 
40 
1.6 
2.4 
50 
1.7 
2.6 
60 
1.8 
2.9 
70 
1.8 
2.9 
Count 
80 
1.8 
3.0 
90 
1.6 
3.0 
100 
1.5 
2.9 
110 
1.2 
2.7 
120 
0.8 
2.3 
NOTE. This calculation is based on the assumption that the capital costs of mules and rings were the 
same at a count of 40. Account has been taken of the somewhat greater speed of rings in the United 
States as compared with Great Britain. The generally accepted figure of 10% for loss, depreciation, and 
upkeep of machinery (see Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 271) is used. In 
addition, the interest cost of the money invested is set at 10%. While the cost differential at a count of 
40 is independent of these percentages, the cost differentials at higher counts would be higher if lower 
interest rates were used and lower at higher interest rates. 
There is some reason to believe that the rate of growth of the capital differential is underestimated. 
This bias results because high-count mules have shorter "draws" than do low-count mules and, therefore, 
occupy less space. This is not the case with rings. 
Quality Differentials 
There remains the question of the quality of ring versus 
mule yarn. There is a great deal of talk, especially in British 
writings, concerning the superior quality of mule yarn. Clearly, 
however, British comments on this subject are of questionable 
value. After all, one can be counted on to claim superiority 
for the product one concentrates on. I have also been unable 
to find any data that show a price differential between yarns 
of the same count, made of cotton of the same quality (here 
defined to exclude staple length), differing only in the method 
of production. 
Nevertheless, there do seem to have been some differences 
between the two types of yarn. Thus, Copeland, an American, 
remarks: "Mule yarn, however, is superior . . . ," and "the 
harder ring-spun yarn is better adapted for warp than for 
weft."73 
My general conclusion in this matter is that mule yarn probably 
did have some superior qualities. It is not clear whether this 
advantage became greater in a technical sense as the count 
increased. What is clear, however, is that the importance of 
this difference increased with the count. For the low-quality 
cloth usually made with low-count yarns, this minor difference 
73
 Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 68. 
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in the yarn probably did not matter much. As the quality of 
the cloth increased with the count, however, differences in 
the yarn undoubtedly took on added importance. Quality 
differences thus probably did make the ring somewhat less 
well adapted to high than low counts as well as more suited 
to warp than weft. This difference in suitability for warp and 
weft probably played a role in what appears to have been the 
greater staying power of old American mules in weft as opposed 
to warp spinning. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Having estimated the various costs and benefits involved in 
choosing between mules and rings, we may now evaluate the 
results. 
Taking into account all these different costs (including labor, 
fuel, transportation, and capital) with the single exception of 
cotton, it seems that in Great Britain the saving per pound 
of cotton spun on rings rather than mules was about 1.5 cents 
for warp and 1.2 cents for weft at a count of 40. This saving 
rose to about 1.7 and 1.4 cents respectively at a count of around 
70 and then declined slightly. On the other hand, the increase 
in costs due to the longer staple required by ring as opposed 
to mule spinning for twist (i.e., warp) rose from zero at counts 
below 28 to about 2 cents around 40. It then remained at 
that level. For weft, the differential probably reached 2 cents 
around 50. It thus appears that in Great Britain rings were 
preferable for warp production up to a count perhaps of a 
little below 40, but for weft they were probably to be preferred 
even for counts in the low 40s. In cases where the spinner 
contemplated using low-quality cotton, rings may have been 
better even at slightly higher counts. It does not appear that 
rings ever became profitable again at higher counts. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that a growing effective 
quality differential probably worked against ring yarn at higher 
counts. 
When these results are compared with the actual behavior 
of British manufacturers, they appear to have behaved in a 
rational manner. At the very least, these results should throw 
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the burden of proof onto those who maintain that the British 
were irrational in their choice between rings and mules. 
In the case of the United States, the cost advantage per 
pound of yarn was over 2 cents at a count of 40 and then 
rose to around 3 cents. In view of these results, it is under­
standable that ring spinning was used for much higher counts 
in the United States than in Great Britain. At the same time, 
the cost differential is down to 2.3 cents per pound at a count 
of 120 and heading lower. In view of this fact and the high 
price differentials encountered for very long staple cotton, it 
is also not surprising that some mules were being installed 
to spin very fine yarn. Indeed, my reaction is that surprisingly 
few new mules were installed in the United States. Although 
the quantitative data are not strong enough to prove the point, 
I suspect there may have been some substance to the many 
comments by contemporary observers that employer dislike 
of unions caused them to avoid mule spinning. 
Having completed this study of the choice of spinning 
technique by British and American manufacturers, I made a 
simplified analysis of French and German behavior. This latter 
analysis was based on the data concerning spinning wages and 
the number of spindles tended given by Copeland for France 
and Germany.74 In addition, I assumed that the relation between 
the quantity of labor and capital used and the count being 
spun that applied to Great Britain also applied to France and 
Germany. On this basis, I computed the difference in labor 
and capital costs per pound of yarn spun on rings rather than 
mules for France and Germany. The results of this calculation 
(see Table 4) indicate that French and German manufacturers 
should have stopped installing rings at a count very slightly 
below the British cutoff point.75 
74Ibid., pp. 299-300. 
75
 This difference is due almost entirely to the fact that German and French 
mule spinners received somewhat lower wages per hundred spindles than did 
the British mule spinners. Copeland himself, however, reports that the French 
and German mule spinners, unlike the French and German ring spinners, were 
less skilled than their British counterparts (ibid., pp. 300-301). He thus feels 
that the German and French spinners would not have earned any more in England 
than at home. This, in turn, implies that British mule-spinning wages were not 
really higher per unit of output. If this is the case, then French and German 
48) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE

TABLE 4 
DIFFERENCE IN LABOR AND CAPITAL COSTS 
(in U.S. cents) 
Count 
40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 
France 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 .8 .5 .1 g 
Germany 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 .7 .3 0 - .5 
How does this compare with actual behavior? The information 
available is not good enough to detect the kind of very minor 
deviation from English behavior that my results appear to call 
for. The general conclusion of the literature is that the Conti­
nental countries resembled England in that they installed very 
few rings for counts above the mid-40s.76 Furthermore, the 
fact that, by 1913, 54% of all German spindles and 46% of 
all French spindles were rings indicates that, at the very least, 
a very large percentage of the spindles installed for counts 
below 40 must have been rings.77 
These results may be taken as at least prima facie evidence 
that German and French cotton manufacturers were also 
rational in their choices of spinning techniques. Perhaps more 
important, it increases the confidence that can be put into 
the analysis as a whole. Clearly, it would have been very strange 
if British and American manufacturers were found to be 
rational, but French and German manufacturers were not. 
cotton manufacturers were in the same position as their British brethren when 
it came to choosing between spinning techniques. 
76
 See, for example, Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United 
States, p. 301. 
77Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 355. The higher percentage of rings 
in Germany and France than in Great Britain seems very reasonable on the basis 
of the higher-quality goods that were produced in Great Britain and the higher 
rates of growth in spinning capacity that France and Germany had experienced 
in the period since the large-scale introduction of rings into Europe had begun. 
RINGS AND MULES: 
PART TWO 
Because our figures show that low-count rings were a better 
new investment than low-count mules in Great Britain, the 
question naturally arises as to whether they were so much better 
that well-functioning sub-40 mules should have been junked 
and replaced with rings. The standard way of phrasing this 
decision problem is to say that if the total cost of the new 
method is less than the variable cost of the old method, then 
the old method should be thrown out.1 Any calculation of 
total costs, however, includes some essentially arbitrary allow­
ance for depreciation and capital costs. Therefore, I feel it 
is more illuminating to determine what rate of return on invested 
capital is consistent with equating the total cost of the new 
method (i.e., the rings) with the variable cost of the old method 
(i.e., mules). That rate, of course, is the rate of return that 
would be earned on the capital needed to replace the old method 
with the new (for a given level of output). The question of 
rational economic behavior arises in the context of whether 
actual observed behavior is consistent with this rate of return. 
In this particular case, the relevant question is: Did the British 
1
 See W. E. G. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, pp. 55-58. 
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cotton manufacturers pass up an investment opportunity that 
would have yielded a remarkably high rate of return on invested 
capital when they failed to replace their well-functioning sub-40 
mules with rings in the period before World War I? 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to reach as definite a conclu­
sion with regard to this question as was possible in the case 
of choosing between ring and mule spinning for new installa­
tions. The difficulty arises because the errors involved in 
measuring the rate of return on the money needed to replace 
the mules are relatively large. This would not matter if the 
rate of return estimated for this investment was clearly so very 
high or so very low that no reasonable error of measurement 
could change the basic conclusion. The results are not this 
clear-cut, however. Thus, the evidence is not sufficiently strong 
to exclude the possibility that British cotton-spinning firms may 
have shown "excessive" conservatism or caution in not junking 
their low-count mules in the pre-World War I period. It is 
also possible that they made other investments that earned a 
lower rate of return than that which they would have obtained 
on money put into replacing their low-count mules. On the 
other hand, the magnitude of the numbers involved makes 
it extremely unlikely that this investment opportunity was so 
good that failure to take advantage of it was of more than 
marginal importance to profits. Excessive caution is a possibility, 
blindness to change and opportunity is not. 
Equally important, it is clear that the failure to junk sub-40 
mules before World War I could not possibly have had a 
significant effect on the competitive position of the British cotton 
textile industry. At the very worst, this failure could have been 
offset by a wage cut in spinning of a few percent. Much larger 
wage cuts were in fact obtained during the interwar period. 
SAVINGS AND COSTS OF CONVERTING 
FROM MULES TO RINGS 
The labor saving to be derived from replacing mules with 
rings can be obtained from the data presented in chapter 2. 
In Table 5, I have calculated this saving in labor costs per ring 
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TABLE 5 
LABOR COST SAVING PER RING SPINDLE PER WEEK 
AT VARIOUS COUNTS 
(in U.S. cents) 
United Great 
Count States Britain 
10 1.81 1.28 
20 1.69 1.19 
30 1.67 1.14 
40 1.65 1.12 
50 1.62 1.09 
60 1.60 1.07 
70 1.57 1.04 
80 1.55 1.02 
90 1.52 .99 
100 1.49 .96 
110 1.46 .93 
120 1.43 .90 
spindle per week for different counts of yarn, both in the 
United States and in Great Britain. 
A much more difficult problem is to accurately calculate 
the costs of replacing mules with rings. Finding the cost of 
the spinning equipment itself is not much of a problem. 
According to the United States Tariff Board, the unit cost 
of ring-spinning equipment in Great Britain right before World 
War I was around $1.80 per spindle.2 
In order to obtain an internal rate of return on this investment, 
I applied the formula 
where 
C is the unit cost of the ring-spinning equipment, 
S{ is the annual labor cost saving per ring spindle (assumed 
constant over time), 
Di is the annual charge for "depreciation, upkeep, and 
obsolesence" on the ring-spinning machinery (10 per­
2U.S. Tariff Board, pp. 463-65. 
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cent of original unit cost, a constant amount over time), 
and 
r is the internal rate of return. 
This formula views S{ as a permanent stream of income 
that can be maintained forever so long as D{ is reinvested 
in the equipment each year. This may be a slightly unorthodox 
view of Diy but I do not think it an unreasonable one.3 
This particular approach to D{ could possibly evoke the 
objection that if new rings depreciate and become obsolete, 
so do old mules. That is, depreciation and obsolescence should 
affect both alternatives similarly over time, leaving the cost 
difference between the two approximately the same. This 
objection, however, fails to note that if the old mules are retained 
(at zero cost) and then become even more worn and out of 
date, they can be replaced with brand new, modern rings at 
any time without loss. This clearly is not the case with somewhat 
worn and somewhat outdated rings that were recently installed 
(at considerable cost). Alternatively, it can be said that if both 
rings and mules, once they have been installed, deteriorate 
over time, then the longer conversion from mules to rings 
is delayed, the greater will be the eventual cost reduction. Di 
3
 Another approach to this calculation, which would give similar results, is to 
estimate the expected lifetime of the new spinning equipment and then to apply 
the formula 
where n is the expected lifetime of the equipment. In this case S{ has to include 
any possible increase in upkeep costs. On the other hand, no explicit calculation 
of depreciation allowances is needed since the lifetime of the equipment is limited. 
The reason I preferred not to use this approach is that though I have no truly 
accurate measure of how long the ring-spinning equipment was expected to last, 
or how S{ might decline as the ring spindles aged, I do have good information 
on the actual rates charged for depreciation, obsolescence, and upkeep. 
It should also be noted that my assumption (in the text) that Si will remain 
constant over time means that there is no possibility that two investments with 
the same internal rate of return will have different present value to cost ratios. 
If S{ had varied over time it would have been possible for two investments costing 
the same and having the same internal rate of return to have different present 
values. 
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can thus be seen as the opportunity cost incurred by converting 
now instead of in the future. 
The results of this calculation indicate that capital used to 
replace mules with rings in Great Britain in the production 
of 10-count yarn would have earned a net return of about 
26% per annum. At a count of 40, the net return would have 
been 21%. Turning down such an attractive investment oppor­
tunity might well be considered an act of economic irrationality. 
The problem is much more complicated than this, however. 
The conversion from mules to rings would result in a number 
of other costs, most of which are not incurred when a whole 
new plant is built. Some of them are: 
1.	 The cost of halting production in the entire plant while 
the new ring spindles are being installed. 
2.	 The cost of alterations that have to be made in other 
machinery and in the building (which can be a serious 
problem). W. E. G. Salter has pointed out that the 
"inadequacy of existing buildings for modern methods 
is a simple but extremely common form of technical 
complementarity." 4 
3.	 The cost of the extra preparatory equipment required 
by the ring spindles.5 
4.	 The loss that would undoubtedly be encountered on 
the disposition of the inventory of spare parts held for 
the mule spindles. 
5.	 The cost of the suboptimal results that would probably 
be achieved in the first months of operating the new 
equipment. 
6.	 The cost in money, trouble, and time that would be 
involved in recruiting and training the female ring 
spinners to replace the male mule spinners. The dismissal 
of the mule spinners might also increase the probability 
4
 Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, p. 85. Salter specifically refers to the 
problems of the British cotton textile industry.
5Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, pp. 213, 272, 273. 
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of a strike by the rest of the work force. Trouble would 
seem especially likely if only part of the mules in a 
mill are replaced at one time.6 
The difficult problem, of course, is to estimate the level of 
these costs. Very little of the detailed information needed to 
make a hard calculation exists. Any such estimate is therefore 
only an educated guess. Nevertheless, in this case it is essential 
that the attempt be made. These costs were very real and to 
assume them away, and then to conclude that the British 
spinning firms ignored an investment opportunity that would 
have yielded a net return of between 21 and 26% per annum, 
would quite simply be wrong. I have, therefore, made what 
I consider to be a set of fairly conservative estimates of these 
costs. Because these adjustments in fact reduce the net rate 
of return to a level sufficiently low to make this investment 
opportunity relatively unprofitable, the reader can also view 
the adjustments I make to be what is necessary to make 
conversion appear unattractive. To the extent the reader thinks 
that any of the extra cost estimates I make are excessive, he 
can scale them down and see what effect this has on the final 
net rate of return. After doing so, he will have to make up 
his own mind about the British manufacturers who, at least 
implicitily, decided that this rate of return was insufficient. 
The first extra cost listed is that of closing down the whole 
plant while the new equipment was being installed. Conversion 
clearly was no snap operation. Not only did the old equipment 
have to be dismantled and the new equipment assembled but 
the building itself and the rest of the machinery also had to 
be adjusted. The power mechanism would, of course, have 
to be changed.7 In addition, extra preparatory equipment had 
to be installed. Changes in the building would be required 
to accommodate the change in the ratio between preparatory 
and spinning equipment.8 
6
 For a discussion of the hostility of the mule spinners to women spinners of 
any kind, see Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure, and Policy, pp. 142-43. 
7
 The mule required power to move back and forth as well as to turn rollers 
and spindles. 
8
 See Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, p. 85; and Tippett, A Portrait 
of the Lancashire Textile Industry, pp. 85, 87 (caption 30). 
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It seems likely that a four-month shutdown is a conservative 
estimate for a total conversion. If a 10% rate of depreciation, 
loss, and upkeep and a 10% interest rate are combined with 
the cost of an English spinning mill (excluding the spinning 
equipment itself) as reported by the United States Tariff Board9 
in 1912, this shutdown period would have increased the cost 
per new spindle by about 41 cents. 
The cost of the idle capital, however, is not the only cost 
incurred during a shutdown. In addition, there are personnel 
costs. Surely, the administrative and white collar workers would 
have to be kept on throughout the shutdown period. As for 
the operatives, other than the now-redundant mule spinners, 
the firm would face the alternatives of keeping them on the 
payroll or risking their dispersion.10 Either possibility would 
be costly. Because the labor costs of spinning far exceeded 
the capital costs, I think it is a conservative estimate to say 
that the personnel costs of a shutdown were probably of the 
same magnitude as the costs of idle capital. 
It was, of course, possible to replace the mules piecemeal. 
Such a procedure would have avoided the necessity of closing 
the mill completely. On the other hand, it would have resulted 
in lower production and general inconvenience for an extended 
period of time. In addition, labor troubles would probably have 
been more severe under such an arrangement. The temporarily 
remaining mule spinners would certainly have objected to a 
policy of gradual dismissal. Finally, the adjustments required 
in the arrangement of the building and the other equipment 
would probably have been done less efficiently if done in stages. 
It is thus by no means obvious that a step-by-step conversion 
would have been cheaper than a single sweeping overhaul. 
The next cost to be considered is the cost of the alterations 
in the building and the power mechanism. An estimate of 15% 
of the original cost of the building and driving equipment 
(excluding the power plant) seems to be reasonable. Such a 
9U.S. Tariff Board, p. 465. The other equipment has to be depreciated because 
it presumably deteriorated or at least became outmoded while standing idle. 
10
 For a comment on the importance to one textile firm of keeping the operatives 
continually employed, see W. G. Rimmer, Marshalls of Leeds: Flax-Spinners, 1788­
1886, p. 281. 
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figure would add roughly 40 cents to the cost per spindle. 
The rings would also require somewhat more preparatory 
equipment.11 Once again, a figure of 15% is certainly reasonable. 
This would add about 20 cents per spindle. 
Finally, there is the question of the spare parts inventory. 
To some extent, this inventory could have been run down 
in anticipation of the changeover, and presumably some of 
it would be sold, although undoubtedly at a substantial loss. 
All in all, I believe that a probable loss equal to 50% of the 
normal spare parts inventory of a British mule spinning mill 
is not an unreasonable estimate. This would add approximately 
another 40 cents to the cost per spindle.12 
The total of these extra costs, as I have estimated them, 
is $1.82 per spindle. This implies a total cost per new spindle 
of slightly over $3.60. In recalculating the internal rate of return 
according to the formula used above, Cshould thus be doubled. 
A serious question arises, however, as to what should be done 
about Dt. I have chosen to make the most conservative assump­
tion possible and have limited depreciation allowances to the 
investment in machinery only. (For a discussion of the issues 
involved in this question, see Appendix A.) 
On the basis of these conservative assumptions and estimates, 
I calculate that the rate of return on capital used to replace 
well-functioning mules with rings was approximately 12% per 
annum for count 10 yarn and slightly less for higher counts. 
At a count of 40, the net return was around 10% per annum. 
The generosity of these estimates is apparent from the fact 
that points 5 and 6 in the above list of costs have been ignored. 
The possible influence of point 5 is indicated by the fact that 
if during the first year of operation realized labor economies 
were held to one-half those shown in Table 1 for count 10 
yarn (not an unreasonably pessimistic assumption), this would 
be the equivalent of permanently reducing the rate of return 
on the capital invested by almost 1 percentage point. 
"Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 213.

12U.S. Tariff Board, p. 465.
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THE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
At first glance, even 12% may seem to be a pretty good 
net rate of return on capital. In fact, however, it is not all 
that it seems to be. This calculation is based on an assumption 
of continual operation at 100% of capacity. In choosing between 
two equally capital intensive techniques, it does not matter 
whether 100% utilization is expected. In the case of a replace­
ment decision, however, it matters a great deal because the 
option to retain the old equipment requires no capital at all. 
Thus, the rate of return on capital used to replace mules 
with rings would be less than 12% if the new equipment were 
not used full time. In view of the prevalence of (usually 
organized) short-time operations, strikes and lockouts, not to 
mention the continuing fear of a cotton shortage,13 no sane 
British cotton spinner could have expected continuous 100% 
utilization. At a 90% utilization rate, which must be considered 
a relatively optimistic expectation, the rate of return on count 
10 yarn would fall from 12% to approximately 10.3%. At 75% 
utilization, the rate of return is around 8%, and at 50% 
utilization, it is around 3.3%.14 
In view of the risks involved and the conservative nature 
of my calculations, I find it understandable that British cotton 
spinners generally did not consider the replacement of well-
functioning mules with rings a particularly attractive investment. 
In the period just before World War I, leading Lancashire 
spinning firms were paying around 6% on preferred shares 
13
 The much feared reoccurrence of a cotton famine became a reality during 
the last few years of World War I. As a result of a shipping shortage, raw cotton 
supplies at one time fell so low that output in the "American sector" of the industry 
was restricted to less than 40 percent of capacity (D. Henderson, The Cotton Control 
Board, p. 6). During this period of raw cotton shortage, output was regulated 
by the Cotton Control Board, which relied on rules limiting the percentage of 
its equipment a firm might operate or on a combination of this type of regulation 
with short-time work. Although profits were very high in the industry, especially 
in spinning (raw cotton prices were controlled, but output prices were not), this 
system certainly did not favor firms who had installed labor-saving, capital intensive 
equipment. For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Henderson. 
14
 In 1930, capacity utilization in the British cotton-spinning industry fell to 
58% and in 1931 was probably worse (see Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, 
pp. 344, 338). 
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and 5% on money deposits.15 Thus, on the basis of the 
quantitative evidence available, the failure to junk mules can 
certainly not be taken as proof of mass irrationality or technical 
backwardness. On the other hand, these calculations and esti­
mates in no way prove that there were not occasions when 
English cotton manufacturers missed a fairly good investment 
opportunity when they kept their mules in operation. 
THE ROLE OF MACHINERY AGE 
The above calculations are, of course, supposed to be based 
on a comparison of new rings with at least relatively new mules.16 
Older mules would presumably work less well because of wear 
and tear and might also be less well designed.17 In addition, 
old mules would presumably be served by old preparatoty 
equipment and an old power plant. Thus, rings could be 
substituted for the mules at the same time as the other old 
equipment was switched. This would reduce the part of the 
cost of closing down the plant chargeable to the switch in 
spinning equipment. 
This discussion simply points out that as mules got older 
and older, a stronger case could be made for replacing them. 
Old mules were in fact scrapped in Great Britain, however, 
so that this observation in no way conflicts with observed 
behavior. It is, of course, true that the advantage of new rings 
over new mules at certain counts undoubtedly speeded up the 
15
 United Textile Workers Association, Inquiry into the Cotton Industry, 1921-1922, 
pp. 17, 24. 
16
 It should be noted, however, that all the biases involved in the calculation 
of the numbers in Table 5 tend to make the mules used in the comparison older 
than the rings used. 
17
 Available information indicates that the average output per mule "side" (at 
a given count) was probably increasing by about 1 percent per annum between 
1870 and World War I. This resulted from having more spindles per side and 
making them move faster. Not all of this gain accrued to the employer, however. 
Bigger and faster machines tended to require more labor input, and to the extent 
that output per unit of labor increased the employers had approximately to split 
this gain with the workers (see Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire, 
Cotton Spinning Industry, pp. 204-5). 
18
 On the other hand, if the preparatory and other equipment was old but 
in reasonable condition, the manager might well want to postpone replacing the 
mules with rings in order to be able to switch all the equipment at one time. 
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rate at which old mules producing these counts were scrapped. 
This can hardly be considered a startling revelation, however, 
since it is a logical corollary of the superiority of new rings 
over new mules.19 
DIFFERENCES IN BRITISH AND AMERICAN BEHAVIOR 
In the United States the labor-saving resulting from switching 
to rings was greater than in Great Britain. It is also clear that 
new rings had a greater advantage over new mules than was 
the case in Great Britain. The rate of return on capital used 
to replace well-functioning sub-40 mules with rings, however, 
does not seem to have been higher in the United States than 
in Great Britain. My calculations indicate that this rate of return 
must have been almost identical in the two countries. The 
principal reason for this was the high cost of machinery, 
especially spinning machinery, in the United States.20 
In the United States, unlike Great Britain, rings were generally 
a better new investment than mules even for counts above 
40.21 The extra cotton costs involved in using high-count rings, 
however, reduced this advantage below that enjoyed by new 
rings over new mules at sub-40 counts. As a result, using capital 
to throw out well-functioning mules used for counts above 
40 was definitely not a good investment. Capital so used would 
undoubtedly have failed even to return respectable depreciation 
charges. This point, of course, does not affect the fact that 
the possibility of using rings to advantage accelerated the rate 
at which high-count mules were scrapped. 
The difference in the rate of return to be gained from capital 
used to finance the junking of mules at low, as opposed to 
high, counts is in good accord with the observed fact that old 
19The only situation in which the superiority of new rings over new mules 
would not tend to accelerate the scrapping of old mules is one in which replacing 
old mules with new rings costs sufficiently more than replacing old mules with 
new mules to offset the advantage of new rings over new mules. In such a situation, 
worn-out mules would presumably be replaced with new mules, but entirely new 
installations would be equipped with new rings. 
20See U.S. Tariff Board, pp. 462-65. 
21
 See chapter 2. 
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mules remained in service for high counts long after they had 
been totally displaced in low-count production.22 
There is one problem remaining, however. Although the 
rate of return on junking well-functioning sub-40 mules was 
about the same in the two countries, junking seems to have 
been much more prevalent in the United States than in Great 
Britain. The mere fact that sub-40 mules vanished earlier in 
the United States than in Great Britain does not prove very 
much. After all, it is undoubtedly true that it became rational 
to choose new rings over new mules earlier in the United States 
than in Great Britain. Nevertheless, the fact that there were 
virtually no sub-40 mules operating in the United States as 
early as 1900 indicates that there must have been a good deal 
of junking.23 In addition, the literary evidence gives strong 
support to the willingness of American manufacturers to junk 
mules.24 
It thus seems that American and British manufacturers 
reacted at least somewhat differently to what, as so far described, 
were similar economic situations. The question is whether this 
divergence can be explained without recourse to British "tech­
nological conservatism" or, conversely, to American "tech­
nological radicalism." 
One possible cause of this divergence in behavior could have 
been a difference in interest rates. Interest rates, however, 
were if anything somewhat higher in the United States than 
in Great Britain. 
DIFFERENCES IN CAPACITY UTILIZATION 
A more important consideration is the fact that a British 
cotton manufacturer could expect to enjoy a lower average 
rate of capacity utilization on his new equipment than could 
his American counterpart. There can be little doubt that the 
22
 See previous references (chapter 2) to Young, The American Cotton Industry, 
a n d Ut t ley , Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the United States. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 See K n o w l t o n , Pepperell's Progress, p . 1 7 1 ; Smi th , The Cotton Textile Industry 
of Fall River, p. 100; Lamb, "The Development of Entrepreneurship in Fall River," 
p. XII-8; and 1905 Census of Manufacturers, 3: 42. 
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British industry was more subject to excess capacity than was 
the American industry. This was mainly due to the fact that 
although both industries grew in spurts, the trend rate of growth 
was much more rapid in the United States. This meant that 
the level of demand reached in one spurt, and to which capacity 
had in all likelihood been adjusted, was more rapidly surpassed 
in the United States than in Great Britain. This is clear from 
the figures in Table 6 on cotton consumption in the two 
countries. In the thirty year period 1885-1914, there were 
not less than 20 years in Great Britain during which cotton 
consumption was below the previous peak level. In the United 
States, there were only 10 such years.25 Since the United States 
got rid of many sub-40 mules before 1885, it can also be noted 
that between 1870 and 1884 there were only 5 such years.26 
While there were still plenty of sub-40 mules in operation, 
and assuming a freely competitive environment, a ring-spinning 
firm might not have been overly concerned about the possibility 
of excess capacity in the industry. Such a firm presumably 
could count on using its lower variable costs to take business 
away from its mule-equipped competitors. This was probably 
the situation in United States up until the sub-40 mule ap­
proached extinction in that country. In Great Britain, however, 
the ability of the low-variable-cost producer to take orders away 
from his competitors was virtually foreclosed by the widespread 
practice of organized short-time work.27 
Leading students of the cotton textile industry have referred 
25
 See Mitchel l , Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p . 4 6 0 ; a n d U.S. Historical 
Statistics, p . 654 . 
26
 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Bulletin No. 160, 1926, 
p. 50. 
27
 Short-term work must be distinguished from production quotas, especially 
tradable quotas. Short-term work forced all (participating) firms to operate a short 
day. Robson notes specifically that it was a matter of having each plant operating 
for a reduced number of hours per week. Since all the workers were to work 
these hours, it even impeded the shifting of production between different machines 
in a given plant (see Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 221; also see Turner, 
Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy, pp. 337, 339, 346, 349). Turner notes 
(p. 349) that post-World War II workers were afraid to abandon the long tradition 
of short-time work which would have relaxed "labor restrictions in efficient ones 
(firms)." J. Jewkes and H. Campion note how short-time work after 1921 retarded 
labor movment out of the depressed cotton industry by making it possible for 
all workers to remain and still get some employment and income ("The Mobility 
of Labour in the Cotton Industry," p. 137). 
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TABLE 6 
COTTON CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GREAT BRITAIN, 1885-1914 
(in millions of pounds) 
United Great 
Year States* Britain 
1885 l,047t 1,298 
1886 1,025 1,450 
1887 l,103f 1,499 
1888 1,155| 1,525 
1889 l,259t l,564f 
1890 l,302f l,664f 
1891 l,423f l,666f 
1892 1,208 1,548 
1893 1,150 1,434 
1894 l,492t 1,603 
1895 1,250 1,664 
1896 1,421 1,637 
1897 l,736f 1,618 
1898 l,836f l,761f 
1899 l,844f l,762t 
1900 1,802 1,737 
1901 2,040f 1,569 
1902 2,094f 1,633 
1903 1,990 1,617 
1904 2,262f 1,486 
1905 2,439f l,813f 
1906 2,487f l,855t 
1907 2,247 l,985f 
1908 2,599f 1,917 
1909 2,380 1,824 
1910 2,357 1,632 
1911 2,700f 1,892 
1912 2,934f 2,142f 
1913 2,97It 2,l78f 
1914 3,044t 2,077 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Bulletin 160, pp.49-50; Mitchell, Abstract 
of British Historical Statistics, p. 179. 
•Figures for the United States were originally presented in running bales and have been converted to 
pounds at the rate of 478 lbs. per bale. 
f New all-time high. 
to organized short-time work by British spinning firms as the 
"normal response to a decline in demand"28 and as "traditional 
policy" in the face of a fall in demand.29 In the years leading 
28Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 221. 
29
 Allen, British Industries and their Organization, p. 236. 
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up to World War I, organized short-time was practiced in British 
cotton spinning in 1897, 1900, 1903, 1904, and 1910.30 In 
1903, organized short-time was worked for four months; and 
in 1904, short-time work at about 70% of capacity was the 
rule for most of the year.31 The fact that the short-time policy 
was supported by both the Employers Association and the trade 
unions increased compliance and made violation of the rules 
a risky activity. 
In view of these facts, it seems clear that British firms were 
more likely to experience less than 100% capacity utilization 
of their equipment than were American firms. At the same 
time, I do not believe that this factor is important enough 
to explain all of the differences in behavior of American and 
British manufacturers with regard to their low-count mules. 
DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYER REACTION TO TRADE UNIONS 
At this point, I have no choice but to claim that there were 
differences either in employer reaction to unions or to technical 
change in the two countries. Of these alternatives, the union 
explanation appeals to me for two reasons. First of all, the 
literary sources all report that employer antipathy to the mule 
spinners' unions was an important factor in explaining the 
rapidity with which the mule was replaced in the United States.32 
These, incidentally, are the very same sources that describe 
the willingness of American manufacturers to junk mules and 
on which I partly base my claim that American manufacturers 
did in fact junk well-functioning mules. Second, the union 
argument makes good economic sense. 
It has already been noted that the American mule spinners' 
unions were troublesome in themselves and, more important, 
were a powerful catalyst in encouraging strikes and organization 
on the part of the other workers.33 It is hardly surprising 
30Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 221; and Copeland, The Cotton 
Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 333. 
31Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 221. 
32Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress, p. 171; R. Smith, The Cotton Textile Industry 
of Fall River, p. 100; Lamb, "The Development of Entrepreneurship in Fall River," 
p. XI1-8; and 1905 Census of Manufacturers, 3: 42. 
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if under these circumstances the prospect of getting rid of 
the mule spinners would make an otherwise mediocre invest­
ment opportunity appear attractive to American cotton manu­
facturers. 
My argument with regard to the British manufacturers is 
virtually the opposite. Their mule spinners unions were more 
orderly and, furthermore, were not nearly as important in 
the leadership of general strikes and general unionism.34 On 
the contrary, an attempt to replace the mule spinners with 
more docile girl ring spinners might well have increased the 
possibility of opposition from the other workers. 
CONCLUSION 
It thus seems likely that the differences in levels of capacity 
utilization and in labor organization probably caused American 
and British manufacturers to react somewhat differently to 
this particular investment opportunity. My information is not 
precise enough to say who came off better. Nor have I proved 
that attitudes toward change and innovation played no role 
whatsoever in this matter. What is clear from the order of 
magnitude of the numbers involved, however, is that neither 
country could have gained, or lost, very much from the 
difference in their behavior. At worst, the British ignored a 
marginally good investment opportunity. The worst possible 
for the Americans is that they took advantage of a marginally 
poor one. 
Finally, a word has to be said about the relatively late adoption 
of rings, for any count, in Great Britain. The United States 
had more rings than mules as early as 1870, but in Great 
Britain rings did not have much practical effect until well after 
that date. The most that I can say is that some such gap is 
consistent with the greater relative advantage of rings under 
American conditions,35 together with the unanimous opinion 
33Knowlton, Pepperell's Progress, p. 171; and R. Smith, The Cotton Textile Industry 
of Fall River, p. 100. 
3 4Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy, p. 141. 
35
 In fact, the relative advantage of rings in the United States as opposed to 
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of contemporary observers that ring technology was improving 
much faster than mule technology during the second half of 
the nineteenth century.36 This, of course, by no means implies 
that there may not have been an information or learning gap 
between the United States and Great Britain. 
Great Britain was probably even greater in the second half of the nineteenth 
century than is indicated by my calculations. These calculations are based on 
a period when America had gone over much more heavily to rings than had 
Great Britain. Unless the supply schedules for ring and mule spinners were both 
perfectly elastic (which they definitely were not) in both countries, this would 
imply that there was probably more downward pressure on mule spinners' wages 
and upward pressure on ring spinners' wages in the United States than was the 
case in Great Britain. 
36
 See, for example, Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United 
States, pp. 66-68. 

LANCASHIRE AND THE 
AUTOMATIC LOOM 
Besides ring spinning, the other great innovation in the cotton 
textile industry during the second half of the nineteenth century 
was automatic weaving. 
Prior to the introduction of the automatic loom, the standard 
factory cotton-weaving equipment in both Great Britain and 
the United States, and everywhere else for that matter, was 
the plain power loom. This loom carries out the basic steps 
in weaving without manual assistance. If a warp thread breaks, 
however, the loom continues working. To prevent the quality 
of the cloth from deteriorating seriously, it is essential that 
such a break be noted promptly, the loom stopped, and the 
break repaired. In addition, plain power looms have to be 
stopped when the yarn in the shuttle is exhausted. The operator 
then has to replace the bobbin in the shuttle and rethread 
it.1 
In 1894, the American textile machinery firm of George 
1
 Threading the shuttle involves sucking the thread through an opening in the 
shuttle. Inevitably, this causes the weaver to inhale a good deal of dust. This 
operation is repeated approximately 500 to 1,000 times per day, so it is very 
unhealthy (Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 
86). 
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Draper & Sons introduced the Northrop automatic loom. This 
loom solved the two problems of the plain loom just mentioned. 
The Northrop loom stops automatically when a warp thread 
breaks, and, without stopping, it automatically changes and 
rethreads the shuttle when it runs out of yarn. These automatic 
actions not only mean that an automatic loom has to stop less 
frequently than a plain loom but, more important, that an 
operator can tend many more automatic than plain looms. 
In order to achieve some part of the labor-saving advantage 
of this innovation without requiring the junking of well-func­
tioning plain looms, the company developed a separate warp 
stop motion that could be installed on existing plain looms. 
By automatically stopping the loom when a warp thread breaks, 
this devise permits a somewhat larger loom /operator ratio.2 
THE RATE OF ADOPTION OF AUTOMATIC LOOMS 
There is no doubt that Great Britain lagged far behind the 
United States in the adoption of the Northrop and other 
automatic looms. As noted above, the Northrop loom (the first 
and easily the most important automatic loom) was first market­
ed in 1894. Although about three times as expensive as regular 
(plain) power looms, the labor-saving it permitted made the 
Northrop loom very attractive to American manufacturers. By 
1901, some 46,000 Northrop looms had been sold by the Draper 
Company. Through 1914, American sales amounted to over 
286,000 looms. In that year, approximately forty percent of 
all the looms in New England and fifty percent of all the looms 
in the South were Northrop looms.3 This was true despite 
the fact that the Northrop loom was only slowly adapted to 
the production of the finer and more complicated types of 
fabrics. 
No such rapid rate of adoption occurred in Great Britain. 
2
 A more primitive type of warp stop-motion, suitable only for coarse weaving, 
had been available since before the Civil War. The considerable improvements 
needed in the warp stop mechanism for the purposes of the automatic loom, 
however, resulted directly in the development of a vastly better separate device 
(Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 84, 86). 
3
 Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," pp. 324, 326. 
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The Northrop loom was first introduced in 1902,4 and in 1904, 
the British Northrop Loom Company was established.5 By 1914, 
however, this company employed only about 350 workers as 
compared with 40,000 for the entire British textile machinery 
industry and 12,000 for the single firm of Platts of Oldham.6 
Indeed, it is likely that even this small Northrop staff worked 
partly for export. The best estimate is that in 1914 there were 
at least 6,000, but certainly not more than 10,000 automatic 
looms in Lancashire.7 This at a time when Lancashire had 
a total of not less than 805,000 looms of all kinds weaving 
cotton. Indeed, as late as 1936, there were only about 15,000 
automatic looms in place in the United Kingdom.8 
Between 1903, the year after the introduction of the Northrop 
loom into Great Britain, and 1914, the number of cotton looms 
in Lancashire increased by 157,000.9 Even if it is assumed that 
as much as two-thirds of the cloth whose production in Great 
Britain was increasing was not suited to production on automatic 
looms,10 well over 80% of the new looms installed in new weaving 
sheds to produce goods suited to automatic looms were, in 
fact, plain looms. Indeed, even this figure understates the case. 
If the main impediment to putting in automatic looms was 
that the types of cloth whose production was increasing were 
not suited to production on automatic looms, then there would 
undoubtedly still have been plenty of room for switching the 
4D. A. Farnie, "The Textile Industry: Woven Fabrics," in C. Singer et al., eds., 
A History of Technology, 5: 586. 
5S. B. Saul, "The Engineering Industry," in Aldcroft, ed., The Development of 
British Industry and Foreigh Competition, 1875-1914, p. 195. When this company 
was formed, the American Draper company is reported to have taken 2/3 of 
the stock in return for rights and designs (ibid.). The law requiring foreigners 
holding British patents to either produce in Britain or give up the patent was 
not passed until 1907, so this legislation was presumably not the reason for the 
establishment of this company. 
6Ibid., pp. 191, 195. 
7
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 494. 
8Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 340. 
9
 Ibid. 
10Irwin Feller estimates that "at least 60% of New England output was beyond 
the technical capabilities of the Draper loom—at least, again, as first marketed" 
("The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 331). The United States Tariff 
Board also states that the automatic loom was not well suited to the products 
of a "large portion" of English mills (see U.S. Tariff Board, p. 494). 
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production of goods that were suited to automatic looms from 
old plain looms to the new automatics and producing more 
cloth not suited to automatics on the plain looms thus released. 
This means that the well-known argument presented by Marvin 
Frankel that the unsuitability of existing British weaving sheds 
for the new machines blocked the spread of the automatic 
loom is not relevant to this period.11 Although the problem 
is thus one of explaining why the automatic loom failed almost 
completely to catch on in Great Britain before World War 
I, even when entirely new weaving sheds were being built, 
it should be kept in mind that a number of attempts to use 
automatic looms were in fact made. This means that some 
experience with, and knowledge of, the performance of the 
Northrop loom under British conditions must have been gained. 
INTERPRETATIONS OF BRITAIN'S LAG IN AUTOMATIC WEAVING 
The standard reaction to Britain's lag in automatic weaving 
has been to call it an important failure and a major reason 
for the industry's decline. The blame for this failure is usually 
placed either on inefficient management or on obstructive 
unions, or else it is shared between the two groups in varying 
proportions. Management is frequently accused of a short­
sightedness approaching myopia. Thus, for example, in a recent 
article stressing the failure of British entrepreneurship in 
general during the 1870-1914 period, Derek Aldcroft accussed 
British cotton-weaving management of ignoring the automatic 
loom despite the fact that this type of loom (according to 
Aldcroft) cut the cost of weaving approximately in half.12 
"See Marvin Frankel, "Obsolescense and Technical Change in a Maturing 
Economy," pp. 313-14. I also doubt that Frankel's points about the need for 
ring yarn and the practices of converters (p. 313) can help explain the almost 
total failure to install any automatic looms in Great Britain before World War 
I. The same argument applies to the very interesting point made by the United 
States Tariff Board that many British weaving firms preferred soft mule yarn, 
unsuited for automatic looms, because it absorbed more sizing than did the harder 
ring yarn (U.S. Tariff Board, p. 494). This, of course, is not to say that these 
arguments might not have some relevance to the later experience of the British 
industry. 
12Aldcroft, "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914," p. 117. 
Aldcroft refers to a 1909 article by Melvin Copeland as the source of this information 
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The view expressed by Aldcroft is supported by many other 
prominent economic historians. Thus, in a book published in 
1967, A. L. Levine states that "Lancashire" was complacent 
and obdurate in the face of the automatic loom. Levine also 
refers to an "ostrichlike or incorrect" attitude toward costs in 
connection with the automatic loom.13 Other more moderate 
but still adverse comments are made by A. E. Musson, C. P. 
Kindleberger, and R. S. Sayers. J. H. Clapham makes the 
somewhat obscure remark that it was "unfortunate" that there 
were not more automatic looms in Great Britain before World 
War I.14 
Other observers blame worker and union opposition to the 
new machines. Indeed, Roland Gibson virtually accuses the 
unions of destroying the industry by their opposition to the 
on cost savings. What Copeland really says, however, is that the automatic loom 
(in America) reduced the labor cost of weaving by 50% ("Technical Developments 
in Cotton Manufacturing Since 1860," p. 146). Because the automatic (Northrop) 
loom cost about three times as much as a plain loom (both in the United 
States and in Great Britain), such a statement about labor cost proves nothing 
at all about total cost. In view of this fact, Aldcroft's statement about "costs" 
is very misleading. Even more remarkable, however, and a strong indication of 
the confused state of knowledge on this question, is the fact that Aldcroft has 
since completely reversed his position. In a 1968 publication, he states: "Moreover, 
the fact that some industrialists were slow to adopt new techniques does not 
necessarily mean that they were inefficient or lacked enterprise. One might, for 
example, criticize cotton manufacturers on the grounds that they ignored the 
ring spindle and automatic loom. But this was not due to conservatism on their 
part but rather to the fact that the new machinery was not really suitable to 
English conditions of manufacture" ("Introduction," in Aldcroft, ed., The Develop­
ment of British Industry and Foreign Competition, 1875-1914, p. 34). 
Aldcroft offers no evidence or reference to support this very strong assertion. 
Presumably, however, it is based on the study of the cotton industry by R. E. 
Tyson that is included in the book. As noted above, however, Tyson's discussion 
of spinning is only a summary of Copeland's argument of 1912, which, in turn, 
is much too general to support such a strong conclusion, although Copeland 
himself draws it (The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 70). 
As for weaving, all Tyson does is to point out that the automatic loom offered 
"advantages and disadvantages," but he makes no systematic attempt to evaluate 
them. As I read him, Tyson does not draw any conclusions concerning whether 
or not the British cotton manufacturers should have installed more automatic 
looms (Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 122). In fact, of course, his evidence 
and analysis (a total of six sentences) is grossly inadequate as a basis for any 
kind of conclusion on this very complex issue. 
13
 Levine, Industrial Retardation in Britain, pp. 36, 125. 
14Musson, "The Great Depression in Britain," p. 207; Kindleberger, "Foreign 
Trade and Economic Growth," p. 297, and Economic Growth in France and Great 
Britain, p. 273; Sayers, A History of Economic Change in England, p. 101; J. H. 
Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. Ill, p. 177. 
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automatic loom.15 The opposition of the unions is also stressed 
by Frank Taussig and the United States Tariff Board.16 Finally, 
some writers avoid partisanship and blame both unions and 
management.17 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE AUTOMATIC LOOM 
Unfortunately, there is very little information available on 
the early British experience with automatic looms. Indeed, 
despite the extensive use of such looms in the United States 
during this period, there is also a shortage of hard facts about 
the American experience. Enough data are available, however, 
to permit some fairly reliable conclusions about the performance 
of the automatic loom in the United States. In addition, I 
feel that it is possible to modify the analysis to take account 
of British conditions with sufficient accuracy to draw at least 
some tentative conclusions about British behavior. 
Performance in the United States 
The most comprehensive and reliable information available 
concerning the operation of automatic looms in the United 
States appears in a book published by an Englishman, T. W. 
Uttley, in 1905.18 While visiting New England in 1903, Uttley 
calculated the cost of producing 5,400 yards of 28-inch print 
cloth in a Burlington plant using Draper automatic looms and 
in a Fall River plant using plain looms. Adjusted for a mistake 
Uttley made in his depreciation figures,19 the results are shown 
in Table 7. 
15
 Gibson, Cotton Textile Wages in the United States and Great Britain, p. 76. 
16Taussig, Some Aspects of the Tariff Question, pp. 283-85; U.S. Tariff Board, 
p. 494. 
17
 See, for example, Chin, Management, Industry, and Trade in Cotton Textiles, 
pp. 55, 85; and Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, 
p. 92. 
18
 Uttley, Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the United States, p. 26. This 
information is also used by Irwin Feller in his article on the Northrop loom 
in New England. See also my "Comment" on Feller's article, pp. 624-27. 
19
 This mistake was corrected by Irwin Feller ("The Draper Loom in New England 
Textiles," pp. 339-41). 
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TABLE 7 
LABOR AND CAPITAL COSTS OF PRODUCING 5,400 YARDS OF CLOTH

ON DRAPER AND PLAIN LOOMS, WEEKLY BASIS, 1903

Draper Loom Plain Loom 
Weavers $10,227 $19,368 
Weft carriers .355 .203 
Tackier 2.293 1.096 
Oiler .913 
Total labor cost $13,788 $20,667 
Interest at 6% 3.203 .931 
Depreciation and Obso­
lescense, 7% 3.737 1.085 
Total Capital and 
Labor Costs $20.728 $22.683 
On the basis of these figures, Uttley and others20 have 
concluded that the automatic looms were preferable to the 
plain looms as a new investment. This conclusion, however, 
depends crucially on the rate of interest charged. The 6% 
used by Uttley is based on his judgment and should not be 
accepted without question. As with the problem of replacing 
well-functioning mules with new rings, I think it is much more 
useful to determine at what interest rate the information in 
Table 7 indicates that an investor should be indifferent about 
installing new automatic looms or new plain looms.21 This 
interest rate, of course, also represents the rate of return that 
would be earned on the extra capital invested in automatic 
looms (i.e., the cost of automatic looms minus the cost of the 
plain looms) once it had been decided to invest in some kind 
of loom. Thus, for example, in the above case, the automatic 
looms were a better original investment than the plain looms 
if the interest rate was below approximately 11.2%. This is 
so because the extra capital invested in the plain looms would 
earn a return of approximately 11.2% per annum. This, in 
turn, means that if market conditions were such that the plain 
looms would earn a return of 6%, then the automatic looms 
20
 See Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 341, and my 
"Comment," p. 624. 
211 am assuming that the weaving shed is also new or else is equally well suited 
to either automatic or plain looms. 
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TABLE 8 
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF PRODUCING ONE POUND OF

CLOTH BY PLAIN AND BY AUTOMATIC WEAVING IN

ONE TEXTILE MILL, 1910-1911

Automatic Plain 
Looms Looms 
Labor cost of yarn $0.033012 $0.033254 
Labor cost of weaving .028110 .046250 
Total labor cost .061122 .079504 
Works expense cost of yarn .016719 .017036 
.013300 .014660 
Works expense cost of weaving 
.030019 .031696 
Total works expense 
.017988 .018765 
Depreciation cost 
.109129 .129965 
Total conversion cost 
.165067 .165067 
Cotton cost 
Total cost per pound of 
cloth 274196 .295032 
Total cost per yard of cloth 049494 .053255 
would earn a total rate of return of approximately 9.7%. This 
is a weighted average of 6% on the capital needed for plain 
looms and 11.2% on the extra capital needed to have automatic 
looms instead.22 If the plain looms could earn no return at 
all, then the total rate of return on the automatic looms would 
be approximately 8.0%, this being the weighted average of 
0.0% and 11.2%. 
Another set of data bearing on this problem is presented 
by the United States Tariff Board in its 1912 study of the 
cotton textile industry.23 These data are presented in Table 
8. 
The data are of only limited use, however. The main trouble 
is that they say nothing about the cost of capital and that the 
depreciation item included clearly refers to the whole process 
of converting ginned cotton into gray cloth. I see no way of 
22
 The two rates of return are combined (weighted by the cost of plain looms 
relative to the incremental cost of automatic looms) because it is only the incremental 
capital needed for automatic looms that has been found to yield 11.2% per annum. 
The cost of installing automatic looms is thus the cost of installing plain looms 
plus the incremental cost of the automatic looms. 
23
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 342. 
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calculating the capital costs of the two methods of weaving 
from this information.24 In addition, the value of the data 
is called into serious question by the willingness of the Tariff 
Board to compare automatic looms (of necessity, modern) with 
plain looms installed before the Civil War.25 Although the Tariff 
Board says nothing about the ages of the machines compared 
in Table 8, it seems quite likely that some such mismatch 
underlies these data.26 
Nevertheless, I would argue that something can be salvaged 
from the board's data by considering only the reduction in 
labor costs resulting from the use of automatic looms. If this 
percentage of reduction is applied to the data provided by 
Uttley, it turns out that the total cost of automatic weaving 
was less than the total cost of plain weaving if the interest 
rate was below 14.5% (assuming Uttley's 7% depreciation rate 
and the other limitations listed above). This result can be taken 
as at least some evidence that Uttley's calculations were of the 
right order of magnitude. 
These calculations indicate a rate of return on extra money 
spent on installing automatic instead of plain looms of between 
11% and 15% per annum. In fact, however, there is good 
reason to believe that these numbers are somewhat exaggerated. 
Thus, it is clear that the automatic looms required more 
maintenance than did the plain looms.27 In the case of Uttley's 
example, he reports that the automatic looms required "extra 
repairs, space, power, etc."28 but these considerations were 
not included in his calculations. 
In addition, of course, the 11% and 15% figures assume 
continual operation at 100% of capacity. Any slipping below 
100% utilization would lower the cutoff point below the above 
figures. Finally, the 7% charged for depreciation and obsoles­
cence is a very arbitrary figure. Any change in this number 
would, of course, result in an opposite change in the cutoff 
24See my "Comment," pp. 626-27. 
25
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 470. 
26
 See my "Comment," p. 627. 
27
 This was even admitted by General Draper himself, although he tried to 
play it down (see Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 343). 
28
 Utt ley, Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the United States, p . 26 . 
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point. In this connection, it might be noted that at least in 
regard to spinning and preparatory machinery, which was 
probably less subject to obsolescence than were looms during 
this period, the standard British practice was to charge 10% 
for depreciation, obsolescence, and repairs. It is by no means 
obvious that this 10% rate is evidence of excessive conservatism. 
The range of rationality with regard to rates of depreciation 
must certainly stretch at least from 7% to 10%. (For a discussion 
of the problem of determining appropriate rates of depreciation, 
see Appendix B). 
Given these various considerations, a range of from 9% to 
12% seems a better estimate of the rate of return on extra 
capital put into automatic looms than the original 11% to 15% 
range I calculated. This, of course, is not to deny that in some 
particular instances the rate of return might have been much 
higher. If it was noticeably lower, as it presumably was for 
those fabrics not "suited" to production on automatic looms, 
automatic looms would clearly not have been used.29 
These calculations indicate rates of return on automatic looms 
consistent with their installation when capacity was expanded. 
This is indeed what appears to have happened in the United 
States during this period.30 On the other hand, such rates 
29
 It is likely that the longer work days customary in the South, as opposed 
to New England, tended to make the rates of return a bit higher there. As for 
wage levels, although the average wage was certainly lower in the South, the 
small-town location of most southern cotton mills probably made the marginal 
wage a good deal higher than the average wage. Thus, automatic looms may 
well have been somewhat more attractive in the South than in New England 
(Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 39, 115-17). 
30The number of automatic looms installed increased from 12,661 in 1899 to 
136,322 in 1914 in the South and from 13,752 to 150,464 in the North. During 
the same period, the number of plain looms increased from 97,926 to 127,361 
in the South and decreased from 285,133 to 229,713 in the North (Feller, "The 
Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 326). The entire decrease in the 
number of plain looms in the North occurred between 1909 and 1913, a period 
when the number of plain looms in the South remained constant. These years 
in all probability witnessed the replacement of plain looms in New England that 
had been installed well before 1895 and had finally stopped functioning satisfac­
torily. These numbers certainly give no evidence of any mass junking of well-func­
tioning plain looms, as undoubtedly would have happened had the rates of return 
on automatics been much higher than those calculated above (the range for throwing 
out well-functioning plain looms and replacing them with automatics corresponding 
to the 11.2% and 14.5% figures calculated above is 5.9% to 8.3%). These numbers 
also indicate that only a relatively small portion of all the automatic looms installed 
in the United States before 1914 had to be installed in buildings that previously 
housed plain looms. 
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of return are somewhat less than sensational,31 and can hardly 
have revolutionized productivity per unit of all inputs, as 
opposed to output per unit of labor, in the industry.32 
The Automatic Loom under British Conditions 
The principal problem in applying these data to the British 
pre-World War I experience is determining the extent of the 
labor-saving that was available in Great Britain from using 
automatic looms. Because there was very little experience with 
automatic looms in Britain before World War I, only scattered 
pieces of data are available on automatic weaving wages in 
this period. Furthermore, such data as exists are available only 
because these particular wages (i.e., the wages in a particular 
plant or company) were at issue in strikes and lockouts. System­
atic data on the wages of automatic loom weavers in Great 
Britain are not available for any period before the middle 1930s. 
I feel, however, that these data can be used to get a general 
idea of the change in per-unit labor costs resulting from using 
automatic rather than plain looms, even in the pre-World War 
I period. I would argue further that any bias that results from 
using 1930s data is in favor of the automatic loom. This follows 
from the fact that by 1930 the automatic loom had at least 
grudgingly been accepted by the workers and had been incor­
31
 Peter McClelland has pointed out that this good, but not sensational, rate 
of return can be taken as evidence of a good pricing policy on the part of the 
Draper Company. By setting the price of the automatic loom, on which they 
had a patent monopoly, at a level that yielded a return just high enough to 
induce rapid adoption, the company must have come very close to maximizing 
its own profits. Assuming these actions were deliberate, the Draper Company 
did a beautiful job of extracting the monopoly profits available. The British price, 
however, was so high as to allow little or no adoption. The direct cause of this 
high price was that the North American Draper Company demanded such a 
large percentage of the (nominally independent) British Draper Company's profits 
in return for patents, designs, and so on (as noted above, the American Company 
took 2/3 of the shares in the British Company) that the British investors could 
not make a reasonable rate of return on their investment if looms were to be 
sold at a price low enough to induce rapid adoption in Great Britain. The rationale 
for this action by the American company, I suspect, was fear of a British price 
low enough to induce export to the United States. 
32
 In this context, it is interesting to note that the figures on productivity change 
in the Massachusetts cotton textile industry to be presented in chapter 5 indicate 
that the rate of productivity increase was considerably greater between 1880 and 
1895 than between 1895 and 1910. The latter period, of course, witnessed a 
very rapid adoption of automatic looms in Massachusetts. 
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porated into the "system." No longer was every introduction 
followed by disputes over wages and work loads. In the past, 
such disputes had frequently resulted in strikes.33 In addition, 
it is perfectly clear that the possibilities for increasing the number 
of looms per weaver, a tendency clearly in evidence during 
the post-World War I period, were greater on automatic than 
on plain looms.34 
Finally, all authorities agree that the automatic loom was 
being rapidly improved throughout this period, whereas the 
plain loom remained pretty much unchanged.35 In the 1930s, 
about half of the automatic looms operating in Lancashire had 
been installed after World War I, whereas almost all the plain 
looms were pre-World War I.36 
Very extensive data on weaving wages, both for automatic 
and plain looms, for the year 1936 are presented by E. M. 
Gray in his book The Weaver's Wage. The data presented by 
Gray indicate that there was a high concentration of weavers 
having 6 plain looms apiece or from 11 to 16 automatic looms 
apiece.37 Those having fewer looms, he reports, were usually 
either learners or operators working on extremely wide looms 
or complex fabrics. On the other hand, those operating more 
looms usually had particularly narrow looms and simple fab­
rics.38 The standard assignments clearly appear to have been 
6 plain looms or between 11 and 16 automatic looms. For 
purposes of this analysis, I shall make the relatively conservative 
33
 Gibson , Cotton Textile Wages in the United States and Great Britain, p p . 7 0 - 7 6 . 
34
 The British unions finally abandoned their policy of not more than four 
plain looms per man after World War I (Gray, The Weaver's Wage, p. 10). For 
a discussion of the American experience with increased work loads, see R. C. 
Nyman, Union-Management Cooperation in the Stretchout. 
35See, for example, Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 123. 
36
 It might be noted that the fact that after World War I the number of automatic 
looms in Lancashire was increasing while the number of plain looms was decreas­
ing—and decreasing at a fairly rapid rate (40% in the 1920s and 1930s [see 
Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 330])—is difficult to explain unless 
(1) the automatic loom was getting more efficient at a faster rate than the plain 
loom, or (2) larger labor savings were available as a result of changing from 
plain to automatic looms than had previously been the case, or (3) previously 
mistaken entrepreneurs suddenly "saw the light" with regard to automatic looms. 
Of these possible explanations, I find the last one to be the least plausible. 
37
 Gray, The Weaver's Wage, pp. 10, 35. The average appears to have been 
about 6 1/2 for men and 5 1/2 for women. 
38Ibid., p. 9. 
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assumption that the average number of automatics tended was 
14. 
If we make a 10% allowance for the greater speed and output 
of the English over the American plain looms39 and apply 
the loom-output ratio given for the United States by Uttley, 
these data indicate that the labor cost of weavers per unit of 
output on automatic looms in Great Britain was 67.9% of the 
cost of plain looms. The corresponding figure given for the 
United States in Uttley's example was 52.8%. 
The second problem in this analysis is to determine the capital 
cost of plain and automatic looms in Great Britain. I have 
accepted the Tariff Board's assertion that plain looms were 
24% cheaper in Great Britain than in the United States.40 As 
for the ratio of the price of automatic looms to the price of 
plain looms, this is variously given as from 2.5/1 to 3/1.41 
This is virtually the same price ratio that existed in the United 
States. I therefore felt free to use the ratio of 2.75/1, given 
in Uttley's example. 
If we assume that the wage rate per loom was the same 
in the United States and Great Britain, an application of the 
information about Great Britain discussed above to the Uttley 
data results in a rate of return on the extra capital invested 
in the automatic looms of 6.2% (assuming 100% capacity 
utilization and 7% for depreciation, obsolescence, and upkeep). 
In fact, however, wages were probably somewhat higher in 
Great Britain than in the United States.42 A very generous 
allowance for this fact would raise the British rate of return 
from 6.2% to perhaps 10%. 
This calculation, admittedly based on very scanty data, thus 
results in a rate-of-return range of 11% to 15% for the United 
States and a single and, in my opinion, very conservative estimate 
of 10% for Great Britain. The method of calculating the British 
number certainly makes it more like the upper than the lower 
of the American figures. Furthermore, as with spinning equip­
ment, the problem of capacity utilization was more serious in 
39See U.S. Tariff Board, pp. 490-92.

40Ibid., p. 465.

41
 Ibid., p. 494; and Farnie, "The Textile Industry: Woven Fabrics," p. 586.

42Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 303.
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Great Britain than in the United States. As will be recalled, 
this results both from the slower growth of British output in 
this period and the predilection of the British for spreading 
available work regardless of the types of equipment in different 
plants. Thus, in a period of slack demand, a British weaving 
shed equipped with automatic looms might well have had trouble 
in making full use of its low variable cost advantage. In addition, 
Great Britain seems to have had rather more strikes. The strike 
problem is made even more serious when it is realized that, 
at least in Great Britain, the introduction of automatic weaving 
in itself was quite likely to bring on a strike.43 
If 80% capacity utilization was expected,44 the British rate 
of return on automatic looms would fall from 10% to about 
6.6%. In addition, if 10% was allocated for depreciation, 
obsolescence, and upkeep, then the rate of return would be 
down to 3.6%—hardly an attrative investment. 
A final reference should be made to the experience of the 
one British firm that employed automatic looms before World 
War I and whose experience is known in some detail. The 
reason this firm's experience is known, incidentally, is that it 
had so much labor trouble with its automatic weaving facilities. 
In 1903, Ashton Brothers of Hyde opened a good-sized auto­
matic weaving shed, equipped with Northrop looms. After a 
dispute with its employees that almost resulted in a strike, the 
company obtained a one-year agreement concerning work loads 
and wages on the automatic looms. This settlement appears 
to have been slightly more favorable to the firm than the 
assumptions I have used in calculating the rate of return of 
automatic weaving in Great Britain. The workers were unhappy 
with this settlement once work began, however, and as soon 
as the agreement expired, they went on strike. The outcome 
of this strike, which began in May 1904 is, unfortunately, not 
43
 See Gibson , Cotton Textile Wages in the United States and Great Britain, p p . 
70-76. 
44
 This percentage makes no allowance for the possibility that a strike could 
be brought on because of the introduction of the automatic looms. Such a strike 
would, of course, do even more to reduce the benefits of automatic looms; it 
would idle all the firm's equipment and its management and would do so only 
because the automatic equipment was introduced. Regular strikes would presumably 
idle all the firm's equipment regardless of whether it had automatic or plain 
looms. 
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known. In April 1908, however, another strike broke out at 
Ashton Brothers. Once again, the issue was work loads and 
wages on the automatic looms. After three months, the strike 
was settled with a 7.5% wage increase.45 Although it is possible 
that this firm got a somewhat larger labor-saving from its 
automatic looms than I have assumed in my calculations,46 
any advantage they gained was accompanied by continual labor 
discord and two undoubtedly expensive strikes within the course 
of six years.47 This could hardly have been either a very 
profitable experience for the firm or much of an inducement 
to other firms to adopt automatic looms. 
THE WARP STOP MOTION 
While discussing the role of the automatic loom in the 
pre-World War I period, some mention must also be made 
of the warp stop motion. This device could be attached to 
plain looms, in the United States at a cost of about $25.00;48 
and as noted above, it accomplished part of the purposes of 
the automatic loom. Almost never used in Great Britain, this 
device was widely adopted in New England as a modification 
to previously installed plain looms. New nonautomatic looms 
with warp stop motions, however, were not considered a viable 
alternative to new automatic looms.49 Thus, though New En­
gland manufacturers preferred plain looms with warp stop 
45
 Cotton Factory Times, Ju ly 24 , 1908.

46
 It is only certain that they did so for the first year of their operations.

47
 Because Ashton Brothers put in their Northrop looms some time before the

British Northrop Company was organized, it seems very likely their looms were 
imported from the United States. This means, however, that they must have 
paid the American price, which I have concluded was about 33% above the later 
British price, plus transport, for their Northrop looms. This, in turn, means that 
Ashton Brothers must have needed a very substantial decrease in labor costs 
in order to make the automatic looms a profitable investment. Probably they 
were hoping to get their work loads on automatic looms up to American standards. 
Such a move from 4 to around 20 looms per man would undoubtedly have made 
the investment in automatics very profitable. Unfortunately for the firm, they 
were unable to get terms anywhere near this standard, despite all the labor trouble 
and strikes. 
48
 Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 344. 
49Ibid., pp. 344-46. 
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motions to plain looms without them, they also preferred 
automatic looms to plain looms with warp stop motions. 
Given this fact, if plain looms were preferable to automatic 
looms in Great Britain, it seems reasonable to expect that plain 
looms without warp stop motions would also be preferable 
to plain looms with warp stop motions. If this were not true, 
it would mean that the preference ordering of New England 
and British cotton manufacturers between plain looms with 
warp stop motions and automatic looms was not the same. 
Although such a situation is certainly possible, I do not think 
it reasonable, in the absence of any direct evidence, to assume 
that it existed.50 Only if such an assumption is made can the 
non-use of the warp stop motion in Britain be taken as evidence 
of faulty management. 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE RESPONSE OF BRITISH FIRMS 
TO AUTOMATIC WEAVING 
These calculations unfortunately cannot be taken as conclusive 
evidence of the complete rationality of British cotton manufac­
turers in their choice between plain and automatic looms. It 
is certainly possible that there were situations where automatic 
looms were a much more attractive investment than my calcula­
tions indicate. On the other hand, some few automatic looms 
were in fact installed in Great Britain before World War I. 
Although I admit the possibility that British manufacturers 
in general were somewhat more conservative than their Ameri­
can counterparts with regard to weaving technology and that 
a few of them may have made a mistake in passing up the 
investment opportunity available in the form of the automatic 
loom, I think, however, the evidence makes it highly unlikely 
that the British cotton manufacturers as a group made some 
tremendously costly and remarkably stupid error in not going 
50
 For the plain loom with warp stop-motion to be superior to the automatic 
loom in Great Britain, unlike the New England situation, would require that 
the ratio of the wage-saving on warp stop-motion to the wage-saving on automatics 
was considerably greater in Great Britain than in the United States. This, in 
turn, would require that British workers were relatively much more adept at, 
or fond of, the warp stop-motion as compared with the automatic loom than 
were American workers. Such a situation, though possible, does not seem likely. 
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over to automatic weaving on a large scale. On the contrary, 
a very reasonable defense can be made of the proposition that 
automatic looms did not appear to be, and in fact, were not, 
a particularly attractive investment opportunity in Great Britain 
before World War I. 
I find this argument very comforting. To see why, just 
consider the consequences of rejecting it. Such a rejection would 
imply that British cotton manufacturers ignored a remarkably 
attractive investment opportunity when they failed to install 
large numbers of automatic looms. This, of course, means that 
they would have made a lot of money had they invested in 
automatic looms, and it certainly means that those few British 
manufacturers who did put in automatic looms must have made 
large profits. The 5,500 automatic looms in use in Lancashire 
in May 191151 were enough to equip at least 10 or 15 good-sized 
weaving sheds.52 Within the small geographical area of Lanca­
shire, there must thus have been a number of firms directly 
experiencing the advantages of the automatic loom. If this 
was really such a profitable investment, it is difficult to believe 
that the rest of the industry would not have acted on this 
knowledge. Because automatic looms constituted about 40% 
of the total investment in a weaving shed, a very high rate 
of return on automatic looms would inevitably have been 
strongly reflected in the overall profitability of the firms using 
them. Furthermore, if the automatics were so highly profitable, 
it seems inevitable that the firms using them would expand 
very rapidly, especially if the great majority of firms rejected 
this opportunity. Even if the banks ignored the automatic firms, 
despite what would have had to be sensational profits, the 
firms themselves would have had their large profits to expand 
with. There is, however, no evidence whatsoever indicating 
a rapid expansion of the automatic firms. Indeed, the relatively 
slow rate of growth of the number of automatic looms in 
operation makes it virtually impossible that these firms grew 
rapidly. 
51
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 465. 
52
 See S. J. Chapman and T. S. Ashton, "The Sizes of Businesses Mainly in 
the Textile Industries," p. 486. 
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I find no greater comfort in the alternative hypothesis that 
though the automatic looms were indeed very profitable, the 
British weaving firms were so starved for capital and the capital 
market was so bad that the higher capital costs of the automatic 
loom prevented its introduction. First of all, it is difficult to 
believe that the capital market was so bad that it would not 
supply money for investments earning, let us say, 25% to 30% 
per annum. Second, though many Lancashire weaving firms 
were small and might have had trouble raising funds, there 
were also a number of large operations. In 1911, there were 
no fewer than 153 Lancashire firms operating more than 1,000 
cotton looms.53 In addition, there were a number of combined 
firms that both spun and wove and therefore operated with 
considerable capital. Indeed, if the weaving firms were excluded 
by a capital shortage from using automatic looms, one would 
certainly have expected the large spinning companies, such 
as the "Oldham Limiteds," who clearly had ready access to 
sources of capital, to move into automatic weaving. This, in 
turn, should have resulted in a growth of integrated firms, 
both in numbers and in market share. In fact, however, the 
opposite was happening. The number and market share of 
integrated firms were both declining in the pre-World War 
I period.54 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe 
that an inefficient capital market could have prevented the 
adoption of the automatic loom had it really been a highly 
profitable investment; and if the automatic loom was to have 
done much for the international competitive situation of the 
industry, it would have had to have been highly profitable. 
THE ROLE OF BRITISH UNIONS AND WORKERS 
If, then, British manufacturers did not display extreme and 
illogical conservatism in ignoring the automatic loom, the British 
worker still requires examination. The defenders of the British 
unions maintain that the unions did not oppose the automatic 
loom per se, but acted only to keep work loads and wages on 
53Ibid., p. 531.

54Ibid., pp. 491-92.
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automatic looms at appropriate levels. They tried only to keep 
the manufacturers from using the new machines as an instru­
ment to increase the work effort required for a given wage.55 
For the most part, it is probably true that the unions and 
the workers were principally concerned with work loads and 
wages and were not opposed to change on principle. In an 
important sense, however, this line of defense begs the question. 
Clearly, the work loads and wage rates agreed to were crucial 
in determining whether or not automatic looms were a good 
investment. The real question is thus whether the wage rates 
and work loads demanded by the British unions were indeed 
appropriate. 
The British weavers, with their pre-World War I standard 
assignment of four plain looms per head, obviously had much 
lower work loads than did American weavers. What is perhaps 
more important, they demanded that their work loads be 
increased by a smaller percentage and their earnings increased 
by a larger percentage when moving to automatic looms than 
did the American weavers. 
It is certainly possible to argue that the British weavers 
"should" have increased their work loads by the same percentage 
as the American weavers and with a similar change in weekly 
wages. In addition, short-time work can be regarded as an 
abuse. Because weaving labor per unit of output was somewhat 
higher in Great Britain than in the United States and machine 
costs were somewhat lower, such behavior by the workers would 
have made the automatic loom a somewhat better investment 
in Great Britain than it was in the United States. 
How important would such a development have been for 
the health of the British cotton industry as a whole? The extent 
of this effect, of course, depends on what the rate of return 
on the investment in automatic looms would have been, as 
well as the rate of return on the rest of the equipment in 
the industry. 
Table 9 shows estimates of the rate of return on the total 
investment in an integrated mill with automatic looms, assuming 
55
 Turner, Trade Union Growth, Structure, and Policy, p. 259. For the workers' 
statement of their case, see the Cotton Factory Times, 24 July 1908. 
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TABLE 9 
RATES OF RETURN OF INTEGRATED MILLS

WITH AND WITHOUT AUTOMATIC LOOMS

(% per annum) 
Rate of return without 
automatic looms 4 6 8 10 12 14 
Rate of return with auto­
matic looms at 12% 5.33 7 8.66 10.33 12 13.66 
TABLE 10 
SAVINGS PER YARD OF CLOTH MADE POSSIBLE BY THE INTRODUCTION OF AUTOMATIC 
LOOMS RETURNING 12% 
Rate of return without 
automatic looms 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 
Savings per yard of cloth 
in cents per yard 053 .040 .027 .013 0 -.013 
NOTE: Based on Uttley's example adjusted for British conditions. 
that the extra capital invested in automatic looms returned 
12% (this estimated rate includes an adjustment for the expected 
level of capacity utilization), at various rates of return on the 
rest of the equipment. 
Perhaps a more illuminating exercise is to see what effect 
these 12% investments in automatic looms would have had 
on the prices at which the cloth could be sold while maintaining 
the rate of return previously earned without automatic looms. 
Table 10 contains estimates of these savings. Once again, a 
12% rate of return is assumed on the extra capital put into 
automatic looms. These savings should be compared with a 
total conversion cost of about two cents per yard and a sales 
price in the vicinity of five cents per yard. 
These cost-saving estimates should not be considered to be 
more than approximations, but there can be no doubt that 
the cost differences are small. A way to judge the importance 
of these cuts is to compare them with the effect of a 10% 
wage cut in weaving. This particular comparison is of interest 
because British cotton textile workers accepted such cuts in 
LANCASHIRE AND THE AUTOMATIC LOOM (87 
the interwar period.56 A 10% wage cut would have permitted 
a price cut of about 0.04 cents per yard of cloth.57 That is 
more or less equivalent to the saving resulting from the use 
of 12% automatics, if the overall rate of return was to be kept 
at 6%.58 
It must also be kept in mind that the wage cuts applied 
to all weaving sheds. The automatic loom, on the other hand, 
would clearly not have been adopted by all British weaving 
sheds under the conditions posited above. Some types of cloth 
were not well suited to production on automatic looms, and 
such types of cloth made up an unusually large percentage 
of British production.59 In addition, at a yield of 12% it would 
not have paid to throw out well-functioning plain looms. 
Considering these points, and that the American industry was 
expanding more rapidly than the British industry, it is almost 
certain that Britain would have had a smaller percentaage of 
automatics in 1914 than the 45% registered for the United 
States. Furthermore, some portion of these automatics would 
have been installed in weaving sheds originally designed for 
plain looms. The necessary conversion of the buildings would 
have required an extra investment and therefore a rate of 
return below that 12% posited above.60 
These speculations are, of course, based on the conditions 
56
 See J e w k e s a n d G r a y , Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry. 
57
 Again, this refers to the type of cloth involved in Uttley's example. 
58
 Six percent is clearly a conservative estimate of the rate of return on cotton 
textile investment in the pre-World War I period. In the period 1900-1914, British 
spinning companies paid annual dividends approximately equal to 7.25% of 
their capital (Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 338). During roughly the 
same period, it is estimated that the average rate of return on all industrial investment 
in Great Britain was 14% per annum. This number, however, assumes a somewhat 
lower rate of depreciation than that which I have used (see E. H. Phelps Brown 
and B. Weber, "Accumulation, Productivity and Distribution in the British Economy, 
1870-1938," pp. 266, 273). This data on average returns makes it difficult to 
believe that the failure to invest in 12% automatic looms was a major misallocation 
of resources in the British economy. It is, of course, still true that the money 
may have been put into some other very low rate of return investments instead 
of into automatic looms. In that case, however, the automatic looms were not 
so much a lost opportunity as the other low rate of return investments were 
mistakes. 
59See, for example, Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 122. 
60
 See Frankel, "Obsolescence and Technical Change in a Maturing Economy," 
p. 313; and Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, p. 85. 
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TABLE 11 
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN BRITISH COTTON WEAVING IN SELECTED YEARS 
1922 71% 
1923 74 
1924 84 
1925 85 
1930 54 
1935 74 
1936 80 
1937 83 
1938 66 
SOURCES: 1922-25: Daniels and Jewkes, "The Crisis in the Lancashire Cotton Industry," p. 45; 1930-38: 
Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 344. Robson gives a lower figure than Daniels and Jewkes for 
the only overlapping year 1924. It should be noted that only one year from the depths of the depression 
is included. 
that existed before World War I, and implicitly assumed that 
a rational decision-maker at that time should have assumed 
that those conditions would continue. This is probably the best 
way to judge entrepreneurial and union behavior. Before 
accusing these groups of excessive conservatism when it came 
to sinking money into capital intensive equipment, however, 
I think it is useful to apply the advantages of hindsight to 
see what would have happened to less conservative investors. 
Thus, it is certainly reasonable to inquire into what would have 
happened to an entrepreneur who installed automatic looms 
just before World War I. In doing so, I shall once again assume 
that a 12% rate of return applied. 
The periods just before and just after the war would have 
been very prosperous for this manufacturer. With capacity 
utilization at 100%, or even above, he would certainly have 
made his 12%. During the war itself, he may have been hindered 
somewhat by the cotton shortage, but this would probably not 
have been a really serious problem. During the decline that 
set in after these years of prosperity, however, his investment 
would not have looked so good. Table 11 contains estimates 
of capacity utilization in British weaving during these years. 
An automatic weaving firm might have been able to operate 
at a slightly higher level of capacity utilization than the above 
averages, but the practice of short-time work would have made 
much higher rates of operation very unlikely. In addition, 
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during this period, prices fell sufficiently low so that large 
numbers of plain looms were junked. At prices that failed 
to cover variable costs on plain looms, the automatic looms 
would not have returned their incremental 12%, even at 100% 
capacity utilization. 
Thus, though it is undoubtedly true that a British industry 
equipped with automatic looms would have been more competi­
tive on world markets in the 1920s and 1930s,61 it is hardly 
likely that the extra capital involved would have earned a 
satisfactory rate of return. Having more capital invested in 
an industry with collapsing foreign markets may allow the 
industry to stay in business longer, but only because there is 
more equipment that has to be physically depreciated. 
Although British cotton manufacturers were probably better 
off in the 1920s and 1930s without a lot of expensive automatic 
looms, however, the British workers might have been better 
off with those looms. If the lower price made possible by the 
automatic looms permitted an increase in output greater than 
the percentage decrease in labor input resulting from the 
automatic loom, then more work would have been available. 
There would undoubtedly have been less work in the weaving 
sheds, but this might have been more than offset by increases 
in employment in the spinning and finishing sections. It is 
also possible, of course, that there would have been no net 
increase in employment. Furthermore, any increase in the 
demand for labor would have been temporary. The adjustment 
of the economy away from cotton textiles would have had to 
come eventually and it is by no means clear that a short delay 
would have made the process any less painful.62 
61
 It should be noted, however, that a Britsih industry with lower variable costs 
would probably have encountered even more protection and perhaps more Japanese 
devaluation. Most of Lancashire's competitors were in a position to call upon 
the assistance of their governments and would certainly have done so before 
handing over much of their markets to the British. See chapters 9 and 10. 
62
 This argument is almost identical to one made with regard to the New England 
cotton textile industry. The New England textile manufacturers have been widely 
criticized for not having used the large profits they earned during World War 
I and the years immediately after the war to buy new equipment. It is claimed 
that had they done so they would have been able to meet southern competition 
more effectively and would have stayed in business longer. Although this is probably 
true, and although such a policy might have reduced short-run unemployment 
in New England, it would certainly not have helped the stockholders. Asking 
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Much stronger assumptions have to be made if it is to be 
demonstrated that the unions seriously hurt the Lancashire 
cotton textile industry by their opposition to automatic looms. 
Thus, for instance, it might conceivably be argued that the 
workers "should" have gone from 4 plain looms apiece to the 
American standard of about 20 automatic looms apiece. Fur­
thermore, the argument might continue, there was no reason 
they should have gotten any increase in their weekly wages 
because of the shift from plain to automatic looms. Applying 
these assumptions to the data given by Uttley gives a rate of 
return on the extra capital investment in automatic looms of 
about 32% (assuming 100% capacity utilization and 7% for 
depreciation, depletion, and upkeep). This, in turn, implies 
the increases in the rate of return on the total investment 
in an integrated plant presented in Table 12. The saving per 
yard of cloth (Uttley type) at various rates of return on the 
rest of the equipment is shown in Table 13. 
These savings are quite substantial. At an overall rate of 
return of 6%, it is now possible to cut the price of this type 
of cloth by about 5%. This, in turn, implies a cut in the markup 
over the cost of the raw cotton of approximately 12.5%. This 
is also the equivalent of an approximately 30% wage cut in 
the wages of the workers in a shed using plain looms. Clearly, 
such a price reduction would have made a substantial difference 
to the British position in the post-World War I period. From 
the point of view of being able to continue production in the 
face of low prices, it can also be noted that, under these 
circumstances, variable costs would have been about 0.2 cents 
per yard less with the automatic than with the plain looms. 
Furthermore, had British workers really moved from 4 plain 
to 20 automatic looms without any increase in weekly earnings, 
a large majority of all British cotton looms would probably 
have been automatic by 1914. On the other hand, some of 
them to put in equipment that would not bring an adequate rate of return is 
no different from asking them to continue to produce with the old equipment 
even at prices below variable cost (see A. Sweezy, "The Amoskeag Manufacturing 
Company," pp. 473-512). It is fascinating to note how much better, financially 
speaking, the technically "conservative" Amoskeag Company did than her more 
venturesome New England competitors. 
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TABLE 12

RATES OF RETURN ON INTEGRATED MILLS

WITH AND WITHOUT AUTOMATIC LOOMS

(% per annum)

Rate of return without 
automatic looms 4 6 8 10 12 14 
Rate of return with auto­
matic looms at 32% 8.66 10.33 12 13.66 15.33 17 
TABLE 13 
SAVINGS PER YARD OF CLOTH MADE POSSIBLE BY THE INTRODUCTION OF AUTOMATIC 
LOOMS RETURNING 32% 
Rate of return without 
automatic looms 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 
Savings per yard of cloth 
in cents per yard 133 .125 .116 .108 .100 .092 
the new automatics would have had to be installed in ill-designed 
sheds and some well-functioning plain looms would have been 
junked, thus reducing somewhat the rate of return assumed 
in the above calculations. 
Although the situation assumed above would undoubtedly 
have placed the British cotton textile industry in a stronger 
post-World War I position than that it actually experienced, 
and although the British manufacturers would probably have 
been able to make a reasonable rate of return on the extra 
capital invested even during the depression, it would probably 
not have saved the industry from a considerable contraction. 
More important, these calculations are based on very strange 
assumptions. Indeed, these calculations can best be viewed as 
an example of the extreme assumptions that have to be made 
in order to demonstrate that worker opposition, or any other 
kind of opposition for that matter, to the introduction of the 
automatic loom seriously harmed the Lancashire cotton textile 
industry. 
Certainly, if the unions were responsible for the failure of 
British weavers to adopt the "American" standard of around 
20 automatic looms per worker, they were also responsible 
92) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
for the British quota of 4, instead of 6 or 8, plain looms. 
If the unions were responsible for low work loads, then they 
hurt the British industry about equally badly with either the 
plain or the automatic loom. Of course, it could still be argued 
that unions hurt the industry because they prevented the 
attainment of workloads of 20 or so automatic looms by 1914. 
Even if this were so, however, in the absence of unions the 
automatic looms would not in themselves have earned anything 
like 32% because the workers would also be operating 6 or 
8 plain looms. Under those circumstances, the automatic loom 
would once again have been about as good an investment in 
Great Britain as it was in the United States. 
Indeed, even the assumption that the British unions were 
responsible for keeping British work loads below American 
levels is probably unsound. Although the unions may have 
had something to do with it, it should be noted that British 
work loads in general were lower than American work loads. 
Furthermore, these lower work loads in Great Britain were 
not limited to industries or crafts with strong unions. The 
argument about British unions and work loads thus easily 
deteriorates into the not-very-illuminating conclusion that the 
British cotton industry would have been better off had British 
weavers accepted American work loads in return for British 
earnings. 
OVERALL EFFICIENCY 
AND LABOR 
PRODUCTIVITY IN 
LANCASHIRE AND 
MASSACHUSETTS BEFORE 
WORLD WAR I 
Easily the most important and influential work on productivity 
changes in the Lancashire cotton textile industry, as well as 
the Massachusetts cotton textile industry and a number of other 
industries, is that of G. T. Jones. This is particularly true of 
the period leading up to World War I because the later work 
of Marc Blaug ends in 1886.1 Jones's calculations are included 
in Increasing Returns, published in 1933. 
The most important conclusion reached by Jones, at least 
for the purposes of this study, is that there was "little, if any, 
net change in the efficiency of British cotton . . . manufac­
turing" between 1885 and 1910.2 Indeed, his figures indicate 
that a similar conclusion holds up to 1914 as well as up to 
1910.3 Jones also concludes that during the same period 
efficiency in the Massachusetts cotton textile industry increased 
'M. Blaug, "The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry 
during the Nineteenth Century." 
2
 Jones, Increasing Returns, p. 51. 
3
 Jones's figures indicate an efficiency improvement of between 0% and 2% 
between 1885 and 1914, depending on what type of moving average is used. 
I shall be conservative and use the 0% result. See Jones, Increasing Returns, p. 
274. 
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by about 17%.4 The conclusion concerning Lancashire is made 
even more startling when Jones subdivides the period. He finds 
that efficiency increased by about 1/2% per annum during 
the 1890s but that this improvement was offset by a similar 
rate of decrease in efficiency between 1900 and 1910, or 1914 
for that matter.5 Jones himself is somewhat perplexed by the 
decrease in efficiency after 1900. 
Curiously [he states] this progressive fall in efficiency, at least
so far as the consumer is concerned with the term, accompanied 
great expansion of plant and a rapid increase in the average 
size of firms operating.6 
Despite Jones's own apparent surprise at his findings, they 
have had a tremendous influence on subsequent views of the 
Lancashire cotton industry in the pre-World War I period. 
To take only one prominent example, J. H. Clapham states 
that "the real costs of cotton manufacture, on the other hand, 
fell a little in the nineties and then rose."7 Clapham then 
proceeds to quote, without any reservation, Jones's conclusion 
that efficiency in the British cotton textile industry did not 
improve between 1885 and 1910. He also notes the improvement 
Jones found in the efficiency of the Massachusetts industry.8 
Other prominent economic historians who agree that there 
was no improvement in the efficiency of the Lancashire (or 
British) cotton textile industry between 1885 and 1910 include 
E. H. Phelps-Brown, S. J. Handfield-Jones,9 Sidney Pollard,10 
R. E. Tyson,11W. Ashworth,12 and Colin Clark (Jones's editor).13 
4Jones states that the improvement was 17% (Ibid., p. 51), but his tables indicate 
that it was either about 15% or about 13% depending on whether 1910 or 1860 
weights are used (pp. 289-90). 
5Ibid., pp. 55, 117.

6Ibid., p. 117.

7
 Clapham, The Economic History of Modern Britain, p. 70.

8
 Ibid.

9E. H. Phelps-Brown and S. J. Handfield-Jones, "The Climacteric of the 1890's:

A Study in the Expanding Economy," p. 274. 
10S. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy, 1914-1950, p. 4. 
11
 Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 123. 
12W. Ashworth, An Economic History of England, 1870 to 1939, p. 106. 
13C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, pp. 306-10. 
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A. E. Musson refers to "declining efficiency" in the British 
cotton industry and mentions the much better performance 
of the American industry.14 C. P. Kindleberger also mentions 
Jones's findings on the British cotton industry, but his statements 
concerning the efficiency of the industry are more restrained 
than those of Jones himself and the authors listed above.15 
There can be no doubt that these authors have been in­
fluenced in their general view of the British cotton textile 
industry by Jones's results. With the possible exception of Tyson, 
they are all highly critical of Lancashire for not adopting the 
automatic loom and for not going all out for ring spinning. 
What is more, Tyson, who apparently believes that the automatic 
loom and ring spindle were ill suited to Lancashire's needs, 
still concludes: 
The greater use of these two inventions [i.e., the automatic 
loom and the ring spindle] was a major factor in the much 
more rapid increase in efficiency in the American cotton in­
dustry.16 
Tyson presents Jones's results to justify his statement that 
American (or at least Massachusetts) efficiency increased much 
faster than British (i.e., Lancashire) efficiency.17 Kindleberger 
also links a drop in the rate of increase in efficiency with the 
failure to adopt ring spindles and automatic looms.18 
Although Jones's results are generally accepted and widely 
used by economic historians, however, they nonetheless have 
some very peculiar aspects. In particular, it is very difficult 
to reconcile the lack of improvement in overall efficiency 
between 1884 and World War I, not to mention the decrease 
in efficiency recorded after 1900, with what was happening 
to output per unit of labor input. 
A first estimate of output per unit of labor input in Lancashire 
is presented in Table 14. This table contains an index, and 
14
 A. E. Musson, "The Great Depression in Britain," p. 207.

15
 Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain, pp. 137, 273.

16Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 122.

17
 Ibid.

18
 Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain, p. 273.
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TABLE 14 
INDICES OF OUTPUT PER WORKER IN THE 
LANCASHIRE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
(1890-1899 = 100) 
Year Index
1884 92

1885 83

1886 92

1887 92

1888 94

1889 93

1890 100

1891 98

1892 92

1893 91

1894 99

1895 100

1896 101

1897 100

1898 108

1899 Ill

1900 105

1901 107

1902 105

1903 98

1904 98

1905 114

1906 115

1907 117

1908 99

1909 108

1910 94

1911 Ill

1912 120

1913 119

Three-year 
 . . . .Moving Average 
 90

 89

 89

 93

 93

 96

 97

 97

 94

 93

 97

 100

 100

 103

 106

 108

 108

 106

 105

 100

 107

 109

 115

 110

 108

 100

 104

 108

 117

 120*

SOURCE: Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones, "The Climacteric of the 1890s," pp. 294, 295, 297. 
•Based on two years only. 
a three-year moving average of this index, relating the output 
of cotton goods to employment in the British cotton textile 
industry. The output part of this index was developed by none 
other than G. T. Jones himself.19 This output part (i.e., the 
numerator) consists of the mean of the indices of cotton 
19Jones, Increasing Returns, p. 275. 
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consumption (i.e., yarn produced) and yarn consumed. Yarn 
consumed is defined as yarn produced minus exports and 
increases in stocks. The employment series (i.e., the denominator 
of the index) consists of employment in British cotton mills 
and is based on the occupational classifications used by The 
Census of England and Wales, 1911, vol. 9, Occupations and 
Industries, Part 1. 
The three-year moving average of this output-per-worker 
index indicates approximately a 38% increase in output per 
worker between 1885 and 1913. It is likely that this is a slight 
exaggeration, however, because the period 1912-14 was some­
what more prosperous for the cotton industry than was the 
period 1884-86. Good years tend to give higher output-per­
worker figures because there is less unemployment than in 
bad years. Indeed, it can easily be seen from Table 14 that 
there is something of a cyclical movement in these indices and 
that this movement corresponds, at least roughly, to movements 
of prosperity and recession in the industry. In view of this 
fact, I would estimate that a 35% increase in output per worker 
is a more accurate figure than 38%. 
This series, moreover, should be adjusted for several other 
factors. First of all, there is the 6% improvement in average 
wages resulting from changes in the composition of the work 
force to be considered. Because the principal purpose of this 
exercise is to measure the improvement in output per unit 
of labor due to such factors as improved machinery, organiza­
tion, and management, it seems appropriate to subtract this 
6% from the 35% increase in output per worker. On the other 
hand, the 3% decrease in the work week that occurred in 1901 
should be added. The net effect of these two adjustments in 
the output-per-worker series is to reduce the 35% improvement 
in output per worker to a 32% improvement in output per 
unit of labor input. 
So far, it has been assumed that the quality of the product 
remained constant between 1885 and 1913. In fact, however, 
it is perfectly clear that average quality was improving. My 
earlier study of changes in the quality of British cotton textile 
exports indicates a 7% to 8% improvement in the quality of 
the average piece of cotton cloth and pound of cotton yarn 
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exported between 1885 and 1913.20 Because exports amounted 
to almost 80% of British cotton output (by weight) in 1900, 
changes in export quality must have had a preponderant effect 
on overall quality. Moreover, observers of the industry are 
virtually unanimous in the opinion that this period witnessed 
considerable improvement in the average quality of output.21 
I believe that using the 7% to 8% estimate I calculated for 
exports as a measure of overall quality improvement will not 
result in much error. 
After this final adjustment, my calculations indicate that 
output per unit of labor input increased by approximately 40% 
between 1885 and 1913. This represents a growth rate of almost 
exactly 1% per annum compounded. The cyclical nature of 
the series makes it very difficult to say much about the trend 
rate during various subperiods. I think the most reasonable 
preliminary conclusion is that the rate of increase was about 
the same over the entire period. Certainly, there is no evidence 
of an end to the growth of output per unit of labor input 
after 1900. This is especially true when it is considered that 
the work week was reduced by 3% in 1901 and that the period 
1898-1900 was a prosperous one for the cotton industry.22 
Thus, the problem arises of reconciling a 40% increase in 
output per unit of labor input between 1885 and 1914 with 
Jones's finding of no decrease in real cost. One possible way 
of reconciling such results would be to assume a constant 
technology combined with a very large increase in capital per 
head. In other words, a replacement of labor by capital without 
any improvement in the average productivity of the capital 
equipment despite its average later date of construction.23 In 
fact, however, technology was improving,24 and the standard 
20Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," p. 
11. 
21
 See, for example, S. Chapman, A Reply to the Report of the Tariff Commission, 
p.	 xv. 
22
 Cotton consumption set new records in both 1898 and 1899, and consumption 
in 1900 was greater than in any year before 1898. See Chapter 3, Table 6. 
23
 This is the approach taken by Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones, although 
they only try to explain "part" of the difference between the real cost and the 
output-per-head series (ibid., p. 274 n). 
24
 Interest ingly e n o u g h , this fact is clearly accepted by C l a p h a m (at least in 
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criticism of the industry was that it was not adopting the new 
capital intensive methods. Furthermore, though capital deepen­
ing might explain the slow improvement in real cost up to 
1900, it is difficult to see how it could reconcile continuing 
growth in output per unit of labor after 1900 with an increase 
in real cost. 
Another approach to explaining the failure of real cost to 
decline in the 1885-1910 period is taken by Tyson. He accounts 
for the lack of improvement by accepting Jones's proposition 
that "the reasonable conclusion seems to be that a large propor­
tion of the economies reaped from technical progress have 
been offset by the high cost of meeting the demands of the 
workers as regards hours and conditions of work."25 
Although it may be true that the workers held back progress 
by such demands, this effect is already included in the index 
of output per unit of labor input. This explanation, originally 
offered by Jones and repeated by Tyson thus could not possibly 
reconcile a rapid increase in the output/labor ratio with a 
zero growth rate in overall efficiency. 
The only reasonable conclusion possible to my mind is that 
all the writers who accepted Jones's figures, including Jones 
himself, did not bother to look at the readily available figures 
on output per unit of labor input. A glance at these figures, 
together with the generally accepted belief that the average 
quality of output was increasing during the period, should 
have been enough to convince anyone that there was something 
very strange about Jones's figures for the period after 1900 
and that these results were in need of reexamination. I now 
intend to proceed with such a revision. 
THE NATURE OF JONES'S "REAL COST" INDEX 
Jones's conclusions are based on a series that he describes 
as being an index of "real cost." He uses changes in this series 
spinning) on page 176 of An Economic History of Modern Britain despite the fact 
that he also accepts Jones's conclusions about no improvements in efficiency on 
page 70. 
25Tyson, "The Cotton Industry," p. 123. 
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to measure changes in "efficiency." The index Jones computed 
for each given year is the following: 
Pa= P- 2 , ~ where, 
P'a = the "real cost" per unit of the product, 
P = the current sales price of each unit, 
IT i = the supply prices of the various inputs i in the current 
year, 
A
 { = the supply prices of the various inputs i in the base 
year, 
Yai = the amounts of the various factors i used in produc­
ing Xa units of the product in the base year, 
Xa = the amount of the product produced in the base 
year, and 
M = the number of inputs. 
In other words, the real cost is the per unit price received 
in any year minus the weighted sum of the difference between 
the price per unit of each input in the given year and in some 
base year. "Normal profits" are, of course, included because 
they represent the costs of capital and entrepreneurship. This 
real cost thus represents what it would have cost to produce 
a unit of the goods in a given year had the prices and levels 
of relative factor inputs experienced in the base year also 
occurred during the given year. 
The reader will note that P'a is the exact inverse (or shadow) 
of the total productivity measure that has achieved such promi­
nence in the last decade.26 This, of course, means that the 
rate of decline in P'a is exactly the same thing as the rate 
of increase in total factor productivity since measured by Solow 
and others. Ironically enough, though Jones's empirical results 
have been readily—in fact, too readily—accepted, he has never 
26This equivalence is asserted by D. N. McCloskey in an article in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, and is proved in his Ph.D. thesis (see D. N. McCloskey, 
"Productivity Change in British Pig Iron, 1870-1939," p. 290; and "Economic 
Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870-1915", p. 
114). 
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been given the recognition due his theoretical precociousness. 
For his computations, Jones puts the Ps and TT
 {S in index 
form, with the base year values set equal to 100. All of the 
AjS are thus equal to 100. Yai/Xa is simply the percentage 
of total costs in the base year represented by each input. This 
type of calculation will produce Pas in index form with the 
value for the base year being 100. 
In the particular case of cotton textiles, only three inputs 
(T^S and A;s) are used. These are raw cotton, labor, and all 
other expenses. The least satisfactory element in this calculation 
is clearly the "all other expenses" item. This item includes fuel, 
lubricants, upkeep, rates (i.e., property taxes), the cost of capital, 
salaries, and so on. The arbitrary nature of this category is 
increased by the fact that the trend of its supply prices (i.e., 
its ITS) is estimated by using Sauerbeck's wholesale price index,27 
which is really an index of raw material prices. 
BIASES IN JONES'S CALCULATIONS FOR LANCASHIRE 
It is absolutely clear that the final index of real cost in the 
Lancashire cotton industry in the 1885-1914 period contains 
a number of biases, the net result of which is to seriously 
overstate the industry's real cost at the end, relative to the 
beginning, of the period. I will discuss these biases one by 
one: 
1. The first and most important problem concerns the Ps 
(i.e., the price index of cotton cloth). Jones uses the price 
quotations on a group of well-defined cotton gray cloths that 
were published throughout this period by the London Economist. 
(This is a fine series; in addition to Jones, both Marc Blaug 
and I have used it in our studies of the Lancashire cotton 
textile industry.28) 
A serious difficulty arises, however, at the turn of the century. 
In 1903, the Economist suddenly changed the collection of gray 
27
 Mitchel l , Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p . 4 7 4 - 7 5 . 
28
 See Blaug, "The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry 
during the Nineteenth Century"; and Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of 
British Cotton Textile Exports." 
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cloths whose prices it published. The reason for this switch 
is clear. The old set of gray cloths had been selected in 1845, 
and by 1903 they were no longer representative of the industry's 
output. Indeed, around 1898 or 1899, the prices of this old 
set of gray cloths began to behave very strangely.29 Fortunately, 
when the new set of cloths was introduced, their prices were 
quoted back through 12 February 1898. The problem, there­
fore, is how to join the two series. 
Jones begins his discussion of this matter by reporting that 
both sets of prices were available for 1902, 1901, 1900, and 
1899,30 omitting 1898. He then argues cogently that an early 
transition should be used because "the business done in the 
constituents of the first series was already falling off in 1899."31 
On this basis, he links the series in 1899.32 On his own 
assumptions and arguments, however, it would have been better 
to make the transition in 1898. The only reasonable explanation 
of the procedure used by Jones is that he was unaware that 
the 1898 data was available.33 
The choice of year in which to link the two series turns 
out to be of utmost importance. The old set of prices increased 
by an average of 11% between 1898 and 1899 while the prices 
of the new set remained virtually constant. Thus, if the new 
series is used starting in 1898 instead of 1899, the whole real-cost 
index is pushed down by approximately seven points (and seven 
percent). This simple adjustment eliminates the very peculiar 
decline in efficiency after 1900 reported by Jones and replaces 
it with an increase in efficiency of about 0.25 percent per 
34 annum.
29Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," p. 
23. 
30
 J o n e s , Increasing Returns, p . 108. 
31
 Ibid., p. 109. 
32
 That is, he sets the value of the second series in 1899 equal to the index 
value of the first series in that year. 
331 find it difficult to understand how Jones could have missed the 1898 data. 
My suspicion is that he only looked at issues of the Economist where the January 
1898 data (which was not presented) would have appeared if the Economist had 
in fact published it. 
34
 Additional evidence for the superiority of the 1898 linkage comes from the 
behavior of the indices that have been calculated on the basis of this data. My 
index of the quality of British cotton cloth exports increases by 1.9% between 
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2. The second difficulty with Jones's results concerns the 
wage series he uses. For the years up to 1906, he uses G. 
H. Wood's index of weekly wages in the British cotton textile 
industry. On the whole, this seems to be an appropriate series. 
For purposes of measuring productivity or efficiency, however, 
this series should be adjusted in two ways. First of all, it should 
be adjusted for changes in the composition of the work force. 
The period 1885-1906 saw a sharp drop in the number of 
children working half-time in the industry. On the other hand, 
the percentage of youths and women increased. After a very 
careful study of these changes, G. H. Wood concluded that 
changes in the composition of the work force resulted in an 
increase in the average wage by almost 6%.35 Thus, for my 
purposes, this effect means that Jones overstates the increase 
in wages by almost 6%. On the other hand, the average work 
week was reduced by about 3% in 1901.36 The net effect of 
these two factors is to overstate the wage change between 1885 
and 1906 by almost 3%. 
Because the Wood series ends in 1906, Jones was forced 
to use some other index of wages after that date. He chose 
to use a series of piece rates. This, however, amounts to assuming 
that there was no increase in output per worker after 1906. 
Jones clearly recognizes that he has made this implicit assump­
tion and tries to justify it with the following statement: 
It seems to me that there has been little change either in personal 
application or in technical equipment, therefore changes in piece 
rates may fairly be used to continue Mr. G. H. Wood's index 
of time rates.37 
1898 and 1899 if the 1898 connection is used. If the 1899 linkage is used, however, 
quality shoots up by a totally inexplicable 18% (Sandberg, "Movements in the 
Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," p. 11). As for Jones's index of real 
cost, the 1898 connection results in a 2% reduction between 1898 and 1899, 
and the later transition causes a very strange 5% increase in real cost (Jones, 
Increasing Returns, p . 274) . 
35
 G. H. Wood, "The Statistics of Wages in the Nineteenth Century, Part XIX. 
The Cotton Industry, Section V. Changes in the Average Wage of All Employed 
with Some Account of the Forces Operating to Accelerate or Retard the Progress 
of the Industry," p. 608. 
36
 J o n e s , Increasing Returns, p . 103 .

37
 Ibid.
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In fact, however, as was demonstrated above, it appears that 
output per operative was increasing at a rate of about 1% 
per annum during the period concerned. For the years 1906 
through 1914, this is approximately the equivalent of an 8% 
understatement of the increase in wages. 
The net effect of the three factors considered above is to 
give the wage series used by Jones an approximately 5% 
downward bias for the entire 1885-1914 period. Because wages 
have a weight of 22% in the real-cost index, this means that 
a downward adjustment in real cost at the end of the period 
of about 1% is called for. 
3. Jones's real-cost index assumes that "normal profits" are 
earned at all times. Profits higher than "normal" resulting from 
an increase in the price of cotton cloth (i.e., a higher P), without 
any adjustment in factor cost (i.e., the n^s), will result in higher 
real cost. High profits resulting from input savings (i.e., lower 
TI^S) without a decrease in P will also result in a higher level 
of measured real cost. In other words, high profits are associated 
with "inefficiency," and low profits are associated with "effi­
ciency." 
The close relationship between Jones's real cost and profits 
can be seen in Table 15, which contains his index on an annual 
basis together with an estimate of average profits and average 
dividends in British cotton spinning. Unfortunately, profit and 
dividend data are not available for weaving companies. 
Although it is difficult to make any exact measurement of 
this effect, it is perfectly clear that bad years for business were 
good years for real cost and vice versa. It is also clear that 
the period after 1900 was a better period in terms of profits 
and dividends than were the 1890s. This means that the first 
decade of this century should be given credit for some extra 
improvement in efficiency when compared with the those years. 
More important, though 1909 and 1910 were bad years, 1912-14 
was certainly a better period than was 1884-86.38 Thus, if 
Jones's index is used for the 1885-1914 period, a couple of 
percentage points should probably be subtracted from the index 
of real cost in 1914. 
38
 Any kind of longer moving average would also show the end of the period 
to have been more profitable than the beginning. 
TABLE 15 
DIVIDENDS AND PROFITS IN THE BRITISH COTTON SPINNING INDUSTRY 
COMPARED WITH JONES'S REAL-COST INDEX 
Real Cost Index Average Profits 
Y e a r
 (1910=100) (per company in £) % Dividend 
1884 103 2,083 5.0

1885 104 -31 2.0

1886 106 -686 3.0

1887 . 105 986 4.75

1888 106 2,952 5.0

1889 106 2,565 5.0

1890 106 4,220 7.0

1891 112 384 5.25

1892 108 -957 1.25

1893 107 -614 1.0

1894 106 48 1.5

1895 104 678 1.625

1896 98 528 1.75

1897 99 1,676 3.0

1898 103 3,020 4.5

1899 108 4,432 6.125

1900 102 4,307 7.25

1901 104 3,494 7.5

1902 101 -16 4.66

1903 100 -503 3.0

1904 104 352 2.5

1905 113 7,701 7.0

1906 Ill 6,555 9.66

1907 107 13,211 15.875

1908 105 5,865 11.75

1909 90 -2,720 7.875

1910 100 -3,680 5.75

1911 115 288 4.75

1912 Ill 5,584 7.25

1913 108 5,366 7.25

1914 105 531 6.875

1915 96 -150 5.0

1916 96 4,004 7.5

1917 83 5,739 7.5

1918 216 14,403 16.25

1919 186 14,786 21.25

1920 327 n.a. 40.21

1921 158 n.a. 9.97

1922 115 n.a. 4.01

1923 Ill n.a. 2.27

1924 141 n.a. 2.43

1925 140 n.a. 4.65

SOURCES: Jones Index, Jones, Increasing Returns, p. 274; profits and dividends, Robson, The Cotton Industry 
in Britain, p. 338. 
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4. The weighting of the various factor price series creates 
an "index" problem. In the case of British cotton textiles, it 
seems certain that the use of 1910 weights tends to increase 
the real cost at the end of the period. This is the case because 
labor costs were a smaller percentage of total costs in 1885 
than in 1910, and wages increased more rapidly over the course 
of the period than did either cotton prices or "general prices."39 
Although the direction of this effect is clear, its importance 
is probably not great; and I shall make no explicit attempt 
to include it in my adjustment of Jones's "real cost" series 
for Lancashire. 
5. The use of Sauerbeck's index of wholesale, raw material 
prices to estimate the price trend of "all other expenses" creates 
yet another bias in Jones's results. The Sauerbeck index in­
creased less during this period than did the best available index 
of the cost of investment in manufacturing as well as the likely 
advance in salaries. In addition, the price of coal, which played 
a much more important role in "all other expenses" of British 
cotton mills than it did in the Sauerbeck index, increased 
considerably more rapidly than did the index as a whole. 
In order to eliminate this bias, I have disaggregated the 
"all other expenses" category and applied separate price indices 
to the resulting components. 
Jones estimates that of the 17% in the catch-all category, 
7% "is normally absorbed by gross interest (including deprecia­
tion) upon capital engaged in the industry."40 A perusal of 
the detailed production costs of British mills collected by the 
U.S. Tariff Board confirms that this is a reasonable estimate.41 
On the basis of the same data, I have concluded that a reasonable 
division of the remaining 10% of total costs is: salaries 2.5%, 
fuel 2%, other supplies 2%, and the residual (e.g., property 
taxes) 3 1/2%. 
The standard index of the cost of physical capital in manufac­
turing during this period is that developed by Phelps-Brown 
and Handfield-Jones.42 According to this index, the cost of 
39
 See Jones , Increasing Returns, p . 274.

40
 Jones , Increasing Returns, p . 109.

41
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 414.

42
 Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones, "The Climacteric of the 1890's," p. 305.
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manufacturing equipment, including factory construction, in­
creased by approximately 17% between 1885 and 1912. In 
view of the ongoing inflation, the increase was certainly some­
what greater between 1885 and 1914. This compares with an 
increase of 13% in the Sauerbeck index between 1885 and 
1914. If we assume that there was constant interest, depreciation, 
and "normal" profit rates between 1885 and 1914 (changes, 
in any case, should have been accounted for in section 3 above), 
this difference implies that for 1914 Jones's index of "real 
cost" is too large by approximately 0.3%. 
If the reasonable assumption is made that salaries in the 
British cotton industry increased at the same rate as wages, 
another overestimate of 0.5% is discovered. 
British coal prices increased by approximately 28% between 
1885 and 1914.43 Applying this price increase, instead of the 
Sauerbeck index, to the 2% of total costs allocated for fuel 
yields yet another overestimate of 0.3%. 
The sum of these biases is that real cost as estimated by 
Jones is about 1% too high at the end of the period. There 
remains, moreover, the two remaining categories of expenses 
(all other supplies and the residual). The most reasonable price 
index to apply to the "other supplies" category seems to be 
Sauerbeck's separate index for "sundry raw materials." The 
contents of the two categories are at least similar in that lubricants 
play an important role in both of them.44 If this is done, another 
upward bias of 0.4% is discovered. 
Finally, there is the matter of the remaining 3 1/2% of 
costs I classified as the residual. Wishing to avoid over-estimating 
British productivity increases, and for want of anything better, 
I have accepted the original Sauerbeck index for this category. 
Fortunately, the small weight of this category makes it highly 
unlikely that much error has been introduced by this decision. 
When the various adjustments listed above have been made, 
the net effect is to reduce Jones's real-cost index for 1914 
by about 1.5 percentage points. (It may be of some interest 
to note that in making these adjustments I have implicitly 
43
 Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 482.

44Ibid., p. 475.
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replaced the Sauerbeck index, with its 13% increase between 
1885 and 1914, with a new price index for "all other costs" 
that increased by 22% over the same period.) 
REVISED "EFFICIENCY" RESULTS FOR LANCASHIRE 
The adjustments I have made above make a good deal of 
difference in the results derived concerning efficiency changes 
in the Lancashire cotton textile industry. Whereas Jones's 
original calculations showed no improvement in efficiency be­
tween 1885 and 1910 and very little or no improvement between 
1885 and 1914, his calculations including my modifications 
indicate—conservatively—a reduction of real cost by 9% to 10% 
between 1885 and 1910 and of 11% to 12% between 1885 
and 1914. Furthermore, the importance of the reduction in 
real cost is greatly understated by this type of numerical result. 
It must be remembered that raw cotton has a weight of 61% 
in the real-cost index. Since virtually no economies in cotton 
usage were achieved during this period, almost all the increase 
in efficiency (i.e., reduction in real cost) must have referred 
to the utilization of labor, fuel, capital, and a few other minor 
items.45 This, in turn, implies an increase in the efficiency 
(or productivity) of these factor inputs by about 25% to 30% 
between 1885 and 1914. What is more, after my corrections 
have been made, this improvement is spread fairly evenly over 
the period. The peculiar deterioration Jones recorded for the 
post-1900 period has vanished. It has, roughly speaking, been 
replaced by a continuation of the trend he noted for the 1890s. 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN EFFICIENCY CHANGES AND LABOR 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN LANCASHIRE 
The two indices calculated above thus indicate that there 
was approximately a 25% to 30% improvement in output per 
45
 The evidence indicates that major improvements in cotton utilization were 
made during and just after the American Civil War. It is generally assumed 
that cotton wastage did not decrease markedly after that period (see Blaug, "The 
Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry," p. 377). 
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unit of all inputs, other than raw cotton, and approximately 
a 40% increase in output per unit of labor input. The relative 
sizes of these two figures seem eminently reasonable, for the 
innovations of this period appear to have been more labor-
than capital-saving.46 It seems certain that there was at least 
some capital-deepening in the British cotton industry during 
this period.47 
My revision of Jones's series also provides an answer to another 
mystery. Namely, if Jones's efficiency series was correct, how 
was it that Britain was able to increase her exports of cotton 
goods between 1885 and World War I? An even bigger mystery 
was how to explain the continued growth of British cotton 
textile exports after the alleged decline in efficiency set in about 
1900. That these increases in exports were far from negligible 
can be seen from Table 16. 
The only attempt to reconcile Lancashire's allegedly poor 
productivity performance with her excellent export perform­
ance that I have seen was made by Kindleberger. While 
discussing the growth of British exports before World War 
I, Kindleberger makes the following statement concerning 
cotton textiles: 
46
 These numbers seem to be compatible with the findings of Jewkes and Gray 
on wage increases for mule spinners. They found that between 1886 and 1914 
the average mule spinner's wage increased by about 18 more percentage points 
than can be explained by changes in the wage lists (Jewkes and Gray, Wages 
and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning Industry, pp. 18-20, 197-98). This 
increase in wages was thus the result of increases in output per man. The structure 
of these wage lists was such, however, that an 18% increase in wages would have 
required more than an 18% increase in output per head, at least to the extent 
that faster or longer frames (i.e., spinning machines) had anything to do with 
the increase (as they undoubtedly did). Indeed, under the most important mule-
spinning wage list, the Oldham list, an 18% increase in wages in all probability 
reflects more than a 36% increase in output per man. Although the other lists 
were less demanding, the 18% wage increase found by Jewkes and Gray in all 
probability reflects an increase of not less than 30% in output per man, and 
a 15 to 20% increase in overall productivity (excluding raw cotton) seems reasonable. 
In addition, these numbers would be somewhat larger if account were taken of 
the shortening of the work week. That they still remain smaller than the overall 
figures I calculated for the entire cotton industry should be no cause for alarm. 
The rapid growth of ring spinning makes it certain that the figures for the entire 
spinning section were greater than those for mule spinning alone and probably 
greater also than my industry wide figures. 
47
 See Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones, "The Climacteric of the 1890's" p. 
274. 
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TABLE 16

BRITISH EXPORTS OF COTTON PIECE GOODS IN VARIOUS YEARS

(in millions of yards)

To All To All Countries 
Y e a  r
 Countries To India except India 
1883 4,359 1,620 2,739 
1890 5,125 2,183 2,932 
1895 5,033 1,840 3,193 
1900 5,032 2,016 3,016 
1905 6,197 2,539 3,658 
1910 6,017 2,356 3,661 
1913 7,075 3,216 3,849 
SOURCE: British Parliamentary Papers, Trade Returns for the above years. 
Of the expansion from five to seven billion yards between 1900 
and 1913, when Manchester had its last boom, fully half went 
to India. The rate of technological advance had slowed down 
after 1870, and the ring spindle and automatic loom were 
virtually neglected. [At this point there is a reference to Jones.] 
But the industry succeeded in achieving the removal of the 
Indian 5 per cent revenue import [duty?] in 1882 and the 
equalization of the excise tax on British and Indian output 
in 1896.48 
It is true that the complete abolition of cotton duties in 1882 
probably helped Lancashire increase her exports to India in 
the 1880s, but it is difficult to believe that the "equalization" 
of taxes achieved in 1896 had much effect on the post-1900 
period. What happened in 1896 was that the 5% duty on 
imported yarns and goods, accompanied by a 5% excise on 
Indian yarns "above 20's counts," that had been imposed in 
December 1893 was replaced by a 3.5% duty on imported 
piece goods (but not yarn) and a 3.5% excise on Indian piece 
goods produced on power looms. Indian cotton cloth produced 
on handlooms remained exempt from taxation.49 These changes 
meant that Lancashire was in a slightly better position after 
1896 than she had been between December 1893 and 1896, 
but not as well off, principally because of the exemption of 
4 8
 K ind lebe rge r , Economic Growth in France and Great Britain, p . 2 7 3 . 
4 9
 A. R e d f o r d , Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, Vol. II, 1850-1939, p p . 
27-31,40-41. 
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Indian handloom weaving from taxation, as she had been 
between 1882 and December 1893. In view of these facts, the 
"equalization" of 1896 seems to be a very thin reed on which 
to rest an explanation of the rapid increase in British cotton 
textile exports, even to India, between 1900 and World War 
I. The only other possible explanation for the export boom 
combined with constant, or decreasing, overall efficiency would 
be a compression of profits. In fact, however, available data 
do not indicate any great squeeze on profits during the period 
1900-1913.50 Apparently, the improvement in efficiency was 
great enough to permit a growth in exports with customary 
profit. 
"EFFICIENCY" GROWTH IN THE 
MASSACHUSETTS COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
Because the standard approach has been to compare slow, 
or nonexistant, growth in British productivity with rapid im­
provement in America, I intend to compare the series I have 
calculated for Lancashire with their American (or rather, 
Massachusetts) counterparts. These comparisons will help to 
put the British figures in perspective as well as to shed some 
further light on the role of the automatic loom and the ring 
spindle in the two countries. 
The Jones index of real cost for the Massachusetts cotton 
textile industry indicates a drop in real cost between 1885 and 
1910 of 15%, if end-period weights are used, and 13% if 1860 
weights are used.51 The results for the period up through 
1913 are virtually identical to those for 1910, but their reliability 
is reduced by the fact that some World War I years enter 
into the moving average. Jones used a weight of 55% for raw 
cotton both in 1860 and the end of the period.52 A 45% weight 
on inputs other than raw cotton implies an increase in the 
efficiency with which labor, capital, fuel, and the like were 
used of between 29% and 33%. 
50Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 338. 
51
 Based on a seven-year moving average (Jones, Increasing Returns, pp. 298-90). 
52Ibid., p. 192. 
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Jones's series for Massachusetts seems to be largely exempt 
from the problems that plague his Lancashire series. For the 
product prices (the Ps), Jones uses a continuous series for 
the period 1847-1920.53 This, of course, eliminates the problem 
of splicing series that was so crucial in the British case. In 
addition, Jones has apparently accounted for changes in the 
composition of the labor force in the process of calculating 
his wage series.54 On the other hand, he takes no account 
of the 10% reduction in the work week in Massachusetts that 
occurred during this period.55 This implicit increase in weekly 
wages raises the 29% to 34% range calculated above to 34% 
to 39%. This latter range is similar in nature to the 25% to 
30% figure calculated for improvements in British productivity. 
I have decided not to try to explicitly disaggregate the "all 
other expenses" category as I did in the case of England. The 
principal reason for this decision is that Jones used a much 
more satisfactory index for estimating what happened to prices 
in this category for Massachusetts than he did for England. 
The considerable deficiencies of the subseries of prices that 
are available are such that I would place no greater confidence 
in the results of a disaggregation in this particular case than 
I place in Jones's results.56 The components of this index are: 
wholesale prices, 20%; wage payments, 35%; "elements of the 
cost of living," 35%; and rents, 10%. In view of the very heavy 
weight placed on wages, by far the most rapidly growing 
component of the index, it is my judgement that the Snyder 
index is more likely to overestimate than to underestimate the 
true price increase for the "all other expenses" category. Thus, 
if anything, the rate of productivity growth in the Massachusetts 
cotton industry is slightly exaggerated as a result of the use 
of this index. 
53Ibid., p. 156. 
54Ibid., p. 165. 
55Ibid., p. 161. 
56
 For the price of the "all other expenses" category in Massachusetts, Jones 
used the price index developed in 1924 by Carl Snyder (see C. Snyder, "A New 
Index of the General Price Level from 1875," pp. 189-95). 
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TABLE 17 
INDICES OF OUTPUT PER WORKER IN THE 
UNITED STATES COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
(1890-1899 = 100) 
Three-year 
Y e a r I n d e x
 Moving Average 
1884 70
 77

1885 86
 80

1886 84 87

1887 90 89

1888 94 96

1889 103 101

1890 106 107

1891 Ill 103

1892 91 95

1893 83 93

1894 104 90

1895 84 93

1896 92 95

1897 109 104

1898 112 110

1899 109 108

1900 103 108

1901 113 110

1902 113 110

1903 105 112

1904 116 114

1905 122 120

1906 121 117

1907 107 116

1908 121 112

1909 108 111

1910 104 110

1911 117 115

1912 124 121

1913 123 124

SOURCE: B. Weber and S. J. Handfield-Jones, "Variations in the Rate of Economic Growth in the USA, 
1869-1939," p. 127. 
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Once again, it is of considerable interest to see what happened 
to output per unit of labor input. Table 17 contains information 
for the United States comparable to the information for Britain 
contained in Table 14. 
These numbers—in particular, the three-year moving 
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average—indicate approximately a 55% increase in output per 
person employed in the cotton industry between 1885 and 
1913.57 To make this figure comparable to the British one, 
however, some adjustments are necessary. The British figure 
is based on output per hour of labor input. During this period, 
there was a 10% reduction in the work week in Massachusetts. 
This reduction was certainly somewhat greater than the average 
work week reduction in the United States as a whole. Because 
the efficiency (Jones) series is based on the Massachusetts 
industry alone and because my problem is to explain an 
unusually high increase in output per unit of labor in the 
United States, I have decided to be conservative and assume 
a 10% reduction in the workweek. Such a reduction, combined 
with the series in Table 17, indicates that there was approxi­
mately a 71 % increase in output per hour of labor. 
Adjustments should also be made for changes in the composi­
tion of the work force and for changes in the average quality 
of output. Unfortunately, very little is known in detail about 
these factors. It seems clear that the quality of output in 
Massachusetts increased because of the movement of low-quality 
production to the South. The series in Table 17, however, 
refers to output per worker in the whole United States, and 
it is difficult to say much about the quality of production for 
the whole United States.58 A problem also occurs with regard 
to the composition of the work force. It is generally believed 
that the quality both of the Massachusetts work force and the 
national cotton textile work force improved during this period.59 
57
 Since the efficiency figures are really based on a period ending in 1910, 
the figure for increases in output per worker between 1885 and 1910 is also 
of interest. This figure turns out to be only 38%. It must be noticed, however, 
that the three-year average of the output /labor index is in the bottom of a slump 
in 1910. Its value for 1910 was the lowest since 1899. It seems clear that the 
38% figure is an aberration on the low side. In view of this, and since my problem 
is to explain a very high, not low, rate of increase in the output/labor ratio 
for the United States, I shall take the conservative route and use the 55% increase 
for the period up to 1913. 
58
 Reasonable a rgumen t s can be m a d e both for and against improved quality. 
O n the one hand , increased pe r capita income would probably tend to raise the 
average quality d e m a n d e d . O n the o ther hand , most of the labor- and cost-saving 
innovations of the per iod (i.e., the automatic loom) were particularly well suited 
to the product ion of relatively low quality goods. 
59
 See Jones, Increasing Returns, p. 164; and Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing 
Industry of the United States, pp. 112-14. 
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The percentage of women in the cotton industry labor force 
continually declined starting at least in 1870, and the number 
of children actually declined sharply in absolute numbers in 
New England between 1880 and 1905.60 It is, however, difficult 
to estimate an exact value for this improvement. In view of 
these problems, and in order to make a conservative (i.e., large) 
estimate of labor productivity growth, I have assumed that 
the improvement in the labor force that almost certainly 
occurred was offset by an equal improvement in the average 
quality of output. 
One further problem deserves to be mentioned. As was noted 
above, the real-cost index computed by Jones refers only to 
the Massachusetts industry, but the output-per-worker series 
refers to the entire United States. For my purposes, however, 
I doubt whether that makes much difference. For one thing, 
in 1914, New England still had a considerably larger cotton 
textile industry than did the South.61 More important, there 
was relatively little difference in the equipment used in the 
two regions. As was noted in chapter 3, there were almost 
no mules at all used in American cotton spinning, except possibly 
for the very highest qualities. As for weaving, the slightly higher 
percentage of automatic looms in the South (50% versus 40%) 
can be explained by the type of cloth produced in the two 
regions. 
This judgment is supported by the fragmentary data available 
on the Massachusetts cotton textile industry taken separately. 
Census data indicate that between 1889 and 1914, cotton 
consumption per worker in Massachusetts increased by about 
I1 percentage points less than it did in the country as a whole.62 
Part, but certainly not all, of this difference can be explained 
by a more rapid improvement in the average quality of output 
in Massachusetts than elsewhere.63 Thus, the 71% figure I 
have computed for the increase in output per unit of labor 
60Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, pp. 112-14. 
61
 In 1914, there were 263,683 cotton looms in the South and 380,177 in the 
North (Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 326). 
62
 Jones , Increasing Returns, p . 2 9 1 . 
63
 Part of the difference is also due to the large decreases in the Massachusetts 
workweek that were introduced in 1909and 1910. This particular effect, however, 
has already been included in my 71% figure. 
116) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
input in Massachusetts is probably a reasonable upper limit 
and can usefully be compared to the 34% to 39% range I 
estimated for overall "efficiency" growth. 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE RESULTS FOR MASSACHUSETTS 
AND THOSE FOR LANCASHIRE 
The first point of interest about the American figures is 
that the difference between the increase in output per unit 
of labor input and the increase in efficiency was greater than 
the corresponding difference I obtained for Great Britain. On 
the other hand, the American difference is smaller than the 
difference in Britain that would result from accepting Jones's 
conclusion of zero improvement in British efficiency. In fact, 
of course, the reasonable expectation is that the difference 
would be considerably greater in America. This follows from the 
fact that America went much further than Great Britain in 
adopting capital intensive, labor-saving machinery, particularly 
in weaving. There can be no doubt that there was much more 
capital-deepening in the American than in the British cotton 
industry. 
This observation naturally leads to the question of how to 
explain the differing rates of growth in output per unit of 
labor input and in "efficiency" that occurred in the United 
States and Great Britain. 
First, what factors can be used to explain the fact that output 
per unit of labor input increased by about 71 % in the United 
States and by only 40% in Great Britain? 
1. The first and most obvious factor that comes to mind 
is automatic weaving. Fortunately, it is possible to estimate the 
reduction in American labor input per unit of output that 
can be explained by the introduction of automatic weaving. 
Weaving labor accounted for almost 60% of the total labor 
costs involved in converting raw cotton into gray cloth with 
plain looms,64 and automatic looms reduced the amount of 
weaving labor needed by between 35% (Uttley) and 40% (United 
States Tariff Board). Combining this information with the fact 
64U.S. Tariff Board, p. 472. 
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that by 1914 about 45% of all United States cotton looms were 
automatic implies that the use of automatic looms in the United 
States reduced the labor input of American cotton mills by 
at least 10%. Because the proportion of cloth produced on 
automatic looms is the true determinant of the saving and 
because automatic looms generally had higher unit outputs, 
this estimate is extremely conservative. A more realistic figure 
would be that the automatic looms (45% of total) produced 
close to 60% of all cloth output. In that case, the resulting 
labor-saving would be 13.5%. Considering that 40% of all New 
England cotton looms were automatic, the labor-saving in 
Massachusetts was probably only slightly less than for the country 
as a whole. Thus, the automatic loom can be credited with 
at least one-third of the difference in labor productivity growth 
between Massachusetts and Great Britain. In addition, some 
allowance should be made for the substantial number of warp 
stop motions (particularly popular in New England) that were 
in use in 1914. 
2. Another factor was the greater use of ring spindles in 
Massachusetts. Ring spinning of counts above 40 saved labor 
at some cost in capital and, more important, higher quality 
raw cotton.65 Spinning of such high counts on rings was, of 
course, the rule in all of the United States by 1914, whereas 
it was practically unheard of in Great Britain. Ring spinning 
65
 The use of higher-quality cotton would not affect the cost of inputs, according 
to Jones's formula. Thus, if a new method required more expensive cotton to 
produce a given quality of cloth by a new method, the Jones index would tend 
to exaggerate the decrease in real costs due to the new method. Similarly, if 
more expensive cotton permitted easier spinning and weaving with a given 
technology, then the introduction of this more expensive cotton would reduce 
"real costs" (as measured by Jones) without there being any real increase in efficiency. 
This fact implies that just as I have tried to adjust Jones's productivity indexes 
and the output per unit of labor input indices for changes in the average quality 
of the labor used and the cloth produced, so I should have included an adjustment 
for changes in the average quality of the raw cotton used. 
Unfortunately, however, the quality of the raw cotton has at least as much 
to do with the quality of the product as with the cost of producing it. Thus, 
if I were to include an estimate of the quality of raw cotton consumed in my 
revision of Jones's indices, I would also have to estimate the changes in the quality 
of the output. In view of the poor data available on these questions, I do not 
feel that these elaborate calculations would improve on my results. Nevertheless, 
I expect that the undoubted improvement in the average quality of output both 
in Lancashire and Massachusetts means that even my revisions of Jones have 
a slight downward bias. 
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of counts below 40 saved both labor and capital. The saving 
of labor was clearly much more important than the saving 
of capital, however. The spinning of sub-40 counts was common 
in Great Britain by 1914, but in the United States it was the 
only method used. It might also be noted that in many cases 
in the United States, including Massachusetts, rings were put 
in to replace well-functioning mules. In these cases, even 
low-count ring spinning must be considered capital intensive. 
In terms of Jones's index, producers who threw out well-func­
tioning mules and replaced them with new rings were increasing 
their investment (not reducing it as they did when they chose 
to put in new low-count rings rather than low-count mules), 
and they could only receive "normal profits" if the labor-saving 
was sufficiently large to provide a return on this increase in 
invested capital. For the purposes of this particular problem, 
however, the effect of ring spinning is somewhat reduced by 
the fact that, at least at low counts, it had already made a 
good deal of progress in Massachusetts by 1885. 
3. All accounts indicate that the United States as a whole 
was behind Great Britain in preparatory machinery and methods 
in the middle 1880s and was catching up in this field during 
the period up to World War I.66 
4. Reductions in the hours of work usually result in a 
proportionately smaller decrease in output.67 Since the Mas­
sachusetts work week fell by more than the British work week 
during this period, some of the difference in output per hour 
of labor can probably be credited to this factor. 
Whether these four points are enough to explain the British-
Massachusetts divergence in labor productivity growth, or 
whether additional considerations such as managerial ineffi­
ciency or union obstruction in Great Britain have to be consid­
ered, is difficult to say. It seems extremely unlikely, however, 
that such factors can have accounted for more than a very 
small portion of the British lag. 
66
 See, for example, Copeland, "Technical Developments in Cotton Manufacturing 
Since 1860," pp. 114-21. 
67
 For a recent discussion of the evidence available on this point , see F. Leveson, 
"Reduct ions in H o u r s of W o r k as a Source of Productivity Growth , " p p . 199-204. 
See also P. S. Florence, Economics of Fatigue and Unrest. 
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Finally, there is the British lag in efficiency improvement 
as measured by the (revised) Jones index. The gap here, 
appropriately enough, is less than half the labor productivity 
gap. Basically, however, I believe it can be explained by the 
same factors used to explain the labor productivity gap. Surely, 
the automatic loom and the ring spindle helped improve 
Massachusetts "efficiency," although this improvement in effi­
ciency was certainly much smaller than the improvement in 
labor productivity resulting from the introduction of these 
machines. Furthermore, since they were better suited to Ameri­
can than to British conditions, it is by no means certain that 
British efficiency would have benefited from a more rapid 
rate of adoption. In any case, these innovations were bound 
to improve Massachusetts efficiency more than British efficiency 
even if adoption rates had been the same in both countries. 
In addition, the above points about American catching-up 
in the preparatory processes and the larger decrease in the 
work week also apply to the efficiency index. In regard to 
the preparatory processes, there is certainly no sign of British 
irrationality or technical lag. Once again, however, it cannot 
be proved conclusively that the factors listed can explain all 
of the British lag in efficiency growth. 

6 
INVESTMENT IN 
LANCASHIRE BETWEEN 
THE WORLD WARS 
Before this discussion of investment policy and productivity 
is concluded, something has to be said about investment policies 
in Lancashire during the interwar period. This period was 
basically one of depressed demand and low, or nonexistant, 
profits, at least after 1921. The seriousness of this depression 
can be seen from the profit and dividend data in Table 18. 
Equally impressive is the fact that in 1930 average capacity 
utilization in the British cotton textile industry was down to 
58% in spinning and 54% in weaving.1 
Thus, for most of the interwar period, there was little reason 
to invest in the British cotton textile industry. Not only was 
net investment generally negative but there was very little gross 
investment. The problem of choice of machinery and technique 
principally took the form of which types of equipment to keep 
and which to throw out. 
A good idea of what happened in the spinning sector can 
be obtained from Table 19. 
The only period of expansion shown in these tables is the 
1913-24 period. Even then, capacity did not increase by more 
'Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 144. 
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TABLE 18 
DIVIDENDS AND PROFITS IN THE BRITISH COTTON SPINNING INDUSTRY 
Average Profits %

(per company in £) Dividend

1919 14,786 21.25

1920 n.a. 40.21

1921 n.a. 9.97

1922 n.a. 4.01

1923 n.a. 2.27

1924 n.a. 2.43

1925 n.a. 4.65

1926 3,553 4.08

1927 -5,953 2.73

1928 -2,383 2.19

1929 -3,391 2.07

1930 -6,548 1.91

1931 -7,727 1.46

1932 -3,550 1.55

1933 -3,273 1.50

1934 -356 1.57

1935 196 1.75

1936 1,658 1.91

1937 8,857 4.28

1938 10,742 5.53

1939 5,596 5.39

SOURCE: Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 338. 
NOTE: This table must be treated with some degree of caution. The very bad results recorded for the 
twenties and early thirties were no doubt made worse by die overcapitalization (mostly with fixed-interest 
securities) that occurred in the years immediatly following World War I. Similarly, the improvement in 
the late 1930s was undoubtedly exaggerated by the bankruptcy of the most inefficient and most heavily 
debt-burdened companies in the industry, 
than 4% (even with each ring counted as 1 1/3 mule). It seems 
clear, however, that there was no lack of interest in ring spinning 
during these years of relative prosperity.2 
2
 The figures below represent the distribution of spindles by type of product 
in 1939. 
Mule Equivalent 
Rings 
Count Mules Rings (ring = 1 1/3 % Ring 
of Yarn (millions) (millions) mule, millions) Capacity 
0-16 3.9 1.5 2.0 33.9 
17-26 2.3 3.6 4.8 67.6 
27-48 6.6 3.3 4.4 40.0 
49-80 7.6 1.6 2.1 21.6 
81 - 2.9 0.1 0.1 3.3 
SOURCE: Board of Trade, Working Party on Cotton, Report, p. 39. 
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TABLE 19 
CAPACITY AND INVESTMENT IN THE BRITISH COTTON SPINNING INDUSTRY 
EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE IN VARIOUS YEARS 
(MILLIONS OF SPINDLES) 
Rings as % of

Year Mules Rings Waste Total Mule Equivalents

(I Ring = 1J3 Mule)

1913 45.2 10.4 0.7 56.3 22.7 
1924 43.7 13.1 0.8 57.6 28.2 
1927 43.8 13.5* 0.8 58.1 28.4 
1930 42.1 13.1 0.8 54.0 28.5 
1937 27.0 10.7 0.9 38.6 34.0 
1939 24.1 10.3 0.9 35.3 35.4 
INVESTMENT AND SCRAPPING 
(ANNUAL RATES IN THOUSANDS OF SPINDLES) 
New Spindles 
Period Installed Spindles Snapped Net Increase 
(Both Kinds) Mute Ring Mule Ring 
1924-29 160 340 -180 
1930-34 15 2,000 300 -2,000 -300 
1935-38 50 1,330 170 -1,330 -120 
SOURCES: Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, pp. 339, 349, 355. Figures for 1927 are from J. Ryan, 
"Machinery Replacement in the Cotton Industry," p. 577. 
•The highest number of rings recorded in any year. 
Between 1924 and 1930, there was very little change in 
spinning capacity. Gross investment during the period 1924-29 
was only about 800,000 spindles. The rate of scrapping exceeded 
new installations slightly, at least for mule spindles. In view 
of the low profits earned during these years, it is surprising 
that the decline in capacity was not greater than it was. In 
fact, capacity only started to decline with any speed after the 
onset of the Great Depression. At the same time, gross invest­
ment declined almost to the vanishing point. 
A number of reasons can be suggested for this rather 
precipitous drop in capacity after a period of almost no change. 
For one thing, the depression that had been plaguing Lancashire 
The most surprising aspect of these figures is the relatively small role reported 
for rings in the sub-16 category. I believe this phenomena can principally be 
explained by a very low, or even negative, rate of growth of production of the 
very low counts starting well back in the nineteenth century. The undoubted 
improvement in the average quality of British cotton cloth after 1890 lends credence 
to this explanation. It also points out the extraordinary long physical life of mule 
frames. 
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ever since 1921 or 1922 plunged even deeper in 1930. This 
further decline not only worsened the objective condition of 
the industry, it also destroyed any lingering hopes of a recovery 
from the depression of the 1920s. The industry could no longer 
question the necessity of adjusting to a drastically reduced level 
of demand. Many manufacturers who had held on to their 
factories and equipment during the 1920s, despite losses, must 
have given up when they were faced with even worse market 
conditions. In addition, the bankruptcy rate increased while 
the number of people prepared to outbid the junkman (or 
sometimes foreign cotton manufacturers) in order to keep a 
bankrupt cotton mill in operation (or even in condition to 
operate in case business conditions should improve) was very 
small.3 
As important as these market effects was the fact that for 
the first time organized steps were taken to reduce capacity.4 
Thus, for example, the Lancashire Cotton Corporation Ltd., 
which was formed in 1929 under the "auspices" of the Bank 
of England, had by 1939 absorbed 9 million spindles and had 
junked 4 1/2 million of them.5 
The relevant question to ask about this process of disinvest­
ment is whether the types of spindles taken out of operation 
seem reasonable. To give some idea of the kind of capacity 
needed in view of the composition of demand, I have included 
Table 20, which contains information on the counts of yarn 
spun in Great Britain in various years. 
In chapter 2, I estimated that this information for 1924 
implied that about 35% of all demand for British spinning 
capacity was for the spinning of sub-40 yarn. It seems likely 
from Table 19 that this percentage increased during the 1930s. 
Indeed, by 1937 it appears that over half the demand for 
3
 As early as 1927, it was extremely difficult to sell a cotton mill to anyone 
who wanted to do anything but junk or cannibalize it (see B. Bowker, Lancashire 
under the Hammer, pp. 78-79). 
4
 For a discussion of these capacity-reducing activities, see Robson, The Cotton 
Industry in Britain, chap. 7; A. F. Lucas, Industrial Reconstruction and the Control 
of Competition: The British Experiment, chap. 7; and Allen, British Industries and 
Their Organization, pp. 236-39. 
5
 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 158; and Allen, British Industries 
and Their Organization, p. 238. 
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TABLE 20

COUNTS OF YARN SPUN IN GREAT BRITAIN

IN VARIOUS YEARS

(in millions of pounds)

Year Up to 40s 41s-80s 81s-120s 121s­ Total 
1912 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,982.8 
1924 1,022.0 313.7 55.9 3.6 1,395.2 
1930 821.6 185.2 36.8 3.5 1,047.1 
1935 1,010.9 176.8 37.0 3.1 1,227.8 
1937 1,135.1 181.2 37.1 4.4 1,357.8 
SOURCE: Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 343. 
spindle capacity in Lancashire must have been for the produc­
tion of sub-40 yarn. In absolute terms, however, the demand 
for sub-40 spinning capacity in 1937 was probably about the 
same as it had been in 1924. What is more important, since 
there was excess capacity in the industry even in 1924, it seems 
likely that the 13.1 million rings available in 1924 were probably 
just about enough to meet the entire demand for sub-40 yarn 
in that year. It is clear, however, that a great deal of sub-40 
yarn must have been produced on mules.6 Even in 1930, when 
there were probably more than enough rings to produce all 
the required sub-40 yarn, there were mules producing this 
kind of yarn. By 1937, however, the number of available rings 
had decreased, and there were probably no longer enough 
to meet the entire demand for sub-40 yarn. What is more, 
even then it seems that these rings were not working at full 
capacity. 
Clearly, some explanation is needed for this phenomenon. 
Why were the rings not able to put the less efficient mules 
out of the sub-40 business when there were probably enough 
rings to meet the demand for this kind of yarn, and why did 
the number of rings decline? The problem is not eliminated 
even by the likelihood that the available mules were operated 
less than the available rings. 
Some part of the continued ability of mules to produce sub-40 
yarn can be explained by the special qualities of mule-spun 
yarn. An example of such a situation is the very cheapest type 
6
 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 65; Board of Trade, Report, p. 39. 
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of cloth being sent to India. This doth was designed to contain 
as much sizing and as little cotton as possible. Because the 
softer mule-spun yarn absorbed more sizing than did ring yarn, 
there must have been some weavers who were prepared to 
pay a premium for mule-spun low-count yarn.7 In my judgment, 
however, this factor can by no means account for all the 
low-count mule spinning. 
The most important reason for the continued survival of 
low-count mules, and the failure of the rings to work at full 
capacity on sub-40 yarn, however, was probably the agreements 
reached within the industry to spread the work through orga­
nized short-time and to maintain prices. These practices made 
it much more difficult for the ring-spinning firms to use their 
lower marginal costs to take business away from their mule-
spinning competitors. This does not necessarily mean that these 
more efficient firms were made worse off by these regulations. 
All firms may have benefited. That is, the ring-spinning firms 
may have been better off spinning lower quantities at higher 
prices. The more efficient firms, however, obviously gained 
less from these agreements than did their competitors. 
Between 1920 and the end of 1926, organized short-time 
became "the general rule" in the spinning of American cotton.8 
This system was organized by the Federation of Master Spin­
ner's Associations. During most of this period, activity did not 
exceed two-thirds of a full single shift.9 
This type of regulation did not permit the selling of output 
quotas, or even the concentration of a firm's output on its 
most efficient machines. Not only did this situation help keep 
low-count mule firms in operation, it also prevented firms with 
both types of equipment from concentrating their low-count 
output on their rings. As long as the cartel price covered variable 
cost on the mules, and the mules could only be sold for junk 
if they were to be removed, firms would keep and use their 
mules. 
The rationale for this remarkably inefficient arrangement 
7See U.S. Tariff Board, p. 494.

8Robson, The, Cotton Industry ia Britain, p. 222.

9Ihid.
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naturally came from the trade unions, whose paramount interest 
was to spread the available work among all their members. 
When this system of short-time work was abandoned, it was 
replaced by an agreement that took the form of a joint stock 
enterprise, the American Cotton Yarn Association Ltd. This 
company, or association, also attempted to provide output 
quotas. It did, however, have the desirable feature of permitting 
firms to sell their quotas. 
In principle, this means that it was a joint profit-maximizing 
cartel. As Salter has shown, such a cartel should utilize the 
same scrapping and replacement rules as a firm operating in 
a competitive market.10 A problem arose, however, because 
the share of each firm in the cartel depended on the number 
of spindles it had.11 A firm's share of the monopoly profits 
thus depended on its spindlage. Clearly, this was an inducement 
to maintain, although not to use, sub-40 mules. By November 
1927, however, this attempt at collective regulation had collapsed 
under the pressure of falling demand and price-cutting by 
nonmembers.12 
After the collapse of the American Cotton Yarn Association, 
no organized attempt at output or price control achieved any 
success until 1933. In that year a price-fixing—or rather, a 
minimum price—agreement was reached. When this agreement 
threatened to collapse in 1934, a new agreement, which was 
legally binding on the signatories, was negotiated. These price-
fixing agreements, of course, reduced the ability of the more 
efficient firms to take business away from their competitors. 
It is, of course, true that a good deal of price-cutting was 
practiced throughout this period, and short-time quotas were 
exceeded even during periods when agreements were supposed 
to be in effect.13 The worst years of the period, which were 
the years when no agreements were in effect, must have 
witnessed a fierce competition for orders. Furthermore, because 
the ring spinners had relatively low variable costs, they were 
probably among the leaders in cutting prices. There were forces 
10Saker, Productivity and Technical Change, pp. 91-92.

"Robson, The Cotton Indwtoy in Britain, p. 222.

12
 Ibid., p. 223.

13
 See Bowker, Lancashire under the Hammer, chaps. 4, 5.
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working in the other direction, however. For one thing, the 
unions supported the short-time agreements. This could make 
violations dangerous regardless of variable costs. Second, though 
there was a good deal of price competition in the British cotton 
industry, there were also many imperfections in the market. 
In fact, complaints about the lack of standardization among 
processors and an excessive number of middlemen and export­
ers are among the standard complaints made about the industry. 
Under these circumstances, it seems certain that spinning firms 
with good connections would have had to be underbid by much 
more than an infinitesimally small amount before they lost 
all their customers. 
Finally, before the ring-spinning firms could completely 
monopolize sub-40 spinning, they would have had to drive 
prices below the marginal costs of all the mule spinners for 
some period of time. It seems unlikely that they would have 
been able to do this, however. During the prosperous years 
right after World War I, many if not most British spinning 
firms were refinanced in such a way as to burden them with 
extremely heavy loads of fixed debt. Clearly, those ring-spinning 
firms who had accepted heavy debt loads were in no position 
to bankrupt those sub-40 mule-spinning firms that avoided 
this dangerous temptation. In any case, these heavy debt loads 
must have been a restraint on price-cutting; and this, in turn, 
must have been a great help to those relatively inefficient firms 
who had been financially prudent. It may have been possible 
to survive with either a heavy debt load or inefficient equipment 
but not with both. 
Under these circumstances, it seems understandable that a 
substantial number of low-count mules survived during the 
depression.14 Similarly, it seems reasonable that these low-count 
mules were not replaced by new rings. Although the relative 
advantage of rings over mules at sub-40 yarn well may have 
increased as compared with the pre-World War I situation,15 
the low level of capacity utilization and the bleak prospects 
for the industry clearly militated against such an investment. 
14
 The percentage of rings, of course, increased continuously during the whole 
period (see Table 19). 
15See chaps. 2, 3, above. 
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The failure to install any large number of rings for high counts 
is also easy to explain. Even if, as is quite likely, rings became 
a better new investment than mules even for high counts 
sometime after World War I, they were certainly not so much 
better that the mules in operation should have been thrown 
out. Furthermore, conditions in the industry were so bad that 
replacements were seldom made even for mules that wore out. 
During the whole decade of the 1930s, less than 300,000 spindles 
of any kind were installed in Great Britain. 
The only problem that remains is how to explain the decline 
in the number of ring spindles in Great Britain from 13.1 
million in 1930 (and 1924) to 10.3 million in 1939, while many 
sub-40 mules remained operable. It would seem that all, or 
almost all, of the sub-40 mules should have been junked before 
any of the more efficient rings were removed. It must be 
remembered, however, that though the British cotton textile 
industry was not the only cotton textile industry in the world, 
it was the most depressed. Throughout most of this period, 
there were protected cotton industries in countries other than 
Great Britain that were making money and expanding their 
capacity.16 Thus, whereas no type of equipment could make 
much of a profit in Great Britain, modern equipment was 
of value elsewhere. Thus, British ring spindles could be disman­
tled and sold abroad at prices above the scrap value, although 
well below the prices of new rings.17 It seems highly unlikely 
that anyone would have been willing to pay anything but scrap 
value for low-count mules. In other words, at least part of 
the superior efficiency of rings over mules at low counts was 
capitalized into the resale value of the equipment. Thus, if 
little or no money could be made with either type of equipment 
in Great Britain (because of low prices and low rates of capacity 
utilization), then the opportunity cost of keeping idle or almost-
idle rings was much greater than the cost of keeping idle 
low-count mules. 
The likelihood of exporting used equipment increased tre­
mendously when a firm went bankrupt. As noted above, the 
16See Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 335. World spinning capacity 
outside Great Britain expanded between 1927 and 1937. 
17
 For some comments on the early aspects of this trade, see Bowker, Lancashire 
under the Hammer, pp. 78-79. 
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financial manipulations engaged in right after World War I 
meant that the financial stability of a firm was not necessarily 
related to its technical efficiency. Thus, a lot of firms having 
at least some rings must have been vulnerable to bankruptcy. 
Once bankruptcy did occur, export of the rings was quite likely 
to follow even though other British firms, who had at least 
some equipment that was less modern than the equipment 
of the bankrupt firm, continued in business. In view of the 
problems of moving and reinstalling equipment, and the natural 
reluctance of British cotton-spinning firms to spend any money 
on their equipment during this period, it seems reasonable 
that the surviving firms permitted the modern equipment of 
bankrupt firms to go abroad, even at quite low prices. 
One final reason for the decline in the number of ring spindles 
after 1930 is that the best policy for a firm to follow when 
it is covering variable but not average costs is usually to 
cannibalize some of its machines to provide spare parts and 
replacements. This was the policy that was practiced with great 
determination, and a good deal of financial success, by the 
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company of Manchester, New 
IJampshire, during this same period.18 At least some part of 
the reduction of ring-spinning capacity in Great Britain probably 
resulted from such actions. 
The problem of looms is much more straightforward than 
that of spindles. There were very few automatic looms in Great 
Britain in 1913 and this number had increased very little by 
1939. Out of 495,000 looms in the industry in 1939, only 19,000, 
or less than 4%, were automatics. 
The interwar period was one of almost no gross investment 
in British cotton weaving. All that happened was that a large 
number of plain looms were junked. Thus, the total number 
of looms shrank from 792,000 in 1924 to 495,000 in 1939.19 
In view of the low level of demand for weaving capacity 
throughout this period (see Table 11) and the very doubtful 
future of the industry, it is not surprising that almost no one 
was willing to put any money into the very expensive automatic 
looms. 
18
 See Sweezy, "The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company."

19Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 339.

SOME FINAL REMARKS 
ABOUT TECHNOLOGICAL 
PROGRESS IN LANCASHIRE 
By any reasonable standard, the years leading up to World 
War I witnessed at least a creditable performance by the British 
cotton textile industry. This is certainly true for the years 
1900-1913. It is also true, however, for periods such as 1890­
1913 and even 1870-1913. All these periods witnessed consid­
erable advancements in production, exports, and technological 
performance.1 
The idea that the industry performed badly during these 
years is largely the result of unfavorable comparisons with its 
performance during earlier periods of truly spectacular ad­
vance. It is, however, utterly unreasonable to have expected 
that such progress would continue up to World War I, especially 
with regard to the growth output and exports. This becomes 
readily apparent when the implications of a continuation of 
these earlier rates of growth are considered. The classic example 
of such an extrapolation is John Meyer's input-output study 
of what would have happened to the British economy had 
the rates of increase in exports achieved by various industries 
'For production and export figures, see chaps. 1 and 7. 
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during the period 1854-72 continued up to 1907.2 If the rate 
of increase in British textile exports achieved in the 1854-72 
period had continued, by 1907 the value of British textile exports 
would have been about four times as large as the actual level 
reached in that year.3 Furthermore, British textile production 
would have been over three times as large as its actual level 
had all British exports maintained their 1854-72 rates of growth 
and somewhat less than three times the actual level had all 
exports except textiles grown at their actual rates up to 1907.4 
These growth rates would have resulted in a rapidly growing 
British share of total world textile production. Indeed, by 1913, 
the value added in the British cotton textile industry would 
have been close to the actual total worldwide value added in 
cotton textiles for that year.5 In view of the ease with which 
textile production by factory methods spread throughout the 
world, and the extent to which the industry was given tariff 
and other types of support in many countries, it is not surprising 
that Great Britain failed to increase, or even maintain, her 
share of world cotton textile production. 
The view that the technological performance of the British 
cotton textile industry in the pre-World War I period was 
poor is primarily based on the Jones index of real cost in 
the industry together with the observed fact that Great Britain 
was much slower than most other countries, especially the United 
States, in adopting ring spinning and automatic weaving. Al­
though Jones is no doubt right about the decline in the rate 
of productivity increase after 1870, such a decrease does not 
seem to be sufficient grounds for calling the industry's perform­
ance bad. More important, according to Jones, real cost did 
not decline between 1885 and 1910 and actually increased 
between 1900 and 1910. These results, however, are incorrect. 
As noted in chapter 5, the corrections I have made in Jones's 
series indicate that for the whole period 1885 through 1913 
real cost declined almost as fast in Lancashire as it did in 
2J. Meyer, "An Input-Output Approach to Evaluating the Influence of Exports 
on British Industrial Production in the Late 19th Century." 
3
 Ibid., p. 16. 
4Ibid., p. 17. 
5
 See Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 355. 
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Massachusetts. Furthermore, at least some of the remaining 
difference in real-cost savings between the two industries can 
be attributed to the unquestionable fact that the principle 
innovations of the period, especially ring spinning, were better 
suited to American than to British conditions. Indeed, the 
analyses presented in earlier chapters make it seem quite likely 
that the British industry would not, in fact, have been any 
better off had ring spinning and automatic weaving been 
introduced more rapidly. If this is true, then the British lag 
in these techniques did not represent any technological lag, 
at least not from an economic point of view. 
THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
Because I am giving the whole Lancashire cotton textile 
industry a relatively clean bill of health for the pre-World 
War I period, it seems logical that I must also give the 
entrepreneurs and managers in the industry a relatively good 
rating. Indeed, I have already reported that I felt that those 
responsible for choosing technology for the industry—at least 
spinning and weaving technology—did a fairly good job. The 
worst charge that can be made against them is that they may 
have displayed somewhat excessive caution when the new 
technology involved an increase in fixed capital. Any charge 
of technological blindness or total irrationality, however, is, 
in my opinion, without foundation. 
What does this conclusion do to the theory that Britain's 
relative decline as an industrial power after 1870 was primarily 
due to entrepreneurial failure? For the more extreme adherents 
to this point of view, such as Derek Aldcroft6 and A. L. Levine, 
it invalidates some of their most spectacular examples of 
supposed entrepreneurial failure. Although I can only speak 
about the cotton textile industry, the fact that examples of 
alleged entrepreneurial failure in this industry appear at first 
glance to be at least as gross as those reported for other industries 
6
 As was noted in footnote 1 of chapter 4, however, Aldcroft has recently 
moderated the position he took in "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy," 
published in 1964. 
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raises the suspicion that the other supposed failures will also 
evaporate under more careful scrutiny.7 Some confirmation 
of this thesis comes from the recent studies of the British iron 
and steel industry by Peter Temin and Donald McCloskey.8 
Although not completely exonerating British iron and steel 
managers and entrepreneurs, they certainly credit the industry 
with a much better performance than had previously been 
the fashion among economic historians.9 
This defense of the British entrepreneur in general, and 
the cotton textile entrepreneur in particular, however, should 
not be carried too far. Thus, it in no way touches on the 
larger economic failure of Britain. That is the failure to shift 
resources out of the production of staples such as textiles, steel, 
coal, and shipbuilding.10 Moreover, I have by no means shown 
that the British cotton entrepreneurs did all they could have 
done to advance themselves and their industry. It is quite 
possible that they could have done more in the way of minor 
machinery improvement or improvements in the organization 
of production. 
Perhaps more important, the British cotton entrepreneurs 
can be accused of not directing sufficient effort to the develop­
ment of new techniques and new machinery fitted to their 
needs. They apparently adopted the new techniques available 
in a rational manner, but the major technical developments 
of this period were achieved in the United States. Under these 
circumstances, it seems natural that they were better suited 
to American than to British conditions. What is more surprising, 
and perhaps largely a result of bad luck, is that some of these 
new methods, especially ring spinning, were also better suited 
to conditions in the world at large. The reason for this is that 
7
 On the other hand, it must be noted that the cotton textile industry was relatively 
unconcentrated and had relatively low barriers to entry (see Bowker, Lancashire 
under the Hammer, chap. 1). Thus, to the extent that the failure of British 
entrepreneurship is connected with monopoly and conservative established firms, 
the cotton textile industry should not in any case have been a leader in technological 
mistakes. 
8P, Temin, "The Relative Decline of the British Steel Industry, 1880-1913"; 
and McCloskey, "Productivity Change in British Pig Iron." 
9See, for example, D. L. Burn, The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867-1939. 
10
 It is by no means clear to me, however, that this failure should be shouldered 
primarily by the managers in these particular industries. 
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these new methods economized on the factor that the British 
textile industry had in greatest relative abundance—labor skill. 
Thus, ring spinning seriously undermined the great advantage 
that Lancashire had enjoyed as a result of its large corps of 
skilled mule spinners. 
It is possible, of course, that no reasonable efforts on the 
part of British entrepreneurs could have prevented this devel­
opment. On the other hand, technical developments favorable 
to Britain may have been feasible. In any case, little or no 
effort was devoted to looking for such possibilities. Any blame 
for this somewhat hypothetical failure must, however, be shared 
with the British machine-building industry. After all, most 
American developments in cotton technology were contributed 
by the machine-builders, particularly the Draper Company. 
Finally, there is the question of commercial, as opposed to 
technological, performance. Were the British cotton firms good 
at selling their product? Did they strive through service and 
product design to meet the desires of potential buyers? Such 
questions are certainly worthy of study, although they fall 
outside areas I have choosen to examine directly. Part Two 
of this work, however, details Lancashire's experience in world 
markets. Hopefully it will clarify what actually happened to 
British cotton textile exports and throw some light on the role 
of commercial behavior in Lancashire's rise and fall. 

PART II

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

8 
LANCASHIRE'S EXPORT 
EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO 
WORLD WAR I 
This portion of the book will consider whether the collapse 
of British cotton textile exports after World War I, and the 
subsequent collapse of the entire British industry, can be 
explained in terms of factors outside the control of the industry. 
That is, do the commercial policies of foreign nations and 
the growth of foreign cotton industries provide an adequate 
explanation of what happened; or did British entrepreneurial 
failure, technological backwardness, or worker obstructionism 
also play non-negligible roles in the tragedy? Clearly, this 
question can only be answered in terms of what happened 
after World War I. To give some perspective to these events, 
however, I feel that it is extremely important to study Britain's 
experience with cotton textile exports during the century of 
expansion between 1815 and 1914. 
OVERALL BRITISH EXPORT EXPERIENCE, 1815-1914 
Table 21 contains summary information on the growth of 
British cotton textile exports in the century before World War 
I. In order to avoid making the computations hopelessly 
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TABLE 21 
AVERAGE ANNUAL BRITISH COTTON CLOTH EXPORTS TO ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD

COMBINED BV DECADES

Average % Increase, Thousands Quality Quality 
of Yards (1815 = 100) Included 
1815-24 
1825-34 
260,128 
411,104 58.0 
98.9 
101.0 61.4 
1835-44 738,926 79.7 84.4 50.2 
1845-54 1,324,593 79.3 78.0 65.7 
1855-64 2,158,530 63.0 68.9 43.9 
1865-74 3,058,053 41.2 66.6 36.9 
1875-84 4,099,148 34.0 70.2 41.3 
1885-94 4,904,342 19.6 65.0 10.8 
1895-1904 5,217,510 6.4 73.1 19.6 
1905-13 6,296,415 20.1 72.1 19.0 
SOURCE: Quantity figures are from various issues of the British Parliamentary Papers. For information on 
the calculation of the quality index, see Appendix C below. 
complicated, the figures are limited to cloth. Thus, no account 
is taken of such items as yarn, sewing thread, hosiery, and 
lace. Cloth was by far the most important item, however, 
amounting to about 75% of all British cotton textile exports 
by value (and probably somewhat more in terms of value added 
in Britain) by the end of the period. If anything, the exclusion 
of items other than cloth somewhat understates the growth 
of British exports, since the exports of these other items 
increased faster than did cloth exports. 
The one major adjustment I have made in the raw export 
data is to take account of fluctuations in the average quality 
of the cloth exported. This gives a more realistic picture of 
what happened to exports than do the basic yardage figures. 
Indeed, because the value added in Great Britain as a percentage 
of the price of a yard of cloth was generally directly related 
to the quality of the cloth, the adjustments I have made are 
not large enough. At least, if exports are viewed as the selling 
of British services (that is, excluding the re-export of the raw 
material), then even column 4 of Table 21 reflects too high 
a rate of growth for periods of decreasing average quality. 
In specific terms, this principally means that the rates of growth 
of exports shown in column 4 for the decades 1835-44 and 
1855-64 are somewhat exaggerated. 
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The record of export growth shown in Table 21 is remarkable. 
It is true that the growth rates at the bottom of the table 
are lower than those at the top of the table. This, however, 
should not in itself be taken as a sign of a declining competitive 
position or as a danger signal for the future. Indeed, the record 
could easily have been read so as to encourage optimism during 
the years just before World War I. Using the numbers adjusted 
for quality changes, the main break in the rate of export growth 
occurred in 1885-94, when the rate of growth dropped from 
its previous level in the vicinity of 40% per decade to something 
like 10%. By 1913, however, two decades of growth at approxi­
mately 20% per decade had followed. This good recovery must 
have looked even more gratifying in 1913, for that year 
witnessed an all-time, all-country record of almost 7.1 billion 
yards of cotton cloth exported.1 
Despite the growth of British cotton goods exports over this 
period as a whole, however, Britain's share of world exports 
of cotton goods was declining toward the end of the period. 
On the basis of weight, Britain's share rose from about 70% 
in 1829-31 to a high point of about 82% in 1882-84. It then 
declined to 58% in 1910-13.2 On the basis of value, all of 
these numbers, but especially the last one, would certainly be 
larger. This trend would be further accentuated if the percent­
ages referred to the trade in value added to raw cotton. 
Regardless of the index used, however, there was a considerable 
decline in Great Britain's hold on world trade in cotton goods 
between 1882-84 and 1910-13. 
BRITISH COTTON EXPORTS BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
ON A REGIONAL BASIS 
Disaggregation is of considerable help in giving insight into 
the meaning of the numbers in Table 21. The first disaggrega­
1
 Indeed, in each of the years 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1910-13, Great Britain 
exported over 6 billion yards of cotton cloth. Britain had never reached that 
figure before nor has she since. As for other countries, none has ever approached 
six billion yards. 
2Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 2. 
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TABLE 22 
BRITISH COTTON CLOTH EXPORTS TO INDIA AND TO THE 
REST OF THE WORLD IN VARIOUS YEARS 
(in thousands of yards) 
Rest of 
Year India* % Increase World % Increase 
1815 1,356 253,147 
1824 24,470 1,704.0 314,416 24.1 
1835 51,777 111.6 505,047 60.8 
1845 229,261 342.8 862,426 70.8 
1855 467,374 103.9 1,470,362 70.5 
1865 561,089 20.1 1,454,067 -1.3 
1874 1,026,926 83.0 2,332,189 60.4 
1887 1,964,450 91.3 2,932,560 25.7 
1895t 1,839,878 -6.3 3,192,683 8.9 
1905 2,538,704 38.0 3,658,007 14.6 
1913 3,216,450 26.7 3,848,603 5.2 
SOURCES: Various issues of the British Parliamentary Papers. 
* India includes Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and the Straits Settlement (Malaya). Before 1835, it includes 
all shipments east of Iran. 
tThe year 1895 was a very bad one for British cotton cloth exports to India. 
tion I have performed is to separate India3 from the rest of 
the world. The results are shown in Table 22. This table is 
rather simpler than Table 21. It includes only exports in 
particular single years, and it takes no account of quality changes. 
The reason for singling out India should be obvious at a 
glance. By 1913, India accounted for 45% of the total yardage 
of cotton cloth exported from Great Britain. What is perhaps 
even more important, the percentage of increase in exports 
to India between any given year and 1913 is greater than the 
corresponding increase for the rest of the world. Although 
the introduction of quality consideration would somewhat 
reduce the importance of India, it would not substantially change 
the figures noted above. 
The picture presented in Table 22 seems less encouraging 
for Britain's cotton industry than that seen in Table 21. Clearly, 
there was a drop in the rate of growth of exports to India 
after 1887. Because exports to India were extraordinarily bad 
in 1895, the loss recorded between 1887 and 1895 cannot 
3
 India is here defined to include Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and the Straits 
Settlement (Malaya). Before 1835, it includes all of East Asia. 
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be taken as representing a trend. This, however, means that 
the 38% increase recorded between 1895 and 1905 is too large. 
Furthermore, the 26.7% increase between 1905 and 1913 can 
best be viewed as the result of a short spurt culminating in 
the record year of 1913. Clearly, the year 1913 represented 
the peak of an export boom as far as the Indian market was 
concerned. 
Even more serious for Britain's prospects as a cotton exporter 
was the low rate of growth of exports to the rest of the world 
after 1887. This is especially true of the mere 5.2% increase 
between 1905 and 1913. A pessimist could well have taken 
this as a sign of future stagnation or even decline outside of 
India. The low rate of growth outside of India, in fact, meant 
that about three-fourths of the yardage increase between 1887 
and 1913 went to India, with the rest of world accounting 
for only one-fourth of the total increase. Thus, Britain was 
becoming increasingly dependent on India for a continued 
growth of cotton cloth exports at a time when the rate of 
increase in exports to India was almost certainly on a long-term 
downward trend.' 
For purposes of this analysis, a further disaggregation of 
the "rest of the world" is called for. I have done this by dividing 
the world outside India into nine different areas. These are: 
(1) the United States; (2) Northern Europe (Scandinavia, the 
Benelux countries, Germany, and France); (3) Canada, Austra­
lia, and New Zealand; (4) Other Europe (i.e., Europe other 
than Northern Europe); (5) the Middle East (including Turkey, 
North Africa, and Iran); (6) Africa (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa); 
(7) Latin America; (8) China; and (9) Other Asia (i.e., Asia 
east of Iran but excluding India and China; this category thus 
principally consists of Japan, the Netherlands East Indies, 
Thailand, and the Philippines). Information on British cotton 
cloth exports to these various areas is presented in Table 23. 
As in Table 22, the data refer only to individual years, and 
no account has been taken of quality fluctuations. 
These more disaggregated data present quite a different 
picture from the overall data included in Tables 21 and 22. 
Table 23 makes it clear that British experience varied consider­
ably from area to area. Excepting the almost universal decline 
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between 1855 and 1865, which can be credited to the dislocations 
and the shortage of raw cotton associated with the American 
Civil War, there are two areas included in Table 23 which 
display a persistent and rapid growth in their cotton cloth 
imports from Great Britain. These are Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand (3) and Africa (6). Africa in this case refers almost 
entirely to British colonies, so this means that the best market 
areas—the two mentioned above plus India—were all part of 
the British Empire. 
Outside the British Empire, performance was much more 
mixed. In the case of the United States, except for a few years 
right after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain was 
never able to establish a real hold on the cotton cloth market. 
Indeed, by far the largest share of the American cotton cloth 
market ever held by British suppliers was during 1815 and 
1816.4 What is even more startling in view of the rapid growth 
of the American ecomony is that the absolute yardage for 1815 
was not surpassed until 1835. After that year, it was not again 
exceeded until 1847. After reaching this higher absolute level 
(representing, however, only a very small share of the total 
American market), British exports to the United States declined 
rapidly and were in fact on a pronounced downward course 
just before World War I. The very high quality of the cloth 
still exported to the United States was simply a reflection of 
the fact that Britain had no chance in low and medium qualities; 
only at the very highest qualities was she able to sell at all 
in the United States. 
The data on Northern Europe (2), also indicate a failure 
on Britain's part to capture a really substantial share of the 
market. Between 1815 and the middle 1850s, there was only 
a doubling of the yardage exported to that area. In all probabil­
ity, this represented a considerable decline in what had never 
been more than a modest market share. There was something 
of a boom in British cotton cloth exports to Northern Europe 
in the 1870s and early 1880s. The relatively high yardage figures 
4
 Compare the output estimates given by Robert Zevin (see R. B. Zevin, "The 
Growth of Textile Production after 1815," in R. Fogel and S. Engerman, eds., 
The Reinterpretation of American Economic History) with the import figures in 
Appendix D. 
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for those years, however, were followed by a decline. Only 
after 1905 was there some recovery, and in the 1905-13 period, 
yardage figures for Northern Europe were finally exceeding 
the records established several decades earlier. In fact, however, 
these new record figures still constituted only a very small 
market share. As in the case of the United States, Northern 
Europe was a market where Great Britain was only able to 
compete in the high-quality sector. 
British experience in the Other Europe market (4) was quite 
similar to that in the Northern European market. In both cases, 
an absolute peak was reached in the 1870s and early 1880s. 
The main difference between the two was that in Other Europe 
there was little or no recovery in the post-1905 period. The 
yardage of British cotton cloth exported to Other Europe in 
the last decade before World War I was far below the levels 
reached thirty-five years earlier. 
The Latin American market (7) must have been highly 
pleasing to British cotton manufacturers and traders throughout 
most of the nineteenth century. The rate of growth of British 
exports was rapid, and the absolute level was high. In 1887, 
for example, the yardage exported to Latin America was about 
twice as great as that exported to all of Europe. It was about 
that year, however, that something approaching stagnation set 
in. This development can be seen in Table 23, although the 
start of the stagnation period is somewhat obscured by the 
fact that 1895 was an extraordinarily good year. If any of 
the years around 1895 is substituted for that year in Table 
23, then the 1887-95 increase and the 1895-1905 decline both 
vanish. Between the late 1880s and 1913, exports of cotton 
cloth from Britain to Latin America show no trend at all. 
The Middle East (5) was generally a very gratifying market 
for the British cotton industry. Growth throughout the period 
was not only quite rapid but it was also relatively stable. The 
very small size of the increase between 1905 and 1913 results 
mainly from the fact that exports to the Middle East in 1913 
were at their lowest level since 1906. Furthermore, an all-time 
record had been set in 1911 (18% above the 1905 level). 
In Asia, China (8) was an important and generally growing 
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market. It was also, however, a volatile market.5 This condition 
makes it very difficult to interpret the decline that occurred 
between 1905 and 1913. The problem is made worse by the 
fact that both years were relatively good ones compared with 
surrounding years. It would be very difficult, however, to find 
any trend in these years more favorable than stagnation. Still, 
it is virtually impossible to tell what the appropriate reaction 
to this should have been at the time. Was it a harbinger of 
absolute decline, or was it merely another temporary setback 
to be followed by a renewed rapid growth? In any case, a 
reasonable observer at the time should have tempered any 
optimism he may have felt about developments in Northern 
Europe with concern over the future of the Chinese market. 
The remaining area to be discussed is Other Asia (9). On 
the whole, this must also have been a gratifying market. The 
only cause for concern that can be detected in Table 23 is 
the small increase between 1905 and 1913. In fact, however, 
1905 was an extraordinarily good year. If there was a period 
of stagnation in this market, it occurred between 1890 and 
1904. The decade between 1904 and 1913, on the other hand, 
shows approximately a two-thirds increase. 
This division of the world into subareas has greatly increased 
the information obtainable from the British export figures. 
It is now apparent that though some areas or markets grew 
at a rapid and even a fairly stable rate throughout this period, 
other markets did not. What is particularly striking is that in 
some markets stagnation and decline had set in well before 
World War I. Thus, the Latin American market had stopped 
growing in absolute terms sometime around 1890, and both 
the European areas declined, and declined sharply, sometime 
in the late 1880s. As for the United States, a very steep decline 
set in as early as 1816 or 1817, and even the very modest 
records achieved in the late 1850s were not reached after the 
Civil War. 
5
 This volatility was at least to some extent the result of cotton crop fluctuations 
in China. 
BRITISH EXPORTS BEFORE WORLD WAR I (149

BRITISH COTTON EXPORTS BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
ON A NATIONAL BASIS 
The next step in disaggregating British cotton export data 
is naturally to go to the level of individual countries. This 
step is particularly important because it is only at a national 
level that it makes much sense to talk about tariff and other 
governmental policies or about the growth and development 
of local cotton industries. Indeed, it will be noted that when 
I discussed British experience in those of my areas (i.e., the 
United States, India, and China) that consist solely of a single 
political entity, I avoided all mention of government policies 
or domestic industries. For organizational purposes, I postponed 
such discussion to this section where all the markets dealt with 
will be individual countries. 
One major problem arises when the data are disaggregated 
to a national level. There are obviously too many countries 
in the world for all to be discussed in any kind of detail. Some 
rational standards for deciding which countries to consider 
must therefore be established. Roughly speaking, my selection 
criteria are as follows: (1) the importance of a given market 
to the British industry, (2) the importance of a given local 
cotton industry, (3) the extent of a government's efforts at 
developing a domestic cotton industry, and (4) the availability 
of useful information. On the basis of these criteria, I have 
selected the following countries for more intensive study: the 
United States, France, Germany, Italy, Brazil, India, China, 
and Japan. Summary data for India are contained in Table 
22 and for the United States in Table 23. Data on the other 
countries are contained in Table 24. Further data on all these 
countries are available in Appendix D. 
The United States 
The modern American cotton textile industry originated in 
New England during the turbulent years of the Napoleonic 
Wars.6 During these years, embargo and war gave the American 
6
 For a comprehensive history of the New England cotton textile industry up 
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industry protection and, by the same token, excluded Great 
Britain from the American market. With the restoration of 
peace, however, British manufacturers flooded the American 
market with cotton cloth. American (or at least New England) 
production appears to have held up in 1815, but there was 
something akin to a collapse in 1816.7 
Not surprisingly, the American cotton manufacturers re­
ponded to this situation with a call for protection. Their plea 
was answered in 1816 when a duty of 25% was imposed on 
cotton cloth.8 As important as the rate of the tariff was the 
fact that no cotton cloth could be valued at less than 25 cents 
per yard. As cotton cloth prices fell rapidly after 1816, this 
minimum valuation clause resulted in higher and higher real 
rates on low-quality cloth.9 Taussig claims that this minimum 
tariff quickly became "prohibitive of the importation of the 
coarse kinds of cotton cloths."10 Zevin quotes a source that 
calculates the minimum rate to have implied (probably in 1816) 
a rate of 83.5% on the actual value of "coarse Indian goods.'*11 
This tariff policy was reinforced by the acts of 1824 and 1828, 
which increased both the formal rate and the minimum valua­
tion. 
The results of these tariffs are dear. New England's produc­
tion of cotton textiles boomed, and imports from Great Britain 
sagged. From an 1815 level of 70.8 million yards, cotton cloth 
imports from Great Britain declined to an annual average level 
to the American Civil War, see C. F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture; 
and Zevin, "The Growth of Textile Production after 1815." 
'Zevin, "The Growth of Textile Production after 1815,** p. 123. 
8
 A comprehensive account of American tariff policy with regard to cotton textiles 
during the nineteenth century can be found in F. W. Taussig's book, The Tariff 
History of the United States. 
9
 Even a tariff involving an equal rate for all types of cloth would probably 
have rested most heavily on low qualities. This is because the higher the quality 
of a yard of cloth, the higher was the percentage of value added in Great Britain 
as a percentage of the price. Thus, a 25% tariff on all goods would have implied 
a higher tariff on British value added (i.e., a higher effective tariff rate on British 
services) on low- than on high-quality doth. It might also be noted that low-quality 
cloth is particularly well suited to new industries because it requires much less 
skill on the part of the work force than does the production of high-quality 
cloth. 
l0Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, p. 30. 
"See Zevin, "The Growth of Textile Production after 1815," p. 127. 
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of around 40 million yards throughout the 1820s. In the 
meantime, New England's cotton cloth production grew from 
2.4 million yards in 1815 to 141.6 million yards in 1830, and 
231.5 million yards in 1833. This increase represents an annual 
average compounded rate of growth of cotton cloth production 
of approximately 29% between 1815 and 1833.12 As might 
be expected under these circumstances, the average quality 
of British exports to the United States increased considerably 
during this period. American manufacturers were taking over 
the low-quality market, leaving the British only a share of the 
much smaller, although still growing, high-quality market. 
The frequent changes in American tariffs after 1828 are 
reflected in the British export performance. In particular, the 
especially high tariffs during the 1842-46 period were ac­
companied by a sharp drop in quantity (imports averaged less 
than 30 million yards per year over the period) and a distinct 
increase in quality. These trends were reversed after the 
elimination of the minimum valuation system and the reduction 
of the rate on cotton cloth to 25% in 1846. Imports reached 
a level of 104.2 million yards in 1850, 184.6 million yards 
in 1855, and 225.1 million yards in 1859. At the same time, 
there was a pronounced decline in average quality.13 
These tariff changes also appear to have had at least some 
effect on American production trends. The average annual 
compounded rate of growth of cotton cloth production in New 
England was reduced to 5.1% between 1833 and 1860. Even 
more important is the fact that imports from Britain spurted 
up in the early 1850s, but New England cloth production only 
grew at an annual rate of 1.2% between 1850 and 1855. Even 
in 1855, however, the yardage produced in New England was 
over three times as great as the yardage imported into the 
United States from Great Britain.14 
During the Civil War, there was a sharp drop in both the 
quality and the quantity of the cloth imported. The decrease 
in quality was probably due to the reintroduction of high cotton 
12Ibid., pp. 123-24. 
13
 See Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Cloth Exports," 
pp. 16-17. 
14See Zevin, "The Growth of Textile Production after 1815," pp. 123-24. 
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textile tariffs. Because these new tariffs were specific, falling 
prices in the post-Civil War period resulted in higher and 
higher real ad valorem rates. Consequently, cotton cloth imports 
from Great Britain decreased sharply in volume during this 
period of rapid economic growth in the United States. In the 
late eighties and in the nineties, they averaged about 50 million 
yards per year. At the same time, average quality rose rapidly. 
With 1845 = 100, my index of the quality of British cotton 
cloth imported into the United States stood at 73.1 in 1855, 
93.3 in 1880,96.0 in 1890, and 140.9 in 1895. This last increase 
can, at least in part, be attributed to the further tariff increase 
of 1890. A drop in quantity after 1909 and a sharp increase 
in quality during 1912 and 1913 may perhaps be connected 
with the tariff of 1909.15 
A further indication of the effects of tariff changes on British 
cotton textile exports to the United States can be obtained 
from the behavior of yarn exports after 1890. The rate structure 
of the McKinley Tariff of that year favored the importation 
of fine British yarn to be woven in the United States.16 The 
effect on yarn imports was considerable. From a level consis­
tently well below 1 million pounds per year, American imports 
of British cotton yarn advanced to 2.5 million pounds in 1895, 
4.4 million pounds in 1905, and 5.4 million pounds in 1913. 
As noted above, during these years cloth imports were stagnating 
if not declining.17 
As interesting as the effects of American tariffs, and perhaps 
even more indicative of the long-run position of the British 
cotton textile industry in the early part of the twentieth century, 
is the remarkable rise of the southern states as cotton textile 
15Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," pp. 
16-17. 
16See Aldcroft, "Introduction," p. 3. 
17
 The good performance of British yarn presumably took some of the sting 
out of the poor performance of British cloth on the American market. 5.4 million 
pounds of yarn, however, was probably only enough to produce about 30 million 
yards of cloth. More important, the value of a pound of yarn is much less than 
the value of a pound of cloth, but the raw cotton content is about the same. 
Thus, adding the value of yarn and cloth imports tends to exaggerate the amount 
of value added being imported from Great Britain when the proportion of yarn 
in the total is increasing. 
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producers.18 In 1880, the South had less than 5% of all American 
cotton spindles. In 1890, the figure was approximately 12%; 
in 1900, it was 24%; and in 1910, it was almost 40%.19 Southern 
competition began with low counts. By 1890, the South was 
producing almost as much sub-20 yarn as was New England. 
By 1914, the South was producing 2 1/2 times as much sub-20 
yarn and slightly more 21 to 40 yarn than was New England. 
Between 1890 and 1914, the South also increased her share 
of yarn above 40 from 0% to 16% of the national total.20 
This remarkable growth occurred in a previously unindus­
trialized region in open competition with the well-established 
New England industry. Virtually all observers agree that the 
South's great advantage that allowed her to make such remark­
able progress was a cheap and docile supply of labor.21 The 
opportunity inherent in the possibility of using this labor force 
for the production of cotton textiles now seems so obvious 
that the principal task of economic historians is to explain why 
it did not happen sooner.22 
It has been argued by some that the New England cotton 
manufacturers were handicapped by a failure to recognize and 
rapidly adopt the machinery improvements that were becoming 
available. The most recent study of this question, however, 
argues persuasively that the New England manufacturers react­
ed in an economically rational manner when they were faced 
with technological choices.23 There has also been available for 
some time evidence indicating that when the New England 
industry ran into really serious trouble after World War I, 
the most rational policy was to either get out of New England 
or out of cotton manufacturing altogether. This, at least, was 
18
 For a description of the rise of the South, see Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing 
Industry of the United States, chaps . 2, 3 ; B. Mitchell, The Rise of Cotton Mills in 
the South, a n d The Industrial Revolution in the South. 
19
 Cope land , The Cotton Textile Industry of the United States, p . 34. 
20
 Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," p. 330. 
21
 See, for example, Copeland, The Cotton Textile Industry of the United States, 
pp. 39-40. 
22
 The dispute seems to lie between sociological explanations bearing on the 
unfavorable legacy of slavery versus more technological explanations that emphasize 
the advantages resulting from the development of artificial humidifiers and highly 
automatic (i.e., presumably low skill intensive) machinery. 
23
 See Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles." 
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the case if profit maximization for the firm is taken as the 
appropriate criteria of economic rationality.24 
Before concluding these remarks about the United States, 
something must be said about American cotton cloth exports. 
The first point to be made is that they were never large, at 
least not as a percentage of total output. Thus, in the period 
1910-13, American cotton cloth exports averaged less than 
7% of total output. This contrasts with a figure of over 80% 
for Great Britain during these same years. In absolute terms, 
these figures represent American exports of about 400 million 
yards of cloth per year as compared with 6,650 million yards 
for Great Britain.25 
The second major point about American exports is their 
great instability.26 This instability, in turn, was largely caused 
by the extreme instability of American exports to China.27 China 
was easily America's best customer, but she was not very reliable. 
Interestingly enough, the best years for American exports to 
China, 1905 and 1906, were also very good years for Great 
Britain, both in the Chinese market and overall. This, combined 
with the much greater stability of British over American exports 
to China,28 gives the impression that American exports were 
largely of a marginal nature in the Chinese market. That is, 
only a shortage of British cloth caused Chinese buyers to turn 
in large numbers to American suppliers. It is true, however, 
that America had a special niche in the Chinese market, at 
least until Japanese cloth took over. This speciality consisted 
of heavy and coarse, but not heavily sized, gray cloth sent 
to northern China and Manchuria. This cloth was used to make 
the familiar padded winter outfits of northern China.29 It is 
at least suggestive that the United States should specialize in 
an item using so much cotton relative to other inputs. 
It is clear, in any case, that America was not a major threat 
to British cotton textile exports and that exports were not a 
24
 See Sweezy, "The Amoskeag Manufacturing Company."

25
 Robson , The Cotton Industry in Britain, p . 358 .

2 6 C o p e l a n d , The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p p . 2 2 0 - 2 4 .

27
 Ibid., p. 224.

28
 Ibid.

29Ibid., pp. 224-25.
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major force sustaining the prosperity of the American industry. 
The export trade can best be described as a combination of 
a few specialized products together with a possible outlet for 
overproduction in America or a source for alleviating a shortage 
in the rest of the world. This, in turn, reflects the fact that 
the American cotton textile industry was not in a sufficiently 
strong competitive position to be able to permanently devote 
a major share of its capacity to production for export. 
France 
British cotton cloth exports to France throughout the period 
1815-1913 were seriously affected by French commercial policy. 
Although somewhat modified in 1836, the basis of French policy 
until 1860 was prohibition of British textile goods.30 It will 
be noted that this prohibition did not mean that no British 
cotton cloth was imported into France. It simply meant that 
smuggling was required. In fact, given the circumstances, fairly 
substantial quantities of British cotton cloth were declared for 
export to France,31 at least in the years just prior to 1861 
when the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty went into effect with regard 
to cotton cloth. The quantity of British cotton cloth declared 
for export to France increased from 193,000 yards in 1815 
and 139,000 yards in 1830 to 2.4 million yards in 1835, 5 
million yards in 1850, 7 million yards in 1855 and 10.8 million 
yards in 1860. As might be expected, these amounts consisted 
largely of high-quality cloth. In 1815, the average-per-yard 
declared price of the cloth going to France was 151.7% of 
the average price per yard of all cotton cloth being exported 
from Great Britain.32 Although average quality remained high, 
it did fall somewhat once the quantities exported to France 
increased after 1830. 
30
 A. L. Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress 
of the Industrial Revolution in France, p. 186. 
3
'Some of this cloth, however, was probably shipped to a French free port 
and then reexported (see A. L. Dunham, The Industrial Revolution in France, 
1815-1848, p. 19). 
32
 See Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," 
p. 14, for more complete information on relative export prices to various areas 
of the world. 
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This period of prohibition witnessed a rapid growth in French 
cotton textile production. Between 1816 and 1848, French 
consumption of raw cotton increased from 12 to 65 million 
kilograms. Before 1860, annual cotton consumption exceeded 
100 million kilograms; in addition, there was some net importa­
tion of yarn. These yarn imports probably did not exceed 1 
million kilograms, however.33 As a comparison with the 10.8 
million yards of British cloth imported in 1860, it might be 
noted that 100 million kilograms of raw cotton was enough 
to produce approximately 1,100 million yards of cloth.34 
The position of British cotton cloth exports improved mark­
edly after the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty went into effect. This 
treaty allowed British cotton cloth to enter France on payment 
of a 15% duty. As a result, despite the difficult supply situation 
with regard to raw cotton, British cotton cloth exports rose 
to 21.4 million yards in 1865. In 1869, they reached 41.6 million 
yards. At least partly as a result of the loss of the Alsatian 
industry after the Franco-Prussian War, British exports to 
France jumped to 86.5 million yards in 1871 and 87.7 million 
yards in 1875. Not surprisingly, average quality declined some­
what as the volume increased. 
It is extremely difficult to tell what effect the tariff change 
had on the development of the French industry because its 
introduction coincided with the outbreak of the American Civil 
War.35 
33
 See Dunham, The Industrial Revolution in France, p. 164; and Anglo-French 
Treaty of Commerce of 1860, p. 193. The 100 million kilogram figure is based 
on the assumption that the bales involved weighed the usual 478 pounds apiece. 
34This calculation assumes a 10% waste rate in spinning and that 5 1/2 yards 
of cloth weighed one pound. 
35
 It might be noted, however, that during the last year before the disastrous 
war with Prussia, French raw cotton consumption set a new record of 124 million 
kilograms (see, J. H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 
1815-1914, p. 246). This volume of raw cotton should have been enough to 
produce approximately 1,350 million yards of cloth. David Landes presents 
consistently lower estimates of French raw cotton consumption. He sets consumption 
at 44.8 million kilograms in 1848 (but 63.9 million in 1849), 59.3 million in 1850, 
93.7 million in 1869 and 80.3 million in 1872 (see D. S. Landes, "Technological 
Change and Development in Western Europe, 1750-1914," pp. 394, 423). For 
my purposes, however, it does not matter very much whether Clapham or Landes 
is right. The important point is that British cotton cloth exports to France were, 
with the possible exception of the years right after 1870, very small compared 
with the level of French production. 
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The loss of Alsace naturally reduced output for a while. 
As early as 1874, however, the raw cotton consumption record 
set in 1869 had been exceeded.36 This impressive performance 
was the result of rapid growth in the Nord and the partial 
reconstruction of the Alsatian industry in the Vosges. In 1876, 
consumption reached a high point of 158 million kilograms. 
This, however, was a level not reached again until 1891. There 
was thus a fifteen-year period of stagnation. After 1890, 
however, there was renewed and relatively steady growth. The 
all-time pre-World War I peak was reached in 1909 when 
319 million kilograms of raw cotton were consumed in France.37 
British exports were not able to sustain the level of 1871 
once France started to recover from the loss of Alsace. They 
fell from 86.8 million yards in 1871 to 56.3 million yards in 
1880. The decline did not stop at that point, however. By 
1885, exports to France were down to 45.0 million yards, and 
in 1890 they amounted to only 30.4 million yards. This further 
drop was undoubtedly accelerated by the French conversion 
to specific tariffs in 1881. Because cotton cloth prices generally 
fell after 1880, this change resulted in a rising level of real 
protection. 
In 1892, the Meline Tariff dealt a further blow to British 
cotton textile exports to France. By 1899, British cotton cloth 
exports had fallen to a mere 16.4 million yards, and in 1913 
they were only 12.8 million yards. The average quality of British 
exports to France rose as the quantity declined after 1871. 
The positive effect of these two tariff changes on the growth 
of the French industry is clear. Certainly the Meline Tariff 
must be connected with the renewed upsurge in production 
after 1890. The failure of the gradual tariff increase after 
1881 to have an appreciable effect on the French cotton industry 
can probably be explained by the generally very poor perfor­
mance of the whole French economy during the 1880s. 
France, as might be expected from the above description, 
36
 Alsace had over one-third of all French spindles before 1870. The area 
concentrated on the production of relatively fine textiles, however, and no doubt 
accounted for considerably less than one-third of French raw cotton consumption 
(ibid.). 
37Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, p. 247. 
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was not a major exporter of cotton cloth. In the years just 
before World War I, French cotton cloth exports were at a 
level (in value terms) equal to approximately 7% to 8% of 
total British cotton cloth exports.38 These French cloth exports 
accounted for about 25% of all the raw cotton consumed in 
France. Of this amount, however, approximately one-half by 
value, and over one-half by weight, went to the French colonies, 
where foreign (especially British) competition was prohibited. 
The rest of the exports were mostly specialty items of particularly 
high quality. In fact, Great Britain was the single most important 
customer for these items.39 
Germany 
British experience in the German market was not quite as 
variable as in the French market, largely because German tariffs 
did not fluctuate as much as French tariffs (and prohibitions). 
The quantity of British cotton goods imported into Germany 
right after the end of the Napoleonic Wars was large relative 
to the size of the German market for these goods,40 and did 
serious damage to the German industry that had grown up 
during the wars.41 After 1815, there was some growth in the 
quantity, and decline in the quality, of British cotton cloth 
shipped to Germany until approximately 1830. At that point, 
stagnation in both quality and quantity set in at least through 
1850. 
This was generally a period of rising tariffs. The founding 
of the Zollverein tended, like any customs union, to divert 
trade from outside to inside the union. Furthermore, tariffs 
tended to become heavier during these years, both because 
of falling prices (the tariffs were specific in form) and because 
of increased rates.42 It was also a period of growth for the 
38
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 218. 
" C l a p h a m , The Economic Development of France and Germany, p p . 2 4 8 - 4 9 . 
40
 In this period, linen was the principal cloth used by the bulk of the German 
population. 
41
 As far as factory production was concerned, this industry was limited to spinning. 
42Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, p. 101. 
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German cotton textile industry. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Germany was consuming about 15,000 tons of raw 
cotton per annum.43 This was enough cotton to produce 
approximately 150 million yards of cloth. This figure may be 
compared with imports of 47.4 million yards of cloth from 
Great Britain in 1850. 
Immediately after 1850, there was a considerable increase 
in cotton goods imports. To some extent, however, this increase 
may have been a statistical peculiarity resulting from the 
Crimean War.44 The succeeding period up to 1870 is difficult 
to interpret because of the American Civil War and the Franco-
Prussian War. It is interesting to note, however, that German 
raw cotton consumption increased by about four and one-half 
times between 1846-50 and 1866-70.45 During the same period, 
British cotton cloth exports fell somewhat short of doubling. 
It seems extremely unlikely that any change in re-exporting 
patterns could have been so important as to have kept the 
British share of the German cotton cloth market from decreasing 
during this period. What is more, these trends continued 
unabated after the German conquest of Alsace. In fact, British 
cotton cloth exports to Germany declined quite sharply between 
1871 and 1880. At the same time, German raw cotton consump­
tion increased by about 70% between 1866-70 and 1871-75.46 
After 1880, British cottori cloth exports to Germany stagnated 
until almost the end of the nineteenth century. This stagnation 
was accompanied by rising German tariffs. In particular, the 
tariffs on high-quality goods were raised. This action was very 
undesirable from Britain's point of view because she had a 
comparative advantage in high qualities. The stagnation in the 
quantity of British exports to Germany resulted in a sharp 
43
 Ibid., p. 295. 
44
 During the Crimean War, Britain attempted to place an embargo on exports 
to Russia. Because my data is based on the destination declared by the exporter 
at shipment from Great Britain, no goods were listed as being headed for Russia 
during the period of the embargo. In fact, however, substantial amounts of British 
cotton cloth did reach Russia, much, if not most, of it via Germany. 
45Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, pp. 295-96. Unlike 
the French case, Landes's figures agree well with Clapham's numbers on Germany 
(see Landes, "Technological Change and Economic Development in Western 
Europe," p. 423). 
46Ibid., pp. 296-97. 
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decline in Britain's share of the German market. In 1871-75, 
Germany consumed enough cotton to produce about 1.2 billion 
yards of cloth per annum; and in 1871, she imported 78 million 
yards of cotton cloth from Great Britain. In 1895, Germany 
consumed cotton at a rate equivalent to a production of about 
2.5 billion yards of cloth but imported only 50 million yards 
of cotton cloth from Great Britain.47 After the turn of the 
century, British cotton cloth exports to Germany started to 
increase once again. This can probably be credited to rapidly 
rising incomes in Germany together with a relatively high income 
elasticity of demand for high-quality cloth. At the same time, 
however, German raw cotton consumption was growing at least 
as fast as imports from Great Britain. By 1910, Germany 
consumed enough raw cotton to produce about 4.5 to 5 billion 
yards of cloth, and imports from Great Britain amounted to 
86 million yards.48 
Germany was a more serious threat to Britain in third markets 
than was France. Before the outbreak of World War I, Germany 
was exporting somewhat more cotton cloth by value and weight 
than was France. More important, Germany did not have any 
large colonial market. Almost all of the German exports had 
to withstand the cold blast of international competition. Of 
course, Germany was still a minor cotton cloth exporter by 
British standards. In 1910, the value of German cotton cloth 
exported was less than 10% of the value of British cotton cloth 
exported.49 Interestingly enough, the single largest buyer of 
German cotton goods was Great Britain.50 
Italy 
Starting after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and going 
all the way up to at least 1880, Italy was a large and growing 
47
 ibid. 
48
 ibid. 
49U.S. Tariff Board, p. 215. 
50Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, p. 298. As in the 
case of France, it should be noted that Germany did relatively much better in 
the export of speciality items such as cotton hosiery, lace, embroideries, clothing, 
and so on, than in the export of cloth. In 1910, total German cotton goods exports 
had a value of about 25% as great as the value of total British cotton goods 
exports (U.S. Tariff Board, p. 219). 
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market for British cotton cloth. British exports of cotton cloth 
to Italy increased from 11.7 million yards in 1815 to 79 million 
yards in 1860. The rapidity of this growth is readily apparent 
if Italy is compared with Germany. In 1815, Italian cotton 
cloth imports from Great Britain were about 35% as great 
as were German imports. By 1840, Italian imports exceeded 
German imports, and that situation continued through 1860. 
Some of this rapid growth in volume, however, was offset by 
a decline in the average quality of the British cotton cloth 
going to Italy. 
In the meantime, there was some growth of the domestic 
Italian factory cotton textile industry. This development was 
far from spectacular, however.51 In 1861, Italy imported 12,400 
tons of raw cotton.52 Roughly speaking, this amount was enough 
to produce 125 million yards of cloth. This figure may be 
compared with 1860 imports of 79 million yards of cotton 
cloth from Great Britain alone. 
It was after Italian unity was achieved, and especially after 
the enactment of the tariffs of 1878 and 1887, that the domestic 
Italian industry really started to mushroom. Over the whole 
period, 1861-1913, Italian raw cotton imports increased from 
12,400 tons to 201,900 tons.53 In the meantime imports of 
cotton cloth from Great Britain declined sharply. This decline 
is especially noticeable after 1887. In 1885, Italy imported 85.6 
million yards of British cotton cloth. By 1890, this figure had 
fallen to 56 million yards. As the Italian industry continued 
to prosper, British exports to Italy continued to fall. They 
reached a level of 26.5 million yards in 1895, 8.7 million yards 
in 1905, and increased very slightly to 10.2 million yards in 
1913. By comparison, the 201,900 tons of raw cotton imported 
into Italy in 1913 should have been enough to produce approxi­
mately 2 billion yards of cloth. 
As expected, the quality of British cotton cloth imported 
into Italy increased rather sharply as the quantity fell. Indeed, 
by 1913, the average quality of British cotton cloth entering 
51
 See S. B. Clough, The Economic History of Modern Italy, pp. 20-21.

52Ibid., p. 63.

53
 Ibid.
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Italy was higher than that sent to any other market with the 
single exception of the United States. In that year, the price 
of the average yard of cotton cloth going from Britain to Italy 
was over twice as high as the price of the average yard of 
cotton cloth exported to all markets from Britain.54 
Italy's complete control of her domestic low- and medium-
quality markets eventually spilled over into a considerable export 
trade. By weight, Italy in 1910 exported about as much cotton 
cloth as did France or Germany. The average quality of this 
cloth, however, was lower than the quality of French and German 
exports.55 This in turn means that the average quality of Italian 
cotton cloth exports was far below average British quality, 
despite the low quality of British cloth bound for India. Italian 
exports were concentrated on the Middle East and Latin 
America. As a supplier of low-quality cotton cloth to these 
areas, Italy was rapidly becoming a real threat to Britain during 
the years just before World War I.56 
Brazil 
For at least the first half of the period under review, Brazil 
must have been a very satisfying market for British cloth 
exporters. As can be seen in Table 25, the quantity of British 
cotton cloth taken by Brazil grew steadily from 15.8 million 
yards in 1815 to 156 million yards in 1860. After a period 
of slack associated with the American Civil War, exports to 
Brazil reached 233 million yards in 1880. After 1830, this rapid 
growth of cloth exports to Brazil was accompanied by a decline 
in average quality. This seems normal enough in view of the 
rapid growth of the market. What is more, at least part of 
this growth in demand resulted from the "tremendous expan­
sion of the slave trade" that occurred between 1830 and 1850.57 
54
 See Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," 
p.	 14. 
55
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 215. 
56See G. W. Daniels and J. Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire 
Cotton Industry," p. 164. 
57See S. J. Stein, The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture, p. 4. 
164) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
This great growth of British exports took place despite the 
mildly protective tariff of 1844. This tariff levied a tax of 30% 
ad valorem on cotton goods.58 This may have reduced the level 
of British exports somewhat below the levels they would other­
wise have reached, but it did not do much to accelerate the 
growth of domestic Brazilian production. It was only after a 
long period displaying a "steady protectionistic trend" after 
1879 that the local cotton industry entered into a period of 
rapid growth. After 1879, real tariff rates increased almost 
continuously because of three different developments: (1) 
nominal rates were increased, (2) the percentage of the tariff 
to be paid in gold (instead of depreciated milreis) was raised, 
and (3) official valuation of imports was combined with falling 
actual values.59 This protectionistic trend received an especially 
big boost from the "remarkably protective" tariff of 1900.60 
During this period, the growth of Brazilian cotton cloth output 
was nothing short of sensational. From an estimated level of 
22.7 million yards (20.6 million meters) in 1885, output in­
creased to 290.4 million yards in 1911.61 Naturally enough, 
imports were not faring well. With the exception of the years 
1892 and 1893, when cotton cloth imports from Great Britain 
reached an all-time high, the general trend after 1880 was 
downward in quantity and upward in quality. By 1905, British 
cotton cloth exports to Brazil had fallen to 131.5 million yards, 
and in 1913 they were all the way down to 96.5 million yards. 
This drop occurred despite the fact that Britain continued 
to be the dominant supplier of imports.62 At the same time, 
Britain's share of the whole Brazilian cotton cloth market (in 
yardage terms) dropped from about 90% in 1880 to about 
20% in 1913. Under these circumstances, the fact that Brazil 
did not amount to anything as a cotton goods exporter must 
have seemed small consolation indeed to British producers and 
traders. 
58Ibid., p. 10. 
59Ibid., pp. 84-85. 
60Ibid., p. 85. 
61
 Ibid., p. 100. 
62
 Compare the figures for total Brazilian imports on page 193 of Stein, The 
Brazilian Cotton Manufacture, with the figures for British exports to Brazil presented 
in Table 24. 
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India 
India was easily Britain's most important, and most rapidly 
growing, cotton goods market during most of the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, in 1913 India imported no less than 3.2 billion 
yards of British cotton cloth. This impressive figure can be 
contrasted with the mere 1.4 million yards of British cotton 
cloth taken by India in 1815. Interestingly enough, in 1815 
India imported very-high-quality cloth, the average price per 
yard being 132.9% of the overall average price per yard of 
British cotton cloth exports in that year.63 By 1913, India was 
Britain's low-quality market par excellence, the average price 
per yard being only 84.4% of the overall average price.64 By 
my estimate, the average quality of British cotton cloth exported 
to India declined by almost exactly 50% between 1815 and 
1913.65 
The decline in quality was almost continuous until around 
1890 and was accompanied by a virtually uninterrupted, and 
usually very rapid, increase in quantity. It is perfectly clear 
that India could not remain the highest-quality importer once 
British sales spread beyond colonial officials and local notables. 
In the years following 1815, Lancashire greatly expanded her 
Indian sales by appealing to groups who could afford only 
relatively cheap cloth. Not only did Lancashire ship out her 
regular assortment of cheap cloth but she deliberately developed 
special types of cheap cloth for India and other low-income 
markets. A leading example of this policy was the introduction 
of very cheap, heavily sized goods during and after the American 
Civil War.66 
The net effect of British competition on the domestic Indian 
handloom industry is a matter of some dispute. The traditional 
view is well expressed in Karl Marx's famous quotation from 
63Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," p. 
14. 
64
 So heavy was India's weight in the calculation of the overall average price 
that, of the ten regions separated out, only "Other Asia," in addition to India, 
had an average price below the overall average. The other eight regions all had 
average prices above the overall average (ibid.). 
65Ibid., p. 18.

66Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United States, p. 79.
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the governor-general's report of 1834-35: "The bones of the 
cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India."67 Other 
evidence, however, indicates that very substantial numbers of 
handloom weavers must have continued to function throughout 
the nineteenth century.68 There can be little doubt that more 
cotton cloth would have been produced in India had British 
cloth not been available. It is not, however, clear whether the 
level of Indian handloom production actually declined after 
1815. The total Indian market for cotton cloth must have been 
growing rapidly given the population explosion of this period. 
In addition, although British cotton cloth imports no doubt 
hurt the Indian handloom weavers, cheap British yarn probably 
helped them. Indian imports of British yarn increased fairly 
steadily until around 1880.69 In that year, these imports 
amounted to some 46.9 million pounds. This amount of yarn 
was probably enough for close to 250 million yards of handwo­
ven cloth. In addition, there must have been some domestic 
handspun yarn (made out of Indian raw cotton) available. 
Between 1890 and 1913, the average quality of British cotton 
cloth imported by India increased somewhat despite a continued 
increase in the quantity imported. The principal reason for 
this development was clearly the establishment of a domestic 
factory industry. By the end of the period, this new factory 
industry had become a factor to be reckoned with on the Indian 
market. In the 1909-10 to 1913-14 period, Indian mill produc­
tion of cotton cloth averaged 1.1 billion yards per annum 
compared with average annual imports of 2.6 billion yards.70 
In the single year 1913, Indian factory cotton cloth production 
amounted to about 35% of the yardage imported.71 This high 
67
 K. Marx, Capital, p. 471. A perplexing feature of this quotation is that Marx's 
reference is extremely vague. Morris Morris, who attempted to find the original, 
has informed me that he was unable to do so. 
681 have this information directly from Professor Morris. See also M. Morris, 
"Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic History," 
pp. 612-13. 
69This alone, of course, does not mean that handweaving was necessarily 
increasing; domestic hand spinning may have been decreasing. 
70
 See A. R. Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p. 404. 
71
 The fact that this percentage appears to be slightly less than that achieved 
for the period 1909-10 to 1913-14 can probably be credited to the boom in 
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level of output was the result of rapid recent growth. It is 
estimated that between 1900 and 1913 the number of factory 
spindles in India increased by one-third and that the number 
of power looms more than doubled.72 In addition to mill 
production, it seems apparent that there was an increase in 
handloom production during these years.73 The growth of 
handloom weaving was aided by the spread of the fly shuttle 
as well as the growth of a domestic factory spinning industry.74 
This early development of an Indian factory cotton textile 
industry, and the growth of the handloom industry, occurred 
with little or no protection. After 1896, the mill industry had 
no protection, and the handloom industry had virtually none. 
In addition, it should be remembered that the continual decline 
in freight rates during the nineteenth century had an effect 
similar to a decline in tariffs. Even more important, at least 
with regard to inland markets, was the building of the Indian 
railways and the general improvement in internal transportation 
and communication facilities. 
Given these circumstances, it seems that the Indian situation 
just before World War I was not as favorable as the figures 
alone on yards of cloth imported from Great Britain might 
have indicated. The country had a rapidly growing, modern 
mill industry that was flourishing without benefit of tariffs. 
The ability of this domestic industry to take advantage of the 
cheap labor available in India had already permitted it to make 
serious inroads in the low^quality market.75 Even without 
considering the possibility that Britain might be unable to 
maintain her overwhelmingly dominant position among foreign 
suppliers of cotton cloth to India,76 the rise of the domestic 
Indian cotton cloth sales experienced in 1913 (see A. S. Pearse, The Cotton Industry 
in India, p. 209). 
72
 Daniels and Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton 
Industry," p. 165. 
73Arno Pearse refers to the "resuscitation" of the handloom industry (The Cotton 
Industry in India, p . 27) . 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 For an excellent discussion of the growth of the Indian cotton textile work 
force, see M. D. Morris, The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India. 
76In 1913, Britain supplied 97%, by weight, of all cotton cloth imported into 
India (Daniels and Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton 
Industry," p. 164). 
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Indian industry must have cast a shadow over Britain's long-term 
future in this all-important market. 
China 
Throughout most of the 1815-1913 period, China was a 
large and growing market for British cotton cloth. This is 
particularly true after the "Opium War" had effectively 
"opened" China to Western commercial penetration. British 
exports rose from 13 million yards in 1840 to 73 million yards 
in 1850, 194 million yards in 1859, and 469 million yards 
in 1871. After this point, the rate of growth slowed down 
considerably. Thus, only 448 million yards of British cotton 
cloth were imported into China in 1880. This quantity subse­
quently grew to 570 million yards in 1890, an amount not 
equaled until 1902. After 1902, the quantity fluctuated between 
a high of 800 million yards in 1905 and low of 471 million 
yards in 1910. The figure for 1913 was 717 million yards. 
As expected, average quality decreased rapidly during the 
period of rapid expansion. Until after 1890, Britain was 
competing, on the Chinese market, almost exclusively with local 
handloom weavers. Thus, the rapid growth in British sales 
up to that date must have consisted almost exclusively of a 
capture of part of the handloom weavers' market.77 After 1890, 
however, there was a resurgence in the average quality of British 
cloth going to China. With 1845=100, the average quality 
of British cotton cloth exports to China increased from 81.9 
in 1890 to 118.9 in 1913.78 During that same period, the average 
Chinese import price rose from 100% of the worldwide average 
77
 This, of course, does not necessarily mean that the output of the handloom 
weavers was decreasing. Indeed, the study of Chi-Ming Hou concludes that 
handloom weaving in China generally was increasing in absolute amounts at least 
through 1930 (Chi-Ming Hou, "Economic Dualism: The Case of China," pp. 284, 
286, 287). It seems highly probable, however, that during most of the period 
up to 1890, the British were slowly expanding their percentage share of the 
Chinese market at the expense of handloom weavers. 
78
 These particular figures may somewhat exaggerate the real change. Taking 
the average of slightly longer periods, we find the results are 83.1 for 1889-91 
and 112.4 for 1911-13. 
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price for British cotton cloth exports to 119.1% of the average 
79 
price. 'y 
This means that, in 1913, the British cotton cloth going to 
China was of a considerably higher average quality than that 
going to India and of a quality similar to that going to 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Europe.80 
The reason for this turnabout, as well as the lack of significant 
growth in the quantity of British exports, can be traced to 
two developments. The first of these was the growth of a 
domestic factory industry. The number of spindles in Chinese 
factories grew from 65,000 in 1894 to 430,000 in 1902 and 
964,000 in 1913. In the meantime, the number of power looms 
grew from 2,100 in 1896 to 4,564 in 1913.81 By 1913, this 
factory industry was able to produce roughly 10% as much 
cloth as was being imported.82 This, however, was still only 
a tiny fraction of total Chinese output. Little reliable information 
is available on Chinese handloom production, so only a rough 
estimate of total Chinese production can be made. It seems 
likely, however, that total Chinese cotton cloth production in 
1913 was about 5 or 6 times as great as total imports.83 
At the same time as a domestic Chinese factory industry 
was beginning to emerge, Britain was starting to encounter 
serious competition on the Chinese market from other export­
ers. The first source of such competition was the United States, 
especially the South. By 1910, however, the United States had 
been overtaken in the Chinese market by Japan.84 This 
competition from the United States and Japan was felt almost 
exclusively in the market for cheap gray cloth in northern 
China and Manchuria.85 These countries did not seriously 
threaten Britain's hold on the higher-quality South China 
79Sandberg, "Movements in the Quality of British Cotton Textile Exports," p. 
14. 
80
 Ibid. 
8 1F. Utley, Lancashire and the Far East, pp. 239-40. 
82
 Compare pp. 236, 233, 240, in Utley, Lancashire and the Far East. 
83See ibid., p. 236, for some evidence on this question. 
84
 U .S . Tar i f f C o m m i s s i o n , The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, p . 149. 
85
 For a discussion of the various Chinese submarkets, see R. H. Myers, "Cotton 
Textile Handicraft and the Development of the Cotton Textile Industry in Modern 
China," pp. 618-20. 
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market.86 By the 1910-13 period, the domestic Chinese industry 
and competitive imports had reduced Britain's share of the 
Chinese market for factory-produced cotton cloth to approxi­
mately 55% by value and 50% by volume.87 
Japan 
In many ways, Japan is the most interesting of the British 
markets examined in this chapter. This is principally because 
Japanese competition in third markets played such an important 
role in Lancashire's decline after World War I. Indeed, even 
before World War I, Japan was the only really serious threat 
to Britain in third markets. 
Japan, of course, entered the international economy at a 
relatively late stage. Almost from the beginning, however, she 
was a good customer for cotton goods. As early as 1868, total 
Japanese cotton cloth imports totaled over 32 million square 
yards.88 Of that total, about 23 million yards originated in 
Great Britain. Following a generally upward path, Japanese 
cotton cloth imports reached a high of 97 million square yards 
in 1879 (62 million of these yards were British). This quantity 
was not exceeded until 1896. The peak in Japanese cotton 
cloth imports, however, was reached during the period 1905-10. 
Total imports exceeded 100 million yards in each of those 
years with Britain supplying almost all of it. After 1908, the 
trend was steadily downward. In 1913, Japan imported a total 
of only 52 million square yards and only 50 million yards from 
Great Britain.89 
This decline in imports was, of course, the result of a rapid 
86Ibid., p. 148; and Copeland, The Cotton Manufacturing Industry of the United 
States, p. 225-26. 
87Utley, Lancashire and the Far East, pp. 230-31. Miss Utley quotes Bernard 
Ellinger's assertion that, in the (for Britain) very good year of 1913, Great Britain 
had 68% of the Chinese import market for cotton cloth by weight and 72% by 
value, and Japan had 23% by value and 19% by weight. The quality of domestic 
factory production was no doubt considerably lower than even the Japanese product 
(see Chi-Ming Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840­
1937, p. 153). 
88
 K. Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 306. 
89Ibid., p. 307. 
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growth in domestic factory output. Substantial growth came 
first in the spinning section, but even there it did not really 
amount to much before the 1880s. The 1880s, however, 
witnessed a veritable explosion in Japanese cotton textile pro­
duction. Cotton-spinning capacity increased from 12,800 spin­
dles in 1880 to 358,200 spindles in 1890. By 1900, the num­
ber of spindles had reached 1,361,100, and in 1913 it was 
2,287,000.90 The lead in spinning over weaving is reflected 
in the fact that Japanese yarn imports began to decline decisively 
as early as 1888. In both quantity and value terms, Japan had 
become a net exporter of cotton cloth by 1897.91 Cotton cloth 
exports did not exceed cotton cloth imports, even in terms 
of quantity, until about 1901. In value terms, Japan did not 
become a net exporter of cotton cloth until after 1909. In 
1913, however, Japanese cotton cloth exports were about five 
times as great as imports in yardage terms and over four times 
as large in value terms.92 The single most important example 
of the force behind Japan's move onto world markets before 
World War I is unquestionably the way she pushed aside the 
United States in the North China and Manchurian markets. 
The remarkable growth of the Japanese cotton textile industry 
in the decades after 1880 was accomplished largely without 
the aid of tariffs or any other kind of government assistance. 
Indeed, for most of this period the Japanese government was 
bound by treaties forbidding her to establish anything except 
extremely low tariffs.93 It is true that a few mills were given 
government assistance, mainly in the form of easy credit, in 
the years around 1880. These government-supported mills did 
very badly, however, and played no important role in the 
development of the Japanese cotton textile industry as a whole. 
90Ibid., p. 311. 
91
 Ibid., p. 304. 
92Ibid., p. 306-307. 
93
 Under an agreement of 1866, Japan was obligated to limit her tariffs to 5% 
ad valorem. This restriction was not escaped until after Japan's victory in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Other treaties, however, continued to limit the 
amount of tariff protection that could be given and tariffs remained very low 
until 1911 (W. W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and 
Structural Change, 1868-1938, pp. 19, 539). 
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Rather, the industry was built by a vigorous private sector that 
operated without government support.94 
Even in 1913, Lancashire must reasonably have been appre­
hensive of this booming Japanese industry. In only a few decades 
and without much government assistance, it had come from 
virtually nothing to both capture its domestic market and become 
a major force in all other Asian markets. 
CONCLUSION 
After this review of various British cotton textile markets, 
it is now appropriate that we try to distill some more general 
conclusions. I believe that the following are supported by the 
facts presented above: 
1. Throughout the nineteenth century, the performance of 
British cotton textile exports was heavily dependent on the 
commercial policies followed by importing countries. Even in 
the early part of the century, British exports were adversely 
affected by the French prohibition and the American tariffs 
of 1816, 1824, and 1828. Later, British exports were hurt by 
increased tariffs in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, 
and Brazil among the countries examined in this chapter. On 
the other hand, British exports were assisted by tariff reductions 
such as those that were enacted in the United States in 1846 
and in France in 1861 (the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty). 
2. Throughout the century, domestic cotton textile industries 
developed outside Great Britain behind tariff barriers. The 
earliest and most obvious case of this was in the United States. 
Of the countries discussed above, it was also true of Italy and 
Brazil as well as France and Germany. Among countries not 
discussed above, it was true of Russia.95 
3. These infant industries had their greatest initial success 
at low counts and qualities. This was partly because protection 
was usually greatest at low counts and partly because low counts 
and qualities required relatively less skill than did high counts 
94Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 15. 
95
 See W. L. Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, pp. 43-44, 
47. 
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and qualities. It is also true that these industries usually advanced 
more rapidly in spinning than in weaving. As time progressed, 
however, there was a clear tendency to produce higher-and­
higher-quality goods and for weaving to catch up with spinning. 
4. The cotton textile industries that grew up behind tariff 
walls were usually the first, or one of the first, industries to 
adopt modern methods in each particular country. This 
happened even when other industries were given equal, or 
even greater, protection. In other words, because cotton textiles 
were a relatively easy industry to establish on a modern factory 
basis, the industry responded unusually well to tariff protection. 
5. As the nineteenth century wore on, a number of cotton 
textile industries began to develop without the aid of tariffs. 
This was true of the southern states of the United States 
(unprotected against the established industry of New England), 
India, China, and, perhaps most important, Japan. This ten­
dency was undoubtedly assisted by the development of low-skill­
intensive methods, particularly in spinning. In all these cases 
of unprotected development,96 cotton textiles, when not the 
first, was an early industry to be mechanized. In all four cases 
listed above, factory production began with very low counts 
and qualities and then slowly spread to higher counts and 
qualities. Furthermore, in all these cases, with the possible 
exception of the United States South, where no handloom 
weavers were available, spinning was mechanized earlier and 
faster than was weaving. 
6. Before the outbreak of World War I, several of these 
new industries, protected and unprotected, were beginning to 
compete with Great Britain on world markets. This is true 
despite the fact that Great Britain remained easily the predomi­
nant exporter of cotton goods and that no other national 
industry was primarily dependent on exports. Part of the decline 
in Britain's share of world trade in cotton goods between 
1882-84 and 1910-13 was due to the very rapid growth of 
markets in which Britain did not participate to any large extent. 
This is particularly true with regard to the French colonies 
and, to a lesser extent, eastern Europe. Much of the decline, 
96There were a few unimportant subsidies paid in Japan (see p. 171 above). 
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however, was due to direct competition. This is certainly the 
case with American and Japanese penetration of the Chinese 
market and Italian gains in Latin America and the Near East. 
In addition, Britain herself imported rapidly growing amounts 
of high-quality goods and specialty items from western Europe. 
9 
LANCASHIRE'S EXPORT 
EXPERIENCE BETWEEN 
THE WORLD WARS 
THE OVERALL BRITISH EXPORT EXPERIENCE, 1914-38 
Starting in 1914, British exports of cotton goods went into 
a steep and almost continuous decline that has persisted into 
the post-World War II period. A record of this decline and 
the decline in British raw cotton consumption, together with 
a record of the rise of Japanese competition, up to 1938 is 
presented in Table 25. The severity of the drop in British 
exports can be appreciated from the fact that in 1938 and 
1939 Britain exported only about 1,450 million yards of cotton 
cloth per year. This was a smaller amount than that recorded 
for any year since 1850, and it compares very unfavorably 
with the 7,075 million yards exported in 1913. The current 
position of the British cotton textile industry is apparent when 
it is noted that even the extremely low export levels of 1938 
and 1939 have not subsequently been equaled. Thus, the period 
since 1913 has witnessed the virtual elimination of Britain as 
an important exporter of cotton textiles. This, in turn, has 
caused the British cotton textile industry to shrink to a small 
fraction of its pre-World War I size and importance. This 
is true with regard to total output, employment, invested capital, 
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TABLE 25 
BRITISH AND JAPANESE COTTON CLOTH EXPORTS AND

BRITISH RAW COTTON CONSUMPTION, 1913-38

British 
Raw Cotton 
Year Consumption 
(Millions of 
Pounds) 
1913 2,178 
1914 2,077 
1915 1,931 
1916 1,972 
1917 1,800 
1918 1,499 
1919 1,526 
1920 1,726 
1921 1,066 
1922 1,409 
1923 1,362 
1924 1,369 
1925 1,609 
1926 1,509 
1927 1,557 
1928 1,520 
1929 1,498 
1930 1,272 
1931 985 
1932 1,257 
1933 1,177 
1934 1,322 
1935 1,261 
1936 1,366 
1937 1,431 
1938 1,109 
British

Cotton Cloth

Exports

(Millions of

Linear Yards)*

7,075 
5,736 
4,749 
5,254 
4,978 
3,699 
3,524 
4,435f 
3,038 
4,313 
4,329 
4,585 
4,637 
3,923 
4,189 
3,968 
3,765 
2,491 
1,790 
2,303 
2,117 
2,060 
2,013 
1,993 
2,023 
1,448 
Japanese 
Cotton Cloth 
Exports 
(Millions of 
Square Yards)* 
235 
337 
403 
535 
794 
1,006 
883 
827 
689 
781 
812 
1,009 
1,298 
1,425 
1,483 
1,419 
1,791 
1,572 
1,414 
2,032 
2,090 
2,577 
2,725 
2,710 
2,644 
2,181 
SOURCES: Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 333, and Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 307. 
•Because cotton cloth varied considerably in width, it is not possible to convert accurately linear yards 
into square yards, or vice versa. In general, however, a square yard of cotton cloth was more than a linear 
yard. The difference for a whole country's imports could amount to as much as 20% (see R. A. Kraus, 
"Cotton and Cotton Goods in China, 1918-1936: The Impact of Mechanization on the Traditional Sector,'' 
Appendix J). 
t Square yards 
value added, or any other meaningful measure of economic 
activity. 
This disastrous decline in exports began in a relatively 
innocent way during World War I. During these years, the 
problem faced by the industry was principally one of raw cotton 
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supply or, more exactly, a shortage of shipping capacity. This 
problem got worse as the war progressed and reached a peak 
in 1918. Since it was the weight and volume of the raw cotton 
and the goods produced from it, together with the distance 
the goods were to be shipped, that determined the amount 
of shipping capacity required, low-quality cotton goods to be 
sent to Asia (especially India and China) was the category most 
constrained by the war. During the period of cotton shortage, 
the industry had excess capacity with regard to both equipment 
and manpower. The usual results to be expected from a shortage 
of raw cotton and an excess supply of equipment and workers 
(i.e., high cotton prices, high unemployment, low wages, and 
low profits) were avoided thanks to a system of price controls 
on raw cotton (but not cotton goods) together with legal 
restrictions on the rate of capacity utilization by each firm.1 
Despite low levels of output, labor did not suffer severely, 
and the manufacturers did very well.2 
The end of World War I was followed by a brief boom. 
Despite the fact that output never reached prewar levels3 there 
was pressure on capacity. To some extent, this was the result 
of a lack of investment in the industry during the war. A 
more serious problem, however, was the shortage of workers, 
especially skilled workers. This shortage was the result of a 
reduction in the work week,4 together with the dislocations 
caused by the war. The high profits "earned" in 19205 were 
in large part due to a failure of wages to adjust rapidly to 
the labor shortage. 
This recovery, however, was very short-lived. It had been 
in any case largely a domestic boom. Exports reached only 
4,435 million yards in 1920 (versus 7,075 million yards in 1913), 
and yarn exports were only a third of their 1913 level. Domestic 
cotton consumption, on the other hand, increased by about 
1
 For a description of this policy, see Henderson, The Cotton Control Board. 
2
 See the profit rates presented in Table 18. 
3
 In 1920, cotton consumption in Great Britain amounted to 1,726 million pounds 
compared with 2,178 million pounds in 1913 (see Table 25). 
4The standard work week was reduced from 57 1/2 hours to 48 hours in 
July 1919 (Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 7). 
5
 See Table 18. 
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14% between 1913 and 1920.6 Perhaps the best thing that 
can be said about this brief spurt is that it did not last long 
enough to result in any major investments in new capacity. 
As can be seen in Table 25, 1921 was a complete disaster 
by any standard. Although there was some recovery in exports 
during the 1922-25 period (never, of course, approaching the 
levels of 1913) and in total cotton consumption during 1925-28 
(not, however, reaching the level of 1920), the overall downward 
trend is unmistakable. The coming of the worldwide depression 
of the early 1930s made this clear beyond the slightest doubt. 
After 1928, there was nothing that can seriously be called a 
recovery, either in exports or in total cotton consumption. 
It should be added parenthetically, but only parenthetically, 
that the average quality of British cotton textile exports im­
proved somewhat as the quantity fell. Available data indicates 
that between 1913 and 1924 the average quality of British 
cotton cloth exports improved by approximately 12%.7 Further­
more, it is unlikely that this trend was reversed, and it may 
well have continued, after 1924. It is clear, however, that this 
increase in quality could have done no more than offset a 
small percentage of the drop in the quantity of exports. Indeed, 
the principal reason for the increase in average quality was 
not an increase in the demand for high quality products. Rather, 
it occurred because the low-quality markets were being lost 
at a somewhat faster rate than the high-quality markets. 
In order to place Lancashire's experience into a worldwide 
perspective, data on the evolution of world production and 
world trade in cotton goods, as well as Britain's share of this 
trade, are presented in Table 26. In some sense, it can be 
argued that these data make the post-World War I performance 
look better than it actually was. This is principally because 
the boom of 1912 and 1913 is played down by being averaged 
in with 1910 and 1911. On the whole, however, the data give 
a fair picture of the trends involved. 
This table illustrates the fall in Britain's share of world trade 
6
 Of course, if domestic demand had been lower, exports might have been 
somewhat higher. 
7
 See G. W. Daniels and J. Jewkes, The Comparative Position of the Lancashire 
Cotton Industry and Trade, pp. 64-72. 
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in cotton textiles in the post-World War I period. It should 
also be noted, however, that the share of total world trade 
as a percentage of world production was falling. Clearly, if 
the share of world trade in world production had been main­
tained at the 1910-13 level and Britain had gotten her share 
of this trade,8 then the decline in British cotton textile produc­
tion would have been much moderated. Of greater interest 
is the fact that both Britain's share of world trade and the 
share of total world trade in total world production had also 
declined between 1882-84 and 1910-13. Although the rates 
of decline in these shares were somewhat greater after than 
before World War I, the principal difference between the two 
periods lay in the rate of growth of total world mill production 
of cotton goods. Had world production continued to increase 
at its earlier rate and had Britain been able to hold on to 
the share of trade she actually had in each year, despite the 
posited increase in output, then Lancashire would have pros­
pered mightily during the interwar years. 
In fact, of course, it simply was not possible for world 
production to keep growing at its earlier rate. This earlier 
growth had been based principally on the opening-up of new 
markets. By the beginning of World War I, however, there 
were very few unexploited markets available, and the rates 
of growth of population and income were not large enough 
to prevent a fall in the rate of growth of output.9 The inevitable 
nature of the slowdown in growth is perhaps best demonstrated 
by the fact that the rate of growth of world production of 
cotton textiles has been slower since 1936-38 than it was in 
the period between 1910-13 and 1936-38. 
The problem thus becomes one of explaining why world 
trade fell sharply as percentage of world production, and even 
declined somewhat in absolute terms, and why Great Britain 
was unable to hold on to her previous share of trade. The 
fact that both the percentage of trade in world production 
and Britain's percentage share of world trade declined in an 
8
 This share presumably would have been the percentage of total trade actually 
achieved in the post-World War I years. 
9
 The effect of income growth was in any case limited by the relatively low 
income elasticity of demand for cotton goods. 
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earlier period of rapid growth in total output is a pertinent 
observation, but it is clearly not a satisfactory answer to these 
questions. 
BRITISH EXPORT EXPERIENCE IN SEPARATE AREAS AND COUNTRIES 
The search for satisfactory answers must begin with a study 
of the particular markets in which these developments occurred. 
Indeed, even a casual glance at some individual markets leads 
to a modification of the data in Table 26. For instance, world 
trade in cotton goods after World War I was affected by the 
territorial changes resulting from the war. This particularly 
applies to the breakup of Austria-Hungary. Suddenly, after 
1919, Czechoslovakia emerges as an important exporter of 
cotton cloth, accounting for 4% of total world exports in 
1923-25.10 Most of this trade, however, was simply a continua­
tion of commerce that had been considered internal before 
the break-up of Austria-Hungary. It represented little more 
than the facts that Austria had most of the empire's spinning 
mills, and Bohemia had most of the weaving installations.11 
This political change in Central Europe thus tends to make 
the figures in Table 26 exaggerate the post-World War I level 
of international trade in cotton textiles and underestimate 
Britain's position as a trader. 
Two other points also deserve to be mentioned, particularly 
with reference to Britain's declining share of world trade. First 
of all, a look at particular markets makes it obvious that some 
of the post-World War I exports from Japan consisted of 
extremely cheap, low-quality goods for which Japan was creating 
a new market. That is, if Japan had not exported these goods, 
Great Britain still would not have played much of a role in 
supplying them. The absence of these Japanese goods would 
probably have resulted in a slightly higher level of production 
by third-country domestic industries and somewhat lower levels 
of consumption in these countries. 
10G. W. Daniels and J. Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire 
Cotton Industry," p. 155. 
"See L. Pasvolsky, Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States, pp. 157-58. 
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Second, some import markets contracted much more rapidly 
than others after World War I. Clearly, it makes a big difference 
to any evaluation of Britain's performance if she was traditionally 
a heavy exporter to the markets that contracted relatively rapidly 
or in those where developments were more favorable. In fact, 
Britain's problems were largely related to her concentration 
on markets that contracted very rapidly between the World 
Wars. Three markets were particularly costly to Britain: India, 
China, and the Middle East. Of these, India was by far the 
most important. Before World War I, India accounted for about 
36% of all the cotton cloth produced in Great Britain.12 This 
amount constituted no less than 97% of the cotton cloth 
imported into India from all sources.13 In view of this crucial 
role, I shall begin my survey of particular areas and countries 
with a review of post-World War I developments in India. 
India 
As can be seen from the-data on India contained in Table 
27, the post-World War I Indian cotton textile market was 
a disaster for Lancashire. In fact, it was a disaster for world 
trade in cotton textiles in general. Because Great Britain at 
least started the postwar period as the completely dominant 
supplier of the Indian market, however, she bore the brunt 
of what happened. 
The drop in total Indian imports of cotton piece goods was 
truly remarkable. Between 1910-13 and 1926-28, Indian 
imports of piece goods fell by approximately 30%. If Indian 
imports had stayed instead at their prewar level, total world 
trade in cotton goods would have increased, not decreased, 
during this time period. By 1936-38, Indian imports of piece 
goods were down by 73% from their prewar level. Although 
the cotton trade was sufficiently depressed on a worldwide 
scale by that time, so that India alone was not responsible 
for the decline in world trade since before World War I, it 
12Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 10.

13The 97% figure refers to 1912 and 1913 (ibid., p. 164).

1913 
1913-14 
1919 
1919-20 
1920 . 
1920-21 
1921 
1921-22 
1922 
1922-23 
1923 
1923-24 
1924 
1924-25 
1925 
1925-26 
1926 
1926-27 
1927 
1927-28 
1928 
1928-29 
1929 
1929-30 
1930 
1930-31 
1931 
1931-32 
1932 
1932-33 
1933 
1933-34 
1934 
1934-35 
1935 
1935-36 
1937 
1938 
TABLE 27 
IMPORTS OF COTTON PIECE GOODS AND 
FACTORY PRODUCTION IN INDIA, 1913-38 
(in millions of square yards) 
Total 
Imports 
3,207 
1,081 
1,510 
1,090 
1,593 
1,486 
1,823 
1,564 
1,788 
1,973 
1,937 
1,919 
890 
776 
1,255 
796 
944 
947 
688* 
724* 
Imports from 
Great Britain 
3,216* 
828.9 
1,498 
1,182 
1,507 
1,519 
1,726 
1,546 
1,668 
1,766 
1,631 
1,489 
829.4 
428 
653 
522 
624 
602 
323* 
258* 
Factory 
Production 
1,164* 
1,640 
1,581 
1,732 
1,725 
1,702 
1,970 
1,954 
2,317f 
2,442f 
l,916f 
2,418f 
2,538f 
2,891f 
2,988f 
2,777f 
3,168f 
3,275f 
3,951* 
4,250* 
SOURCES: 1913-36, Statistical Yearbook for British India, various years, and British Parliamentary Papers, various 
years; 1937-38, Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 10. 
*Millions of linear yards. 
tAssuming 4.3 yards per pound. This is the conversion rate recommended by the source. 
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is nevertheless true that had Indian imports been maintained 
at the 1910-13 level, about two-thirds of the decrease in world 
trade that occurred between 1910-13 and 1936-38 would have 
been eliminated. 
The burden falling on Great Britain as a result of the decline 
in the Indian market was very heavy. At least one-third of 
the drop in total British exports of cotton goods between 
1910-13 and 1926-28 can be directly credited to the shrinkage 
of the Indian market. That is, if Indian imports had remained 
at their prewar level in 1926-28 and Great Britain had obtained 
its actual 1926-28 share of these hypothetical imports, then 
the fall in total British cotton cloth exports over the period 
would have been reduced by approximately one-third. If it 
is hypothesized that Britain exported as much cotton cloth 
to India in 1926-28 as she did in 1910-13, then something 
like one-half of the actual drop in total British exports would 
not have occurred. The same things, more or less, can be said 
if 1910-13 is compared with 1936-38. A more startling observa­
tion can be made with regard to the later date, however. In 
1938, India imported cotton cloth from Great Britain equal 
to 3% of the cotton cloth Britain produced in 1912-13. In 
1912-13, India had imported 36% of all the cotton cloth 
produced in Great Britain. The shrinkage of Indian demand 
alone thus equaled one-third of the British industry's total 
demand from all sources in 1912-13.14 
Contrary to widely held beliefs, the principal immediate 
reason for the drop in British exports to India was the develop­
ment of the domestic cotton industry and the tariffs designed 
to aid it, not Japanese competition. It was not until the 1930s 
that Japan first drew close to, and then overtook, Great Britain 
as a supplier of the Indian market. By then, however, British 
exports to India, and indeed the whole Indian import market, 
had already collapsed. Even if Great Britain had had the entire 
Indian import market to herself during the 1930s, it would 
not have helped Lancashire very much. Table 28 provides a 
very brief, but accurate, summary of the situation. 
As was noted in the previous chapter, the output of cotton 
14Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 10. 
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TABLE 28

THE INDIAN COTTON TEXTILE MARKET

(in millions of linear yards)

Prewar 
Average 1930-31 
Indian mill production 1,105 2,561 
Indian handloom production 1,000* 1,400* 
Imports from Great Britain 2,549 526 
Imports from Japan 3 321 
SOURCES: Mill production and imports from Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market"; handloom 
production figures from H. A. F. Lindsay's discussion of Burnett-Hurst's paper, p.451. 
*Estimated 
goods in India was growing rapidly before World War I. This 
was particularly true of factory production, but even handloom 
production appears to have been on the increase. This produc­
tion was given a fillip by World War I. The curtailment of 
British production, particularly of coarse goods, and the short­
age of shipping capacity to take cotton goods to the Far East 
cut sharply into British exports to India. Average annual Indian 
imports fell from a prewar (i.e., the average for 1909-13) level 
of 2,549 million yards to 1,841 million yards during the war. 
These figures probably underestimate the impact of the drop 
because exports were at their highest in 1913 and their lowest 
in 1918. The results for 1919-20 may be more indicative of 
the situation. In that year, Indian mill production reached 1,640 
million yards, and imports were down to 1,081 million yards. 
In addition, handloom production had at least maintained its 
prewar output level of approximately 1,000 million yards per 
year. 
The very substantial increase in domestic production was 
partly a continuation of earlier trends and partly a reaction 
to the protection that the war provided for domestic producers. 
Protection was an unaccustomed, but certainly not an unwel­
come, luxury for the Indian cotton textile industry. As early 
as 1917, moreover, the "natural" protection of the war was 
reinforced by the beginnings of protective tariff legislation. 
In that year, the 3.5% ad valorem duty on cotton piece goods, 
matched by a 3.5% excise on domestic mill production, was 
replaced by a 7.5% duty on imports without any offsetting 
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change in the domestic excise. In 1921, the rate of the duty 
was raised to 11%.15 
With the restoration of "normal" postwar conditions in 
1920-21, cotton textile imports rose, and domestic Indian 
production fell. This can presumably be taken as evidence for 
the contention that the wartime conditions had indeed aided 
the domestic industry. The recovery of 1920-21 was followed 
by a sharp drop in imports in 1921-22.16 After that year, 
however, there was a recovery in imports that lasted through 
1929-30. During the late 1920s, total Indian imports averaged 
about 1,900 million yards per year, as compared with a prewar 
average of over 2,600 million yards and lows in 1919-20 and 
1921-22 of slightly less than 1,100 million yards. 
The decline in total Indian imports was aggravated as far 
as Lancashire was concerned by a slow but steady decline in 
her market share. The principal beneficiary of these losses 
in market share was Japan. The shift in market shares during 
the 1920s is shown in Table 29. Part of this Japanese gain 
can probably be credited to the appreciation of sterling by 
about 12% in relation to the yen in 1924.17 In the same year, 
the rupee increased in value from approximately Is. 4d. to 
approximately Is. 6d.18 The appreciation of the rupee with 
respect to the yen was thus about twice what it was to sterling. 
The political tension between Great Britain and the people 
of India also played some role in Britain's declining market 
share.19 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Japan was 
strengthening her competitive position through improved rela­
tive prices during the 1920s. 
Although the 1920s were bad for Lancashire as far as the 
Indian market was concerned, they were nothing compared 
with what happened with the coming of the world wide 
15
 Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p. 409. 
16
 The import fluctuations of these years were no doubt related to the sharp 
fluctuations that also occurred in silver prices and the foreign exchange value 
of the rupee (see Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p. 427). 
In addition, there was a boycott of British goods in 1921-22. 
17Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 408. 
18
 Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p. 438. 
19
 It must be noted, however, that no large-scale organized boycott of British 
cottons occurred between 1922 and 1930. 
BRITISH EXPORTS BETWEEN THE WARS (187 
TABLE 29 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN IMPORT MARKET FOR COTTON PIECE GOODS BETWEEN 
UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN THROUGH 1931-32 
United 
Year Kingdom JaPa n 
Prewar

average 97.4 0.1

1913-14 97.1 0.3

1919-20 90.3 7.0

1920-21 85.6 11.3

1921-22 87.6 8.3

1922-23 91.2 6.8

1923-24 88.8 8.2

1924-25 88.5 8.5

1925-26 82.3 13.9

1926-27 82.0 13.6

1927-28 78.2 16.4

1928-29 75.2 18.4

1929-30 65.0 29.3

1930-31 58.8 36.1

1931-32 50.1 45.2

SOURCE: Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p. 422. 
depression of the early 1930s. In March 1930, the Indian tariff 
was raised to 15% on British cotton cloth and to 20% on cotton 
cloth from other countries (principally Japan). In March 1931, 
these rates were increased by 5 percentage points; and in 
October 1931, a 25% surcharge was added. Thus, after October 
1931, the tariff on British cloth was 25% ad valorem, and the 
tariff on Japanese cloth was 31.25% ad valorem. To make things 
worse for the British, and perhaps somewhat better for the 
Japanese, a nationwide boycott of British cloth was launched 
by the Congress Party in April 1930. Although a truce was 
declared in March 1931, the campaign was resumed on a full 
scale at the end of 1931. 
As far as exchange rate movements are concerned, the rupee 
followed the pound when it was devalued in September 1931 
(at Is. 6d. per rupee). Japan, however, did not immediately 
respond, and there was some improvement in British cotton 
textile exports, both to India and overall.20 By December 1931, 
however, the Japanese had reestablished the old parity with 
20 Sayers, A History of Economic Change in England, p. 54. 
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TABLE 30 
INDIAN IMPORTS OF COTTON CLOTH ON MONTHLY BASIS, 1929-30 TO 1931-32 
(in millions of yards) 
M  n t ho  1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 
April 213 164 71 
May 155 134 54 
June 100 91 69 
July 141 72 68 
August 171 73 62 
September 160 49 65 
October 132 43 63 
November 148 36 48 
December 134 46 45 
January 194 62 71 
February 157 46 63 
March 179 67 73 
SOURCE: Burnett-Hurst, "Lancashire and the Indian Market," p.410. 
sterling. Between that date and 1933, the yen was devalued 
relative to both sterling and the rupee. The stable exchange 
rate that developed in the middle and late 1930s was Is. 2d. 
21 per yen.
The disastrous effects of the measures taken by the Indian 
government to restrict trade can be seen in Table 30. Both 
British and Japanese exports were seriously affected. At the 
same time, domestic Indian production was aided by the added 
protection. Indian mill production rose from 2,359 million 
square yards in 1929 to 2,900 million square yards in 1931. 
By 1935, Indian mill production had climbed to 3,555 million 
square yards; and in 1938, it was approximately 4,250 million 
square yards.22 Part of this growth may have been at the expense 
of domestic handloom production, but most of the increase 
represented import substitution. 
The relatively minor discrimination in favor of British goods 
that had been enacted in March 1930 was considerably increased 
as the 1930s progressed. The tariff on Japanese goods was 
increased to 50% in 1935, and the tariff on British goods was 
reduced to 20% in 1937. More important, quotas were imposed 
21Seki, The Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 408.

22
 Board of Trade, Report, p. 119.
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on Japanese goods starting in January 1934. This quota system 
was clearly a response to the growth in imports from Japan 
that occurred starting in 1932. The increase was aided by the 
depreciation of the yen, and this alleged Japanese policy of 
"exchange dumping" was taken as an excuse for imposing 
discriminatory quotas. Japan objected strenuously to these 
quotas and used the threat of reduced imports of Indian raw 
cotton as a lever to obtain a more favorable agreement. The 
result was an Indo-Japanese treaty that tied Japanese exports 
of cotton goods to India to Japanese imports of Indian raw 
cotton.23 
It is evident that these discriminatory actions in favor of 
Great Britain were not based on any particular affection for 
Lancashire. The tariff on British cloth was not reduced until 
1937, and then it was only cut to 20% ad valorem. Rather, 
the discrimination in favor of Great Britain was the more or 
less coincidental result of the very real threat that the Japanese 
were posing for the domestic Indian cotton textile industry. 
The 25% ad valorem tariff in effect on British goods between 
1931 and 1937 and the 20% tariff in effect after 1937 were 
apparently enough to protect the Indian industry from serious 
competition from Great Britain. Much of the remaining British 
imports were of high quality and did not really compete with 
Indian products. This was clearly not the case with Japanese 
exports. They continued to compete effectively at tariffs of 
30% or even 50%. Under these circumstances, the quota system 
was a natural expedient. Indeed, if it had not been for the 
possibility of retaliation, the Japanese would have been allowed 
little or no part of the Indian market. 
Given these circumstances, it seems certain that the Indian 
authorities would have acted with similar vigor against Great 
Britain if she had posed a serious threat to the Indian industry. 
The implication of this conclusion, in turn, is that the Indian 
authorities in the late 1930s were willing to admit a maximum 
of substantially less than a billion yards of cotton cloth per 
year, regardless of the source. 
In retrospect, developments in India during the quarter-cen­
23
 T. Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade, pp. 94-98. 
190) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
tury between 1913 and 1938 reflect two trends. The first of 
these was the continued growth of the domestic industry. Like 
all growing cotton textile industries, it expanded into higher 
and higher qualities as it gained more experience and its work 
force became more skilled. This process had already started 
before World War I. During and after the war, it gained in 
speed and force from the protection that was provided, first 
by the wartime shipping shortage and later by tariffs and quotas. 
Indeed, by the late 1930s, India's position had improved to 
the point where she was able to export over 100 million yards 
of low-quality cloth a year.24 This can be taken as a sign that 
India as the low-wage producer was beginning to undercut 
Japan at very low qualities. Since World War II, of course, 
India has become a major supplier of low-quality goods. This 
process was helped by India's membership in the Common­
wealth, with its preferential tariffs.25 
In its development of a protected domestic cotton textile 
industry after World War I, India was only repeating the process 
that had previously occurred in countries such as the United 
States, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Brazil. As far as 
Britain was concerned, the previous loss of these markets had 
not been a disaster because other markets, notably India, had 
been expanding rapidly enough to more than take up the slack. 
When the Indian market for British goods began to shrink, 
however, there was nowhere else to turn. 
The other trend in India was the growth of Japanese 
competition. Before World War I, none of the domestic (i.e., 
non-British) cotton textile industries had yet had time to develop 
into a serious threat in third markets. There had been signs, 
however, that Italy and Japan were, in the future, going to 
cause serious trouble for Britain, especially in low-quality goods. 
Not surprisingly, the post-World War I period witnessed a 
fight between Italy and Japan as to who was going to succeed 
to Britain's position as the world's leading cotton textile exporter. 
This struggle, of course, resulted in a clear Japanese victory. 
Despite the seriousness of Japanese competition in India, 
24Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 10.

25Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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however, Lancashire's fall would have occurred without Japan's 
assistance. Even if Great Britain had supplied all of India's 
cotton cloth imports in 1938, this would only have amounted 
to 724 million yards as compared with the 3,216 million yards 
of British cloth India had taken in 1913. Indeed, even if all 
non-British imports into India had been brought to a complete 
halt, it is unlikely that British exports to India would have 
been in excess of 500 million yards in 1938. 
China (including Hong Kong) 
India was Lancashire's number one disaster area, but China 
did not lag far behind. The sad story of British cotton textile 
exports to China in the interwar period is eloquently told in 
Table 31. As was the case with India, Britain had a falling 
share of a declining total. The British experience in China 
differed from that in India because in China serious Japanese 
competition preceded a sharp drop in total Chinese imports. 
Indeed, as late as 1929 total Chinese imports of cotton cloth 
were at a level approaching the pre-World War I peak. After 
that year, however, a very sharp drop occurred. The figures 
for China alone exaggerate this drop because of the loss of 
Manchuria to Japan. If Manchuria is reintegrated with China, 
as is done in Table 31, then the drop becomes much smaller. 
From the British point of view, however, the trade with occupied 
Manchuria might just as well not have existed. That was certainly 
one market where Britain had no chance of competing with 
Japan. 
The British share of the Chinese import market for cotton 
cloth began to shrink immediately after World War I. From 
a prewar level of about 60% (this in itself being a sharp drop 
from the pre-1890 period) the British share, by weight, was 
down to 30% in the early 1920s. By the late 1930s, her percentage 
share, even excluding the Manchurian trade, was down to the 
teens. 
The post-World War I period witnessed a rapid expansion 
of the domestic Chinese factory cotton textile industry. Data 
on Chinese factory production together with estimates of 
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CHINESE
Total Imports 
Year (Millions of 
Yards) 
Linear Square 
1912 823 764 
1913 1,109 1,017 
1914 1,065 975 
1915 815 724 
1916 726 641 
1917 859 749 
1918 676 586 
1919 906 816 
1920 917 802 
1921 689 603 
1922 832 746 
1923 702 612 
1924 818 722 
1925 844 725 
1926 942 806 
1927 734 618 
1928 944 809 
1929 938 793 
1930 713 589 
1931 459 390 
1932 420 356 
1933 220 187 
1934 107 91 
1935 101 86 
1936 48 41 
TABLE 31 
 IMPORTS OF COTTON
Total Imports 
Adjusted for 
Manchuria 
(Millions of 
Square Yards) 
477 
391 
291 
375 
330 
 CLOTH, 1912-36 
Imports from Britain 
(Millions of linear 
Yards to 1918, 
Square Yards After) 
528 
717 
578 
375 
377 
310 
216 
304 
453 
211 
309 
235 
293 
173 
178 
103 
187 
188 
61 
81 
126 
52 
20 
14 
8 
SOURCES: ;: Total import figures from Kraus, Cotton and Cotton Goods in China, Appendix J. British figures 
are from v; 'arious issues of the Trade and Navigation Accounts of the British Parliamentary Papers. 
handloom production are contained in Table 32. Up until 1929, 
the rapid growth of the domestic industry was achieved with 
the assistance of little tariff protection. This was not because 
the Chinese government lacked the will to protect her cotton 
textile industry—quite the contrary. Until 1929, however, China 
was by treaty limited to a 5% ad valorem tariff. In fact, even 
this 5% rate was not maintained, despite occasional upward 
revision of specific duties, in the face of falling commodity 
prices.26 Some increased protection did, however, result from 
26Y. K. Chang, Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China, p. 53. 
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TABLE 32 
COTTON CLOTH PRODUCTION IN CHINA, 1918-36 
(in millions of square yards) 
Power Loom Handloom 
Production Production 
1918 127

1919 147

1920 161

1921 212

1922 247

1923 303

1924 322 3,129

1925 381 4,445

1926 435 3,947

1927 496 2,489

1928 606 2,560

1929 740 3,521

1930 759 3,094

1931 872 3,272

1932 911 2,880

1933 1,108 2,525

1934 1,178 3,023

1935 1,280 3,378

1936 1,309 2,240

SOURCE: Kraus, Cotton and Cotton Goods in China, Table V-l. 
the decline in the price of silver on the world market. Because 
China was on a silver standard until 1935, a fall in the price 
of silver was effectively a depreciation of the Chinese currency.27 
When China did obtain tariff autonomy, the first independent 
tariffs were relatively low. The new tariffs that were applied 
as of 1 February 1929 placed a duty of only 12.5% ad valorem 
on most cotton goods.28 In 1932, however, stiffer rates on 
cotton textiles were introduced. These rates ranged up to 30% 
ad valorem.29 Finally, in July of 1934, tariff rates on cotton 
textiles were once again increased.30 
These measures, together with the difficulties associated with 
the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, were sufficient to limit 
the importation of cotton textiles into the territory controlled 
27Ibid., pp. 67-71. This fall in the price of silver, of course, affected all Chinese 
exports and imports in a similar way. 
28
 S. F. Wright, China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy, pp. 640, 707, 708. 
29G. E. Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and its Effect on the West, pp. 201-2. 
30
 Chang, Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China, p. 54. 
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by the Chinese Nationalist government to negligible levels.31 
At the same time, the reduction in imports did much to 
encourage the domestic Chinese cotton industry. It is difficult 
to establish any quantitative estimate of this effect, however, 
because the Chinese factory cotton industry had been growing 
rapidly before the tariffs were introduced and because this 
industry was also competing with the very large Chinese hand-
loom industry. The data in Tables 31 and 32 indicate that 
Chinese factory production grew somewhat more rapidly than 
imports declined. On the other hand, it also seems likely that 
total Chinese cotton cloth consumption declined between the 
mid-1920s and the late 1930s. In any case, both the Chinese 
handloom and the Chinese factory industries were undoubtedly 
helped by the policy of protection. 
The Chinese government shared at least one feature with 
the Indian government: a determination to protect her cotton 
industry from serious foreign competition. The tariffs of 1929 
and 1933 were both imposed as soon as treaty obligations 
permitted it. Indeed, the modest rates imposed in 1929 were 
very much in the nature of a compromise between China and 
the countries (especially the United States, Great Britain, and 
Japan) that were the principal beneficiaries of China's low 
tariffs.32 The Chinese government would have been delighted 
to impose higher rates and, indeed, soon did so; but her chief 
concern in 1929 had to be the principle of tariff autonomy. 
Japan was clearly the chief target of China's cotton textile 
tariffs. This is especially true of the rate increases imposed 
in 1933 and 1934. By that time, Britain had been reduced 
to a minor factor in the Chinese market. Most of the small 
amount of British cloth still going into China was probably 
noncompetitive with Chinese and Japanese products. Thus, 
the Chinese industry had little to gain from further imposts 
on British textiles. From Britain's point of view, therefore, the 
final tariff increases, which left Britain with Chinese sales of 
less than 8 million yards in 1936 (approximately 1% of the 
31
 Chinese imports would undoubtedly have declined even without the tariffs, 
but not by nearly as much. 
32
 W r i g h t , China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy, p . 640 . 
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1913 level), were an unfortunate accident. The virtual destruc­
tion of Britain's already depleted trade occurred as a by-product 
of China's determination to resist serious Japanese competition. 
The Middle East 
The third area where Lancashire encountered really serious 
market losses during the interwar period was the Middle East. 
As was noted in the previous chapter, the Middle East was 
a generally satisfactory market up to World War I. Nothing 
was said about any specific countries or any specific national 
policies. This was largely because not much of interest can 
be said along these lines concerning the prewar period. The 
situation changed radically, however, with the disintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire and the introduction of national policies 
of industrial protection after World War I. 
Table 33 contains data on British cotton cloth exports to 
the Middle East as a whole and separately to Egypt and Turkey. 
These two countries were the dominant British markets in the 
Middle East, and the collapse of British cotton textile exports 
to the area as a whole principally reflects developments in 
these two countries. 
As in the cases of India and China, British cotton textile 
exports to the Middle East were hurt both by third-party 
competition and by the growth of domestic production. In 
all these cases, the domestic industries were encouraged by 
protective tariffs. In the Middle East, however, Italy, not Japan, 
was Britain's first serious rival. For example, between 1913 
and 1925, the British share of the Egyptian market fell from 
86% to 61%, whereas the Italian share rose from 7% to 23%.33 
A similar trend was occurring in Turkey at the same time.34 
By the early 1930s, however, Japan was rapidly overtaking 
Italy and, in the process, cutting further into Britain's market 
share.35 
33
 Daniels and Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton 
Industry," p. 164. 
34
 British Fore ign Office, D e p a r t m e n t of Overseas T r a d e , Economic Conditions 
in Turkey to April 1930, p p . 3 5 - 3 8 . 
35
 British Foreign Office, Economic Conditions in Turkey, 1932, pp. 32-36. 
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TABLE 33 
BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TURKEY, AND EGYPT 
(in millions of linear yards through 1918, square yards thereafter) 
:ar
Middle 
£ a s  t Turkey Egypt 
1913 760 
1914 594 271 202 
1915 394 10 243 
1916 412 12 290 
1917 434 320 
1918 471 362 
1919 590 333 183 
1920 613 263 294 
1921 464 56 215 
1922 462 67 206 
1923 499 85 207 
1924 479 89 199 
1925 553 96 237 
1926 322 56 124 
1927 403 62 160 
1928 331 55 129 
1929 337 53 152 
1930 244 30 118 
1931 207 36 72 
1932 252 26 82 
1933 193 35 64 
1934 108 14 44 
1935 91 15 36 
1936 110 12 64 
1937 94 15 52 
1938 68 12 39 
SOURCE: Various issues of British Parliamentary Papers. 
Starting about 1930, moreover, both Turkey and Egypt began 
to take steps to encourage the domestic production of cotton 
textiles. Without protection, the Egyptian cotton textile industry 
had been able to expand only at a relatively slow rate. Between 
the beginning of the 1920s and 1930, Egyptian production 
of cotton cloth (including handloom production) grew by 
somewhat less than 100%, leaving total production at an annual 
level of only about 25 million square yards.36 When tariffs 
were increased after 1930,37 however, the rate of growth of 
3 6
 Z. Y. H e r s h l a g , Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, 
p .	 219 ; a n d C. Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis,  p . 86. 
3 7
 H e r s h l a g , Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East,  p . 
2 1 1 . 
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the domestic cotton industry increased markedly.38 By 1939, 
production had risen to 150 million square meters.39 
In post-World War I Turkey, the first steps toward govern­
ment support of industry in general, including the cotton textile 
industry, were taken in 1927. In that year, the Law for the 
Encouragement of Industry was enacted. This law provided 
industrial enterprises with advantages such as tax and customs 
exemptions or rebates, as well as a favored position with regard 
to government purchases.40 More important, when the tariff-
limiting clause of the Treaty of Lausanne expired in 1929, 
Turkey took action to provide high protective tariffs.41 During 
the 1930s the industrialization of Turkey was given an additional 
powerful push through the direct intervention of the state. 
Because Japan was the dominant supplier of cotton textiles 
to Turkey by this time, she naturally was the chief loser when 
Turkey reduced her imports. 
Latin America 
Although hardly a tremendous success for Britain, the Latin 
American cotton textile market (see Table 34) did not provide 
the kind of total disaster she experienced in India, China, and 
the Middle East. The single most important reason for this 
relatively good record in Latin America was that British exports 
to Argentina were maintained at a reasonable level throughout 
the interwar period. This, in turn, was principally because no 
protection was offered to Argentinian cotton manufacturers 
until 1931.42 It was only after protection was finally provided 
that any real progress was achieved in the Argentinian cotton 
38
 In 1935, Egypt took special action against Japanese cotton and rayon goods. 
The intention was to impose tariffs in the 80% to 100% range on cotton goods. 
As a result of Japanese protests, fortressed by the possibility of a reduction in 
Japanese imports of Egyptian raw cotton, however, bilateral negotiations in search 
of a compromise were instituted (Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign 
Trade, p. 118). 
39Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis, p. 86. 
40Hershlag, Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, pp. 
176^77. 
41
 Ibid., p. 181. 
42
 G. W y t h e , Industry in Latin America, p . 103. 
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TABLE 34 
BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA

(in millions of linear yards through 1918, square yards thereafter)

Year  ^ ^ Brazil Argentina 
1913 744 97 
1914 381 34 88 
1915 399 38 122 
1916 593 67 196 
1917 528 58 173 
1918 486 52 183 
1919 303 32 168 
1920 440 41 162 
1921 192 16 103 
1922 319 25 149 
1923 447 33 173 
1924 412 49 148 
1925 483 68 158 
1926 389 62 113 
1927 386 61 131 
1928 398 55 149 
1929 415 37 144 
1930 293 8 120 
1931 209 2 93 
1932 251 3 116 
1933 302 5 146 
1934 323 3 161 
1935 252 1 134 
1936 313 2 116 
1937 331 1 127 
1938 204 1 98 
SOURCE: Various issues of British Parliamentary Papers. 
textile industry. Furthermore, despite this protection and in­
creasing Japanese competition, the growth of the total Argen­
tinian market kept the level of British exports from falling 
very far, even during the 1930s. Britain's position, and that 
of other exporters, was helped by the fact that spinning 
developed faster than weaving in Argentina. Thus, by the end 
of 1939, though the import market for yarn had been virtually 
eliminated, only about one-third of domestic cloth consumption 
was woven domestically.43 Clearly, however, developments in 
43
 Ibid. Much of the yarn that was previously imported had been used in knitting 
mills. 
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the Argentinian cotton textile industry did not bode well for 
the long-term future of imports. 
In Brazil, the trend toward self-sufficiency noted in the 
previous chapter continued. Although Great Britain did a 
respectable job of maintaining, or almost maintaining, her share 
of the Brazilian import market (long since limited to high-quality 
goods),44 the total level of Brazilian imports was severely reduced 
by the tariff increase of 1929. After that year, Brazil was virtually 
self-sufficient in all types of cotton cloth. This, of course, was 
the logical culmination of a trend that had begun in the 1880s. 
Argentina and Brazil were not the only Latin American 
countries to raise barriers to trade in cotton textiles in the 
early 1930s. In fact, virtually every Latin American country, 
or at least all those with anything resembling a domestic cotton 
textile industry, did so. Although British exports suffered from 
most of these actions, the principal target in virtually every 
case was Japan. This can certainly be said about the Peruvian 
and Columbian quota systems introduced in 1935.45 Japan was 
also the target of the 50% surcharge placed on cotton textile 
imports into Ecuador after 1936.46 Other highly protected Latin 
American cotton textile industries existed in Uruguay47 and 
Venezuela.48 These actions make it clear beyond a shadow 
of a doubt that the Latin American countries, like so many 
other countries in the interwar period, were determined to 
protect their cotton textile industries from serious foreign 
competition. By the 1930s, the chief source of such competition 
was Japan. 
Europe and the United States 
In the previous chapter, much was said about the United 
States and various European countries. There is much less 
44
 See Daniels and Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton 
Industry," p. 164. Also compare the figures for total Brazilian imports provided 
by Stein, The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture, p. 193, with the figures for British 
exports to Brazil shown in Table 34. 
45Wythe, Industry in Latin America, pp. 231, 254. 
46Ibid., p. 236. 
47Ibid., p. 129. 
48Ibid., p. 254. 
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to be said concerning them during the interwar period. These 
countries had been largely eliminated as markets for British 
cotton textiles before the outbreak of World War I. The interwar 
years basically saw a continuation of this downward trend, at 
least to the extent that Britain had anything left to lose. In 
the case of the United States, what little remained for Great 
Britain after World War I was virtually eliminated by a combi­
nation of economic depression, Japanese competition, and the 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff.49 The Anglo-American trade agreement 
designed to improve American trade relations with Great Britain 
was not signed until November 1938 and had little or no effect 
during the interwar period. 
The United States clearly viewed Japan as the most serious 
competitor facing her cotton textile industry. When this threat 
was felt to be serious, anti-Japanese measures were taken, both 
with regard to the domestic United States market and with 
regard to the Philippines.50 
France, Italy, and Germany were all poor and contracting 
markets for British cotton textiles during the interwar period. 
Indeed, France and Italy to all intents and purposes ceased 
importing British cotton cloth during the 1930s. During that 
decade, small but relatively free-trade countries such as the 
Scandinavian and Benelux countries were actually better, or 
at least less bad, markets for Britain than were the major powers 
of Europe. 
Other Markets 
As far as Britain was concerned, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Sub-Saharan Africa were the cotton textile markets 
that behaved most satisfactorily during the interwar years (see 
Table 35). The relatively favorable developments experienced 
in these markets were primarily due to the close political 
connections that existed with Britain. As a result, Britain was 
49The Hawley-Smoot Tariff raised the average duty on cotton goods from 40.3% 
ad valorem to 46.4%. In terms of value added in Britain or Japan, these percentages 
were, of course, much higher (see P. W. Bidwell, Our Trade with Britain, p. 23). 
50Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade, pp. 107-8, 111-12. 
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TABLE 35 
BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS TO CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(in millions of linear yards through 1918, square yards thereafter)

^ J A i­ N e W i r • 
ir Canada Australia _ , , Africa 
Zealand 
1913 341 
1914 75 117 40 281 
1915 66 198 48 291 
1916 76 228 67 331 
1917 72 152 39 397 
1918 34 170 37 401 
1919 22 75 22 217 
1920 58 138 38 234 
1921 19 115 18 135 
1922 42 228 33 234 
1923 54 171 37 263 
1924 54 159 31 239 
1925 46 170 37 339 
1926 46 181 32 270 
1927 46 188 35 301 
1928 44 143 31 314 
1929 38 170 34 286 
1930 32 129 30 246 
1931 28 122 28 180 
1932 27 167 41 274 
1933 47 146 37 286 
1934 64 142 36 251 
1935 60 118 36 354 
1936 74 124 35 392 
1937 76 152 36 379 
1938 64 146 27 229 
SOURCE: Various issues of British Parliamentary Papers. 
able to obtain very favorable treatment for her exports. In 
these countries, unlike India, favorable treatment proved to 
be enough to maintain cotton textile exports at respectable 
levels. The fact that at least some of the countries had no 
domestic industries to protect and showed no particular interest 
in trying to create them was also of considerable importance 
in explaining what happened. 
A specific example of the benefits to be derived from political 
preference can be seen in the sharp recovery of British cotton 
cloth exports to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand after 
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the Ottawa Agreement of 1932.51 Equally interesting in its 
own way is the discovery that the imposition of quotas on 
Japanese cotton textile exports to some of the British colonies 
seems principally to have benefited countries other than Bri­
tain.52 Japan was clearly beating everyone when competition 
was completely free. 
The last British cotton textile market deserving some comment 
is what I have called Other Asia. During the interwar period, 
this market was completely dominated by the Dutch East Indies 
(Indonesia). As can be seen in Table 36, the decline recorded 
for Other Asia is little more than a reflection of developments 
in the Dutch East Indies. The principal cause of this decline, 
not surprisingly, was Japanese competition. Not only did the 
Japanese severely damage British exports, but they also hurt 
the Dutch homeland.53 The eventual result of these develop­
ments was that the Dutch began to put restraints on Japanese 
trade with their Asian empire.54 No more than anyone else 
were the Dutch prepared to let Japan, or any other country, 
take over "their" market for cotton textiles. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions that can be drawn from Britain's experience 
as a cotton textile exporter during the 1920s and 1930s depend 
to a large extent on the observer's perspective. Thus, for 
instance, it can be argued that the interwar experience was 
simply a continuation of pre-World War I trends. Throughout 
the century before 1914, country after country had started 
a factory cotton textile industry, usually with the help of tariffs 
and always at the expense of British exports. The only reason 
that Britain was able to increase her exports up to 1913 was 
that this movement toward self-sufficiency had barely started 
in several major and rapidly growing markets. The most 
important of these were India and China. When the trend 
51
 Canada had raised all her tariffs in September 1930 (ibid., p. 113).

52
 F. V. Meyer , Britain's Colonies in World Trade, p . 80 .

53
 See Daniels and Jewkes, "The Post-War Depression in the Lancashire Cotton

Textile Industry," p. 164. 
54Uyeda, The Recent Development of Japanese Foreign Trade, pp. 99-103. 
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TABLE 36 
BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS TO OTHER ASIA 
(in millions of linear yards through 1918, square yards thereafter) 
Other Dutch 
Y e a r
 Asia East Indies 
1913 421

1914 339 270

1915 282 231

1916 312 257

1917 301 249

1918 214 165

1919 153 124

1920 268 209

1921 189 159

1922 187 136

1923 179 136

1924 192 136

1925 239 192

1926 166 122

1927 190 138

1928 191 143

1929 169 120

1930 95 70

1931 58 39

1932 63 44

1933 33 21

1934 23 15

1935 18 10

1936 33 27

1937 66 60

1938 30 27

SOURCE: Various issues of British Parliamentary Papers. 
toward self-sufficiency and protection reached these countries 
after World War I, this was nothing really new. It was, however, 
a virtual death sentence for Lancashire. The growth of the 
Indian market had been sufficient to offset the loss of the 
Italian and Brazilian markets. Nothing could offset the loss 
of the Indian market. 
It must be recognized, of course, that Britain suffered much 
more severely from the competition of other exporters, espe­
cially Japan, after World War I than she had before. Once 
again, however, it was, or should have been, clear, even before 
World War I, that Japan as well as Italy and perhaps the United 
States were becoming increasingly successful as cotton textile 
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exporters. After all, not only was world trade declining as a 
percentage of world production but Britain's share of world 
trade was also declining.55 
Another approach is to examine what chance Lancashire 
had of prospering, given those events that were outside her 
control. That is, what could have been accomplished had 
Lancashire improved her technology and lowered her costs 
more rapidly than she actually did? 
The first question relevant to this approach is to ask what 
happened to the level of world trade. Clearly, it declined. In 
fact, total average annual world exports of cotton piece goods 
in 1936-38 amounted to something less than 90% of the piece 
goods exported by Great Britain alone in 1913. What is equally 
important, the chance that the actual level of world trade in 
cotton textiles recorded for the late 1930s could have been 
increased significantly by exporters offering lower prices than 
those actually charged seems extremely small. After all, virtually 
every country on the face of the earth was busy fighting any 
possible increase in cotton textile imports resulting from lower 
(i.e., Japanese) prices. In particular, the widespread use of quotas 
demonstrated a strong determination to resist any increase in 
low-price imports.56 
The next step is to consider the extent to which Britain 
might have increased her steadily shrinking share of world 
trade in cotton textiles. The possibilities here, too, seem very 
bleak. It has been authoritatively estimated that of the loss 
in trade suffered by Lancashire between 1913 and the end 
of the 1930s, two-thirds was the result of increased self-suffi­
ciency by importing countries and only one-third was the result 
of increased competition from other exporters.57 In other 
words, if Britain had maintained her pre-World War I share 
of the exports of each quality of cloth to each market she 
would still have lost two-thirds of what she actually did lose. 
Thus, even if Britain had been able to reduce her costs by 
5 5 Robson , The Cotton Industry in Britain, p . 2. 
56
 T h e s e negative conclusions a re re inforced by the fact that the level of post-World 
W a r I I t r a d e in cot ton textiles has been below even t he low levels r eco rded in 
1936-38. 
57
 Board of Trade, Report, p. 5. 
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enough to keep up with Japan, her exports at the end of 
the 1930s would still have been less than 50% of her exports 
in 1913. 
Doing better than retaining this one-third of what was lost, 
of course, would have required reducing the pre-World War 
I share of world trade held by other exporters, especially Japan. 
The improvements in production techniques or the lowering 
of wages that would have been necessary to achieve such a 
result, or both, are difficult even to imagine. This is especially 
true since the Japanese displayed a considerable determination 
to expand, not just defend, their cotton textile exports. A British 
threat to cut seriously into Japan's share of the world export 
market would undoubtedly have resulted in a strong Japanese 
response, both economically and politically. Thus, undercutting 
the Japanese would have been an even more difficult task than 
might appear merely from looking at the prices they charged. 
Finally, there remains the fact that even if all other exporters 
were out of the international market and Britain was able to 
make all the sales the others had been making (two extreme 
assumptions), Lancashire would still have been faced with a 
drop in output compared with 1913. 
This reasoning also convinces me that a mass installation 
of automatic looms in Lancashire prior to World War I would 
probably have resulted in a worse situation than that which 
actually occurred. The attitude of the importing countries and 
the determined competitiveness of the Japanese makes it certain 
that Lancashire faced a very inelastic demand. Thus, even 
reducing prices to cover only the low marginal cost of automatic 
weaving would probably have done little to increase the demand 
for British cotton goods. Indeed, fewer persons would probably 
have found employment in Lancashire had there been more 
automatic looms in use there. 
I doubt, however, that British prices would have fallen so 
low as to cover only the marginal cost of automatic weaving. 
Before that point was reached, an active export trade in used 
automatic looms would probably have developed. These looms 
would have been shipped to countries with growing and, except 
in the case of Japan, heavily protected cotton textile industries. 
Such a situation would unquestionably have imposed severe 
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losses on the British firms that had installed automatic looms 
in the pre-World War I period. 
I believe that this discussion has satisfactorily established the 
conclusion that Lancashire's decline after World War I was 
principally due to causes beyond her control. By no stretch 
of the imagination can the decline be charged to "technological" 
backwardness or a failure to adopt new types of machinery. 
Although something might have been possible along these lines, 
the key to the problem lay elsewhere. 
It would be possible to conclude this section of the book 
right here. The basic point I wish to make has already been 
established. To stop now, however, would be to ignore two 
important problems relevant to Lancashire's collapse as an 
exporter. First, why did cotton textile manufacturing spread 
so easily and why were governments throughout the world 
so eager to protect this particular industry? Second, why was 
Britain unable to compete effectively with Japan during the 
interwar period? These questions will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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COTTON TEXTILES AND 
INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE 
In this chapter, I shall argue that the principal shifts in the 
location of the world's cotton textile industry and the principal 
shifts in the pattern of world trade in cotton textiles are closely 
related to some key characteristics of the manufacturing pro­
cesses in the industry. I intend to make this argument for 
the whole period since the Napoleonic wars through the 1930s. 
In fact, it could probably be extended even farther back in 
time. 
The first important characteristic of the industry is the nature 
of transportation costs. Cotton, like most other textile raw 
materials, changes very little in weight as it is processed. Thus, 
in spinning the waste rate was perhaps 10 or 11% before the 
American Civil War and has been around 6% since then.1 In 
addition, much of the waste cotton is recovered and processed. 
In view of the weight added to the cloth by sizing, it is not 
always clear whether the process of converting raw cotton into 
cloth decreases or increases the weight of the product. Further­
more, the difference in cost per unit of weight between shipping 
raw cotton and shipping cotton cloth is not great. 
'See Blaug, "The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry 
during the Nineteenth Century," p. 377. 
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These considerations mean that it makes little difference 
whether cotton cloth is manufactured in a cotton-growing area 
or in a cotton cloth-consuming area.2 This footloose aspect 
of the industry is accentuated by the fact that it is not a great 
consumer of power or of raw materials other than cotton. This 
makes the cotton textile industry very different, for example, 
from the iron and steel industry. In the early part of the 
nineteenth century, the cotton textile industry was at least partly 
dependent on water power and on a damp climate. Develop­
ments in power technology, especially with regard to steam 
power and electricity, however, have long since freed the 
industry from dependence on waterwheels. The development 
of artificial humidifiers has had a similar effect with regard 
to climate. 
In addition to having low differential transportation costs, 
the industry also has low total transportation costs. That is, 
the cost of transporting cloth is a relatively small percentage 
of the value of the cloth. More important, it is also a relatively 
small percentage of the value added to the raw cotton when 
it is transformed into cloth.3 In the case of yarn, especially 
coarse yarn, this may not always have been true. That is, the 
cost of transporting coarse yarn may on occasion have been 
a serious obstacle to its sale (as yarn) in a place far distant 
from where it was manufactured. This, of course, presupposes 
that a convenient supply of raw cotton was available in this 
distant place. 
The relationship between value added and transportation 
costs for textiles has been of importance to world trade for 
a long time. It is at the very least one important reason why 
cloth was a major item in medieval and ancient trade. Next 
to spices, precious metals, and perhaps a few other products, 
such as steel blades, textiles had the lowest ratio of transport 
costs to value of any product available. It was this consideration, 
2
 As applied to wool, the argument also helps explain why Edward III banned 
the export of raw wool from England. 
3
 Strictly speaking, the important point is that transport costs are low relative 
to the comparative advantage some country is able to develop in producing cotton 
goods (i.e., the difference in comparative costs). The extent of this advantage, 
however, is closely correlated with the extent of the economic activity involved, 
which, in turn, is well measured by value added. 
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rather than any economies of scale in production or the 
"importance" of the product, that made textiles the leading 
item of international trade in most periods of poor com­
munications. 
These relatively low transportation costs have at least two 
implications for the organization of textile production in the 
modern period. First of all, it means that relatively little is 
lost if raw cotton (or wool or several other textile raw materials) 
is shipped from a growing area to a manufacturing area and 
then, in the form of cloth, to a consuming area without following 
the shortest route between the growing and consuming areas. 
Indeed, little is lost if the raw cotton is shipped to a manufac­
turing area and the resulting cloth is then shipped back to 
the original cotton-growing area. Thus, if tariffs had not been 
in the way, Great Britain would probably have supplied the 
southern United States with cotton cloth manufactured of 
southern cotton for most, if not all, of the nineteenth century. 
Instead, New England did it. To some extent, Great Britain 
did it with Indian cotton. More important, American cotton 
was shipped to Great Britain, converted to cloth, and then 
shipped to India to compete with local cloth made of locally 
grown cotton. 
This relationship also goes at least part of the way toward 
explaining why factory spinning preceded factory weaving in 
cotton-growing countries with large handicraft industries. As 
has been noted, transportation costs were a much greater 
percentage of value added in the case of yarn than in the 
case of cotton. Shipping raw cotton from India or the United 
States to Great Britain to be spun into yarn that in turn was 
to be shipped to India or China involved a relatively heavy 
transportation burden. Thus, local factory spinners using locally 
grown raw cotton in India or China had a special advantage 
in supplying the local handweavers with yarn. Another way 
of putting this is that in supplying handloom weavers with 
yarn, British manufacturers had fewer processes with which 
to offset the transportation advantage of local manufacturers 
than they did when they competed with the local manufacturers 
in the sale of finished cloth. This is certainly not the whole 
explanation of the lead factory spinning so frequently had over 
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factory weaving, for this lead could sometimes be observed 
in countries with no ready access to raw cotton. Nevertheless, 
transportation costs undoubtedly played an important role in 
some cases. 
The other consequence of low transport costs is that it tends 
to make one single country dominate world trade in a given 
type of textile product. Indeed, in the absence of tariffs and 
other "artificial" trade barriers, one country might well dominate 
world production of each type of textile product. The reason 
behind this assertion is that in the absence of any trade barriers 
at all (including transport costs) there should be one country 
that has a comparative advantage over all other countries in 
any particular product.4 
Naturally, such a sweeping conclusion needs some modifica­
tion. Thus, for example, if the dominant country is located 
at some distance from its supply of raw materials, it may have 
difficulty competing in very distant markets, even if they are 
unprotected. This is especially true if this distant market has 
its own raw materials supply. As noted above, this would be 
most likely to happen with regard to yarn and very coarse 
cloth. In addition, extreme specialization, either in some partic­
ular market or in some particular product, may allow a compet­
ing exporter to escape the dominance of the leading producer. 
Thus, industries specializing in such things as high-quality 
stockings, lace, handkerchiefs, or particular widths and designs 
of cloth have frequently been able to compete effectively with 
the country that dominated world trade in cotton textiles as 
a whole. What this really means, of course, is that no one 
country is likely to be able to maintain a comparative advantage 
in every single type of cotton product. The production skills 
and market knowledge needed to supply highly specialized 
products and markets is unlikely to be completely concentrated 
in the country that has a comparative advantage in the standard 
grades of cotton cloth. On a more general level, it is possible 
for one country to be most efficient in the production of 
4
 This result also requires that average cost does not rise at high levels of output. 
This condition holds for cotton textiles. In fact, it holds for most products that 
are not dependent on location near a supply of raw materials or a group of 
highly skilled workers. 
COTTON TEXTILES AND WORLD TRADE (211 
low-quality goods and another country in the production of 
high-quality goods. Such a situation might occur if one country 
has a large supply of well-disciplined, hardworking, but not 
very skilled textile workers and another has highly skilled, but 
also highly paid, workers.5 This, of course, is a fair description 
of the relationship between Japan and Great Britain in the 
early 1920s. 
Finally, a declining national industry that is losing, or has 
lost, its comparative advantage will not die immediately. Because 
of the lack of mobility of plant and equipment, as well as 
skilled workers, a fading industry will usually put up some 
resistance, presumably by price-cutting, for a period of time. 
This fight will mean that rates of return on capital and wages 
will fall below the levels needed to attract new capital or labor 
into the declining industry. Indeed, manufacturers may only 
be able to recover part of the original cost of their equipment, 
and highly skilled workers may get little more than they could 
earn as unskilled workers in some other occupation. 
These theoretical considerations are in close accord with what 
happened in the world cotton textile industry between 1815 
and 1938. Throughout the nineteenth century, world trade 
in cotton textiles was dominated by Great Britain. During the 
period 1882-84, Great Britain accounted for no less than 82% 
of world trade in cotton goods.6 What is more, Britain came 
close to dominating world factory production outside of a few 
highly protected countries.7 The biggest weakness of the British 
industry was the extent to which unprotected handicraft indus­
tries continued to flourish, especially in India and China. It 
should be remembered, however, that these handicraft indus­
tries benefited from the advantages of poor inland transpor­
5
 Presumably they are well paid because other well-paying industries are competing 
for their services. 
6Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 2. 
7
 In 1882-84, Britain consumed 37% of all the raw cotton consumed by all 
the world's cotton mills. Because British goods were of higher-than-average quality 
and fineness, this represented considerably more than 37% of world manufacturing 
capacity. In these same years, the heavily protected American industry accounted 
for over 22% of world mill cotton consumption (Robson, The Cotton Industry in 
Britain, p. 2). In addition, there were important protected industries in a number 
of other countries, including France, Germany, and Russia. 
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tation and, at least in some cases, from quality, or at least 
taste, advantages.8 
During the years between 1880 and World War I, the British 
dominance decreased somewhat. In particular, the United 
States, Japan, and Italy began to emerge as serious rivals in 
the export of standard types of cotton cloth. In addition, virtually 
unprotected factory industries began to emerge in India and 
China. I would argue that these developments reflected the 
beginning of a shift in comparative advantage away from Great 
Britain. It will be noted that this competition came first in 
the provision of yarn for handloom weavers and second in 
the production and export of low-quality cloth. For reasons 
that will be discussed below, comparative advantage in cotton 
textiles, among many other products, first begins to shift in 
favor of newcomers at relatively low qualities. 
After World War I, comparative advantage quickly shifted 
in favor of Japan. By the 1930s, Japanese cotton textiles were 
threatening every cotton industry in the world. No better 
testimony to this can be found than the many countries who 
enacted special tariffs or instituted quota systems for the avowed 
purpose of restraining imports from Japan. The 28% (by weight) 
of all world trade in cotton textiles still held by Great Britain 
in 1936-389 can be credited to her remaining comparative 
advantage in the production of high-quality goods, discrimina­
tion in third (especially Empire) markets and, perhaps most 
important, the utilization of fixed and semi-fixed resources 
that could be operated at marginal cost.10 As for Japan's failure 
to eliminate all competing exporters other than Britain, only 
Europe was a serious trade rival by the middle 1930s.11 Most 
of this European trade was intra-European, heavily weighted 
with speciality produts (usually of very high quality), and often 
protected by discriminatory, especially anti-Japanese, trade 
8
 See Kraus, Cotton and Cotton Goods in China, pp. 127-28. 
9Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 2. 
10Between 1924 and 1933, British cotton-spinning wage rates decreased by 14% 
while overall industrial wage rates only decreased by 6%. In addition, the rate 
of promotion of piecers to spinners slowed markedly, and the rate of unemployment 
increased (Jewkes and Gray, Wages and Labor in the Lancashire Cotton Spinning 
Industry, p. 50). 
11
 Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 358. 
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barriers. By the end of the thirties, Japan clearly had the upper 
hand in almost any freely competitive situation. 
The objection might be raised that these shifts in trade 
patterns were to a large extent the result of exchange rate 
movements. Thus, it could be argued that Britain's failure was 
due to overvaluation of the pound in the 1920s and that Japan's 
success was due to devaluation in the 1930s. Although it is 
no doubt true that Lancashire was hurt by the overvaluation 
of the 1920s, the underlying deterioration of the industry's 
competitive position is demonstrated by the further rapid decline 
that occurred during the 1930s, including the late 1930s.12 
Indeed, in 1938 the export of British cotton cloth was at its 
lowest level since 1850.13 This means that in 1938 Britain 
exported less cotton cloth than she did during the "cotton 
famine" connected with the American Civil War. Of course, 
worldwide economic depression and increased trade restrictions 
also hurt, but they cannot account for all of this decline. Britain's 
share of world trade in cotton goods declined from 39% in 
1926-28 to 28% in 1936-38. 
As for Japan, the devaluation of the yen in the years just 
after 1929 certainly helped her export drive of the early thirties. 
It is also clear, however, that cotton textile exports, despite 
their relatively heavy dependence on imported raw materials, 
increased much faster than did other types of exports. In 
addition, Japanese textile exports were hit by all sorts of trade 
barriers. Some of these applied to all countries, but others 
applied only, or with special severity, to Japan.14 Despite these 
12The sterling-yen exchange rate was stable between 1933 and 1941 (Seki, The 
Cotton Industry of Japan, p. 408). 
13Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 332. 
14
 G. E. Hubbard has attempted to estimate the effect of Japanese devaluation 
in the early 1930s by comparing relative devaluation and changes in the wholesale 
price index in Japan, Great Britain, and the United States. On this basis, he 
concludes that Japan had obtained a 9.5% advantage on Great Britain between 
1929 and 1944 (Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West, pp. 
100-101). It is not clear how relevant this statistic is to the cotton industry, however. 
Virtually all the raw cotton used in Japan was imported, and devaluation would 
not help here. For most cotton goods, raw cotton accounted for more than 50% 
of total costs (ibid., p. 124). Although the devaluation of the yen up to March 
1934 exceeded the devaluation of sterling by 23.7%, Japanese price levels also 
increased more than British prices. It is probably a considerable exaggeration 
to say that Japan gained a 10% price advantage over Britain on cotton goods 
214) LANCASHIRE IN DECLINE 
problems and a worldwide depression, Japan was able to increase 
her cotton cloth exports from an average annual level of 1,387 
million square yards in 1926-28 to 2,511 million square yards 
in 1936-38.15 Over the same period, total world trade in cotton 
goods decreased by about 22%.16 
While Japan was overtaking Great Britain, a similar develop­
ment was occurring within the highly protected American 
market. With foreign products virtually excluded by high tariffs, 
the American market was a world unto itself. Up until 1870, 
this market was completely dominated by New England. After 
that date, southern competition began to be felt, first in 
low-quality goods. As time passed, the South came to dominate 
the production of low-quality cloth and to compete seriously 
in the medium and high-quality trades. By the 1930s, the South 
had an advantage in practically all qualities. The remaining 
output of New England was made possible mainly because fixed 
capital was being consumed and industrially immobile workers 
had to accept wages that were low relative to New England 
standards. The situation of the cotton textile industries in Old 
and New England were very similar at this time. 
The logical problem that arises at this point is to explain 
why comparative advantage shifted away from Great Britain 
and New England toward Japan and the South. This question, 
of course, can only be answered after it has been determined 
which factors affect comparative advantage in the cotton textile 
industry. The previous discussion has already made it clear 
that location or accessability of natural resources has little 
influence on comparative advantage in this industry. That would 
seem to leave management and entrepreneurship, industrial 
skill, labor supply, and capital supply. 
Compared with most industries, cotton textiles are labor, 
as opposed to capital, intensive. This is true even if automatic 
through these changes. The special charges and quotas imposed on Japanese 
cotton textiles in so many places during the early 1930s must certainly have been 
enough to offset this devaluation advantage. What is more, between 1934 and 
1937 Japanese wholesale prices increased somewhat faster than British wholesale 
prices while the exchange rate remained constant at Is. 2d. per yen (Allen, British 
Industries and Their Organization, p. 92). 
15Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, p. 358. 
16Ibid., p. 2. 
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looms are used. What is more, it has been demonstrated at 
an earlier point in this book that, at least before World War 
I, sufficiently low wages made power looms uneconomical 
(especially if the looms had to be imported). As a result, 
automatic looms had little impact outside of the United States 
until after World War I. This relatively low capital intensity 
was, of course, of relative advantage to capital-poor countries 
and regions. The trade in used cotton textile machinery that 
flourished during at least part of the period under review 
also helped the cause of the low-wage newcomers. 
Perhaps even more important than low-capital intensity was 
low-skill intensity. The possibility of using unskilled workers 
to advantage, especially in the production of low-quality goods, 
is documented in virtually every study of a nascent cotton 
industry.17 In fact, of course, this also applies to British 
developments in the late eighteenth century, although by the 
late nineteenth century technical improvements (e.g., automatic 
mules and ring spindles) had probably reduced the earlier skill 
requirements somewhat. This means that compared with other 
industries with higher skill requirements, cotton textiles were 
an attractive medium for the South and Japan to use in 
exploiting their relatively large supply of unskilled labor. 
Two other aspects of the industry that helped these particular 
new producers and that go a long way toward explaining why 
cotton textiles were almost always the first industry developed 
by a non-industrial country18 deserve some mention. The first 
point has already been made above, that is, that the industry 
can locate almost anywhere, regardless of transportation costs 
or climate. This condition was especially important for Japan. 
Because the South was covered with cotton fields, the only 
transportation factor that could have hurt its prospects as a 
cotton textile producer would have been if the manufacturing 
process added substantially to the weight of the cotton processed. 
The second, and more important point, is that a considerable 
17
 See, for example, Broadus Mitchell for the United States, Morris Morris for 
India, and G. E. Hubbard for Japan. 
18The only major exceptions to this rule of cotton textiles first were countries 
with some major natural resource to exploit. This, for example, would be true 
of the timber trade in Scandinavia. 
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market exists for cotton textiles almost everywhere, at least 
for low and medium qualities. In this context, "considerable" 
means a sufficient demand to permit full utilization of scale 
economies. In fact, scale economies are not very important 
in cotton textiles. That is, fully efficient manufacturing plants 
do not have to be very large. Certainly, almost any national 
market is, and has long been, large enough to support efficient 
plants, except possibly for very high quality and very specialized 
types of cotton goods. 
The dynamic version of this comparative advantage argument 
is that Great Britain slowly lost the relative advantage she had 
obtained from her early start in cotton textiles, principally 
because she began to accumulate capital and develop other 
industries. The effect of this process was to make labor relatively 
scarce and relatively expensive. Great Britain's comparative 
advantage shifted into more and more capital- and skill-intensive 
industries. Eventually, it became possible for a peasant economy 
like Japan's to expand its comparative advantage from raw 
silk and other agricultural products to include low-capital and 
skill-intensive manufacturing. The result was the development 
of the Japanese cotton textile industry. This trend was also 
aided by the development of machinery requiring relatively 
little labor skill.19 Japan's advantage lasted at least as long as 
she was able to move peasants straight from the rice field to 
the cotton mill. The evidence indicates very strongly that the 
Japanese cotton textile industry had access to a virtually perfect 
elastic supply of cheap labor well into the 1930s. Indeed, the 
rural depression after 1929 improved the relative position of 
the Japanese cotton textile industry compared with what it 
had been earlier.20 During the post-World War II period, the 
Japanese cotton textile industry has not been able to obtain 
cheap peasant labor. This development has undoubtedly con­
tributed to the recent deterioration of Japan's competitive 
position as a supplier of cotton cloth (not relative to Great 
Britain, however), especially low-quality cotton cloth. 
19During approximately the same period, a similar trend had been going on 
within the protected American market. The backward South was able to establish 
a comparative advantage in cotton textiles. 
2 0Hubbard, Eastern Industrialization and Its Effect on the West, p. 165. 
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Relatively cheap labor, however, cannot be the whole story 
behind the shift of comparative advantage in cotton textiles.21 
After all, Japan was certainly not the country with the world's 
relatively most abundant supply of labor. Why was Japan more 
successful than, for example, India, China, or tropical Africa? 
Aside from problems of political stability, I think the answer 
lies in the supply of entrepreneurship and management skill 
together with the adaptability of the work force to factory 
conditions. Clearly, many countries in the past, as well as the 
present, have suffered from an acute lack of these factors of 
production. To discuss why this is so would be to write a textbook 
on the problems of economic development. What is clear, 
however, is that the absence of these factors makes industri­
alization of any kind virtually impossible. In other words, such 
a society has a comparative advantage in peasant and plantation 
agriculture and handicraft industry because these activities 
require relatively little of the factors that are truly scarcest. 
The importance of good entrepreneurship and management 
has been emphasized by several students of the cotton textile 
industry, notably Rockwood Chin. As is apparent from the 
previous paragraph, I fully share the view that these factors 
are most important. I do not believe, however, that Britain 
lost her dominant position in the world cotton textile industry 
because of poor management. Indeed, the whole first part 
of this book can be viewed as at least a partial defense of 
British management against a charge of inefficiency. More 
important is the fact that the nature of comparative advantage 
makes it very unlikely that poor management was the principal 
cause of the British decline. There is no question of the fact 
that Japan had access to a supply of relatively cheap labor. 
For the supply of managerial talent to be of crucial importance, 
therefore, Britain must have had a very great shortage of 
management talent as compared with Japan, and the cotton 
textile industry must have been a relatively management-inten­
sive activity. In fact, I do not believe that either of these 
hypotheses was, or is, true.22 On the contrary, I find it more 
21
 It might, however, be the whole story behind the American shift, for the 
South was the lowest wage area in the United States. 
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plausible that cotton textiles were a good industry for Japan 
partly because she suffered from a relative shortage of manage­
rial and entrepreneurial talent compared with previously indus­
trialized countries. 
Another possible way of putting the blame on poor British 
management is to argue that, for historical or other reasons, 
British cotton textile management was much worse than British 
management in general and that Japanese cotton management 
was much better than Japanese management in general. I do 
not believe that the evidence available supports such a conten­
tion. Furthermore, I would argue that any possible relative 
superiority of Japanese cotton textile management during the 
interwar period was principally a result, rather than a cause, 
of Japanese growth and British decline. 
One of the problems raised at the end of the previous chapter 
still remains to be answered. Namely, why are countries so 
prone to protect their cotton textile industries? The trend toward 
protected self-sufficiency is one of the most striking features 
of the industry's history. Some idea of how far this movement 
had progressed by the early 1930s can be obtained from Table 
37. Furthermore, the striving for self-sufficiency had by no 
means reached its peak by the early 1930s. By 1936-38, only 
16% of world factory production of cotton goods entered 
international trade.23 
As I have noted more than once, this trend toward autarky 
would have severely damaged Lancashire's export trade even 
without the shift in comparative advantage toward Japan. 
Similarly, Japan was not able to enjoy the full fruits of having 
become the world's most efficient producer of cotton textiles 
because of this drop in trade. 
The reason that so many countries moved in the direction 
of protected self-sufficiency in cotton textiles derives from the 
features of the industry that have already been discussed. The 
unimportance of transport costs and scale economies means 
22
 Cotton textiles may have been management intensive relative to Japan's peasant 
agriculture but not relative to industry in general. 
23The share of trade was 55% in 1829-31, 38% in 1882-84, 28% in 1910-13, 
23% in 1926-38, and 10% in 1953-55 (see Robson, The Cotton Industry in Britain, 
P-2). 
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TABLE 37 
SHARE OF HOME MARKET HELD BY DOMESTIC PRODUCERS OF COTTON GOODS IN

SELECTED COUNTRIES IN VARIOUS YEARS

Percentage of Cotton 
~ . .  . Piece Good Consumption Country and Year Supplied by 
Domestic Producers 
United States (1933) 99.5 
India (1935) 76.5* 
China (1934) 87.5* 
USSR (1934) 99.9 
Japan(1935) 99.9 
Germany (1928) 92.9 
United Kingdom (1934) 98.5 
Italy (1934) 99.2 
France (1932) 99.0 
Brazil (1929) 93.5 
Netherlands (1933) 89.5 
Canada (1934) 74.8 
Belgium (1933) 92.9 
Rumania (1934) 88.1 
Switzerland (1929) 88.8 
SOURCE: Board of Trade, Working Party Report, Cotton, p.243. The table is originally from International 
Labour Office, The World Textile Industry (1937); I have been unable to locate this work. 
•Excluding handicraft production. 
that almost any country can be the site of a cotton textile industry. 
The low capital and skill requirements mean that it is usually 
the easiest industry for a peasant country to develop. In other 
words, the characteristics of the industry are such as to make 
it very responsive to tariff protection. This, in turn, means 
that the static inefficiency of using tariffs to protect a cotton 
textile industry is lower than for most other industries. Thus, 
lower tariffs are usually sufficient to induce this particular 
industry to develop than is the case with most industries.24 
It is true that protecting cotton textiles can become very 
expensive in highly industrialized, high-wage countries (such 
as the United States at the present time). In such a situation, 
however, the political influence of a long-established cotton 
textile industry still makes protection very likely. 
Although the cotton textile industry can flourish almost 
24
 The principal exceptions to this rule are industries that face very heavy transport 
costs (e.g., soft drink bottling or brewing). 
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anywhere, it usually requires at least some protection. The 
reason for this, of course, is the unimportance of transport 
costs. With no protection at all, the dominant exporter would 
presumably be able to move in and dominate almost any market. 
This is exactly what Great Britain did during most of the 
nineteenth century. Only protected markets and remote handi­
craft regions were able to withstand British competition. Thus, 
although it is very responsive to tariff protection, cotton textile 
manufacture is not usually a very good infant industry. In 
most cases, the child requires protection even after adolescence 
has been reached. Of course, the level of protection required 
at this stage may well be somewhat lower than that required 
at birth. 
11

CONCLUSION 
This study has arrived at two major conclusions, one negative 
and one positive. The negative conclusion is that the failure 
of British management to adopt new machinery, especially ring 
spindles and automatic looms, at a rapid rate did not play 
an important part in the decline and eventual collapse of the 
British cotton textile industry after 1870. The positive conclusion 
is that a reduction in export demand resulting from forces 
outside the control of British management was the principal 
cause of Lancashire's downfall. In addition, a number of other, 
less sweeping, conclusions were reached in the course of the 
analysis. Some of these are: 
1. Both British and American cotton textile management 
generally acted in a rational manner in choosing between 
ring and mule spindles for new installations in the period 
just before World War I. 
2.	 The relatively aggressive behavior of the American mule 
spinners unions encouraged the adoption of ring spinning 
in the United States. The more amiable British mule 
spinners unions had less of an effect in this direction. 
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3.	 The evidence available is at least consistent with the 
hypothesis that British and American cotton textile man­
agers were rational in their decisions as to whether old 
mules should be junked and as to whether plain or 
automatic looms should be used. It is possible, however, 
that the British were somewhat more cautious than were 
the Americans about relatively capital-intensive produc­
tion methods. 
4.	 The British cotton-weaving unions probably retarded the 
adoption of automatic weaving in Great Britain by their 
stand on work loads and wage rates for automatic looms. 
5.	 Contrary to the findings of G. T. Jones, efficiency in 
the Lancashire cotton textile industry increased between 
1885 and 1910. This is true even for the 1900-1910 
period, for which Jones found a decrease in efficiency. 
6.	 The differences between the increase in efficiency and 
in labor productivity in Lancashire and in Massachusetts 
between 1885 and 1910 (or 1914) seem to be explicable 
without recourse to any supposed British managerial 
failure. 
7.	 The pattern of disinvestment in the British cotton textile 
industry between the World Wars appears to be generally 
consistent with rational economic behavior. 
8.	 Ever since at least 1816, British cotton exports have been 
adversely affected by the growth of protected cotton 
textile industries in various parts of the world. 
9.	 Starting about 1870 or 1880, Britain's comparative ad­
vantage in cotton textiles began to decline relative to 
a number of countries. The most important of these 
countries was Japan. 
10.	 Because of the low transport costs faced by the industry, 
world cotton textile trade is very likely to be dominated 
by one country at a time. Between the World Wars, Great 
Britain was replaced by Japan as the world's leading 
and most efficient cotton textile exporter. 
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In addition to listing conclusions, some mention should be 
made of what has not been demonstrated, especially with regard 
to the quality of British management. Nothing definite has 
been proved about the quality of British management in general; 
nor has it been demonstrated that British cotton textile manage­
ment was efficient in all its functions. Indeed, even within 
the limited sphere of technology it has been noted that British 
cotton textile management displayed little interest in searching 
out improvements or encouraging research. Furthermore, 
management actively supported the policy of short-time work 
during periods of slack demand. This policy tended to retard 
capital-intensive innovations. 
Taking all this into account, however, the analysis presented 
in this study makes it seem highly unlikely that poor manage­
ment was a major contributor to Lancashire's decline. It would 
have required a truly outstanding managerial performance to 
have improved Lancashire's international position significantly. 
If that had happened, however, the proper description of such 
events would be that outstanding management overcame outside 
forces that were undermining British cotton textile exports. 
If a really sweeping conclusion is desired at the end of this 
kind of study, it might be claimed that the story of Lancashire's 
decline has a lesson for all industrialized countries. That is, 
as industrialization spreads, the more advanced countries will 
tend to lose their comparative advantage in those industries 
that can be operated efficiently with a relatively unskilled work 
force using relatively little capital equipment. Thus, if free 
competition is maintained, the advanced countries will have 
to shift out of such industries.1 In fact, the usual reaction of 
the advanced countries to such a development has been to 
offer the affected industry protection in the form of tariffs 
or quotas. Such action, however, imposes costs on the advanced 
country. Even more important, it places a serious obstacle in 
the way of the efforts of the less-advanced countries to industri­
alize. 
The special vulnerability of the British cotton textile industry 
1
 Transportation costs, both differential and absolute, would also play an important 
role in this regard. See the analysis in chapter 10. 
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arose from the fact that it was primarily an export industry. 
As a result, it could not be protected by British tariffs. Moreover, 
because the industry was a major exporter, it was much larger 
than the cotton textile industries of other countries. Readjust­
ment was thus both necessary and very painful. Of course, 
the pain was made worse by the fact that the British wool, 
coal-mining, and shipbuilding industries were all declining at 
the same time. Indeed, it can be argued that the price Britain 
had to pay for her early industrialization was that she became 
specialized in the exporting of low capital- and low skill-inten­
sive staple goods. This meant that sooner or later she would 
have to choose between a major industrial readjustment and 
an extremely low and stagnant wage level. In retrospect, once 
the pain of the readjustment was over, Britain was in a much 
stronger position than had previously been the case. She is 
no longer dependent on enormous export industries vulnerable 
to the kind of disaster that overtook Lancashire. 
APPENDIXES


A. PROBLEMS IN THE 
COVERAGE OF DEPRECIATION 
AND OBSOLESCENCE 
ALLOWANCES 
A major problem in estimating the net rate of return on capital 
invested in the replacement of well-functioning mules with rings 
is deciding which of the necessary conversion expenditures should 
be depreciated. In principal, the purpose of depreciation and 
obsolescence allowances is to compensate for the declining value 
of an investment over time. Eventually, when the equipment or 
other investment has become worthless, the amounts allocated 
to cover depreciation and obsolescence should be sufficient either 
to permit replacement of the investment or to permit the investor 
to withdraw his invested capital from the enterprise. 
Thus, some depreciation allowance should be charged whenever 
a piece of equipment, building, organizational innovation, or other 
investment expenditure is expected to decline in value over time. 
In other words, expectations about future developments are 
decisive. This is particularly true in a case such as the present 
where the problem lies between keeping an old method of produc­
tion or replacing it with a new method. 
In order to illustrate the importance of expectations concerning 
future developments, I shall discuss below four different types 
of expectations and the type of depreciation and obsolescence 
policy implied by each one. In fact, of course, actual expectations 
might have been somewhere in between two of my cases or they 
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might have consisted of a probability distribution involving more 
than one of my cases. 
1.	 It is thought that the choice is between introducing the new 
method now or introducing the same method in the same 
building and at the same total cost sometime in the future. 
In this case, the problem is solely one of deciding on the 
timing of the conversion. 
2.	 It is thought that the choice is between installing the new 
method and using it forever or keeping the old method and 
using it forever. 
3.	 It is thought that the choice is between using either the new 
or the old method for a finite period of time. At the end 
of that time, the firm will be broken up and the residual 
value of equipment, good will, and so on, will be the same 
regardless of which method was used at the end. 
4.	 It is thought that both methods currently available will 
eventually be replaced by a third method and that the cost 
of adopting this third method will be the same regardless 
of the method being used at the time of replacement. 
These various possibilities clearly imply very different things 
for depreciation policy. In the first example, depreciation allow­
ances should be limited to things that physically deteriorate with 
time and use. This presumably applies to all machinery and 
equipment, since a postponement will mean that newer equipment 
will eventually be used. This newer equipment, in turn, will 
presumably be better than older, similar equipment and will not 
have to be replaced as soon. Physical alterations in buildings also 
should be depreciated if they are less durable than the building 
itself. (This is so because if they are less durable than the building, 
they will eventually have to be done over again.) This, however, 
is not likely to be the case. Certainly, the costs associated with 
closing the plant for alterations and recruiting and training the 
new work force should not be depreciated. These expenses are 
only being shifted in time, not avoided, when conversion is 
postponed. 
Under example two, it might appear that no depreciation at 
all should be charged. If both sets of equipment are expected 
to last forever, there is no need for a replacement fund. Such 
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an expectation, however, is patently ridiculous. The equipment 
is certain to deteriorate with time and use. This, in turn, means 
that the equipment embodying the old method will eventually 
have to be replaced—presumably by equipment embodying the 
new methods—at some time in the future. This conclusion largely 
reduces example two to example one. 
Example three, however, leads to very different results. In this 
case, all the expenses of the conversion must be depreciated. If 
they are not, then at the end of the period of operation all the 
extra capital needed for the conversion will not be recovered. 
The investor will not be able to withdraw all the capital he put 
into the firm. 
This alternative of a foreseeable end to operations with either 
method (or any method, for that matter), might be considered 
excessively pessimistic. In fact, however, it corresponds better to 
actual British experience in cotton spinning than does example 
one. After World War I, large quantities of both types of spinning 
equipment were junked. On the other hand, it must be granted 
that ring-spinning firms probably did a little bit better when they 
were dissolved than did mule-spinning firms. 
Example four leads to results similar to those that follow from 
example three. Unless all the extra expenses have been depreciated, 
the investor will not be able to recover all his capital outlay when 
the time comes for conversion to the third method. This conclusion 
will, of course, be modified to the extent that the costs of adopting 
the third method are lower if the second method (i.e., rings) 
has already been adopted. If the cost of adopting the third method 
is reduced by a sum equal to all the non-machinery costs of adopting 
method two, then this fourth example becomes essentially identical 
with example one. 
These various possibilities should make it clear that I am being 
very conservative when I only apply an allowance for depreciation 
and obsolescence to machinery and equipment. This approach 
is tantamount to assuming that the only reasonable expectation 
for a British cotton-spinning manager in the pre-World War I 
period was that sooner or later he would replace all his low-count 
mules with rings, without, however, tearing down his factory 
building. 
B. DEPRECIATION RATES ON 
COTTON TEXTILE MACHINERY 
The appropriateness of the rate of depreciation charged is an 
important factor in judging the soundness of all investment 
decisions involving a choice between production methods of differ­
ing capital intensity. If too high a rate of depreciation has been 
charged, then the apparent rate of return on invested capital 
will be correspondingly too low; and the opposite effect will be 
produced if too low a rate of depreciation has been charged. 
Within the context of this book, these considerations mean that 
any judgment about decisions as to whether well-functioning, 
previously installed mules should be junked and replaced with 
new rings and decisions as to whether automatic or plain looms 
should be used depend crucially on the depreciation rate assumed. 
On the other hand, the rate of depreciation has very little effect 
on the choice between new mules and new rings. 
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to determine what consti­
tutes the "appropriate" rate of depreciation. This is true in 
retrospect and it is even more true in prospect. In all cases, some 
room must be left for disagreement among reasonable men. Thus, 
only under extreme circumstances can an investment decision be 
called "irrational" because it, either explicitly or implicitly, is based 
on too high or too low a rate of depreciation. 
In my calculations, I have used a rate of 10% for "loss, 
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depreciation, and upkeep" on spinning and preparatory machine­
ry. The reason for adopting this particular rate is that James 
Winterbottom, an acknowledged authority on cotton textile pro­
duction during the period being studied, described it as being 
"generally accepted."x Because this rate is higher than other rates 
frequently alluded to by observers as being the "depreciation" 
rate, it should be stressed that the Winterbottom rate involves 
more than just the pure depreciation of the machinery. Loss, 
upkeep, and repairs can be important items, although I have 
made no attempt to quantify them. In particular, it must be 
remembered that though the life of the basic spinning frame 
or other machine might be quite long, many parts, such as spindles, 
have much shorter lives. Furthermore, as far as my calculations 
are concerned, no separate account is taken of the risk of machines 
being destroyed by fire, natural disaster, vandalism, or any other 
cause. In other words, I am implicitly including an insurance 
policy in my "depreciation." 
In arguing for a lower rate of depreciation, it could be pointed 
out that some cotton machinery remained in operation for fifty 
years or even longer. This could be t^ken to imply a real deprecia­
tion rate of around 2% per annum. It must be remembered, 
however, that by no means all machines lasted even close to fifty 
years. In addition, as was noted above, many parts would have 
been replaced and many repairs carried out before a machine 
reached the age of fifty. 
With regard to weaving equipment (i.e., looms), I followed the 
practice of T. W. Uttley, an Englishman observing the American 
cotton textile industry. Uttley uses a 5% rate of depreciation for 
plain looms. For automatic looms he adds 2 percentage points 
to account for obsolescence.2 As Irwin Feller has pointed out, 
it makes no sense to apply the obsolescence allowance to automatic 
looms only.3 If automatic looms become obsolescent, so do plain 
looms. Uttley can, therefore, be said to have used a rate of 7% 
for depreciation and obsolescence on looms. I adopted this rate 
for my calculations. This is not quite the same thing as the 10% 
I used for spinning equipment, however, because it takes no account 
of upkeep. What is more, the Draper Company admitted that 
repair costs were greater on its automatic looms than on plain 
1
 Winterbottom, Cotton Spinning Calculations and Yarn Costs, p. 271. 
2
 Uttley, Cotton Spinning and Manufacturing in the United States, pp. 25-26. 
3
 Feller, "The Draper Loom in New England Textiles," pp. 340-41. 
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looms.4 Thus, although I used the 7% for looms, I am by no 
means convinced that it is superior to any other figure between 
5% and 10%. Indeed, the range may be even larger. This uncer­
tainty, of course, also applies to the 10% figure for spinning 
equipment that I got from Winterbottom. The special advantage 
of that figure is that it is specifically reported to be the rate actually 
used. 
An interesting example of how a particular British textile 
company handled machinery depreciation can be taken from the 
history of Marshalls of Leeds, the well-known flax spinners. Up 
until 1827, machine depreciation was carried out on a purely 
ad hoc basis. In that year, however, a standard depreciation rate 
of 7.5% per annum was introduced.5 This rate was raised to 10% 
sometime before 1858, because in that year it was reduced from 
10% to 7.5%. In 1862, it was further reduced to 5%.6 It is not 
immediately obvious what rate was most appropriate, nor is it 
clear exactly what was included in the depreciation rate. It is 
clear, however, that the reductions of 1858 and 1862 were connect­
ed with a policy of raising the book value of the company. In 
addition to lowering the depreciation rate, the book value of the 
plant was raised by the stroke of a pen. The historian of the 
firm describes these measures as "window dressing."7 Marshalls 
went into liquidation in 1886. 
In its 1912 study of the American cotton textile industry, the 
United States Tariff Board uses a depreciation rate of somewhat 
less than 5% for entire cotton mills.8 This calculation, however, 
includes buildings as well as machinery. Because buildings are 
usually depreciated less rapidly than machinery, the rate applied 
to machinery by the Tariff Board was, in fact, probably 5%. 
Furthermore, although it is never made absolutely explicit, it does 
seem clear that the Tariff Board figure includes no allowance 
for upkeep, repairs, or insurance. Insurance and spare parts 
supplies are treated as separate cost items, and upkeep is probably 
included in "works costs." 
One final consideration is the time pattern of actual physical 
depreciation and obsolesence. That is, did the value in use of 
4
 Ibid., p. 343.

5Rimmer, Marshalls of Leeds: Flax-Spinners, p. 196.

6Ibid., p. 262.

7
 Ibid., p. 270.

8
 U.S. Tariff Board, p. 467.
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the machinery really decline in a straight-line fashion? If it did 
not, problems arise concerning the calculated rates of return. 
To take an extreme example, assume that a piece of equipment 
generated a constant stream of net income for twenty years and 
then fell apart (the so-called one-horse shay case). If that were 
the situation, then the resale value of the equipment would decline 
by 5 percent per annum (disregarding moving and installation 
problems). This fact might make it appropriate to charge 5 percent 
annual straight-line depreciation. It should be noted, however, 
that the capital tied up in the equipment would continually decline. 
After the first year (or other appropriate time period), net income 
would consist of what the equipment yielded plus what could 
be earned on the funds recovered through depreciation accounting. 
Thus, over the life of the equipment, the average invested capital 
would be only about one-half of the original cost of the equipment. 
Rates of return based on the total cost of the equipment would 
thus be only about one-half of the actual rate of return. 
On the other hand, if the net return on the equipment declined 
because of wear, increases in upkeep costs, or obsolesence, then 
the situation is different. In fact, if the net return on the equipment 
declines at 5 percent per year (straight line), then the extra return 
earned on the depreciation funds (if at the same rate as for the 
equipment) would be just enough to maintain the total net return 
on all the money originally put into the equipment. In this case, 
however, the resale value of the equipment would decline more 
rapidly than by 5 percent per year. 
The question then is: What did pre-World War I cotton mill 
managers mean when they charged straight-line depreciation? If 
they believed that their equipment's resale value declined in a 
straight line, then they must also have thought that it was of 
the one-horse-shay variety. In fact, however, it is clear that the 
physical productivity of cotton textile machinery did decrease with 
age.9 In addition, a degree of progressive obsolesence occurred. 
As noted above, my calculations assume that the time pattern 
of this decline in net return was approximately straight-line. 
Even if the equipment were of the one-horse-shay variety, 
however, and thus the true rate of return on invested capital 
was higher than my calculations indicate, the error involved was 
essentially one of accounting procedure. The cotton mill managers 
clearly believed that it was appropriate to charge interest for the 
9Ibid., pp. 471-72. 
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life of the machinery at its original cost. As Paul David has pointed 
out (in conversation), it is not conceptually clear whether or not 
this kind of accounting error should be included in the rubric 
of economic irrationality. 
This discussion has not shown that the 10% depreciation 
apparently charged by British cotton spinners in the pre-World 
War I period (or the 7% depreciation rate I assign to looms) 
is an ideal rate. On the other hand, there is certainly no evidence 
that a manufacturer using this rate (or rates) was in any way 
irrational or "technologically backwards." The most that could 
possibly be asserted is that these manufacturers may have been 
somewhat conservative in matters involving the commitment of 
funds to fixed capital. 
C. THE QUALITY OF BRITISH 
COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS, 
1815-1913 
The term quality as used in this book is defined as real value 
per yard of cloth and pound of yarn exported. Thus, a reduction 
in export quality does not mean that a specific type of cloth has 
deteriorated. Rather, it means that there has been a shift from 
more expensive to less expensive types of cloth. It may also mean 
that the same type of cloth is being exported in a different 
state—white instead of printed or gray instead of bleached. 
The results of the investigation presented in this appendix are 
a quality index of British cotton cloth exports and a quality index 
of British cotton yarn exports for the period 1815-1913. The 
same method used to compute the quality of all British cotton 
textile exports has also been applied to determine the quality 
of exports to particular markets.1 
I 
The normal procedure for computing an export quality index 
is to establish a scale of relative qualities and then weight these 
qualities by the quantity of each type of goods exported in each 
year. Because a lack of information made this calculation impossi­
ble, I was compelled to use an indirect approach. The first step 
'This appendix is a much-shortened version of a paper that appeared in the 
March 1968 Journal of Economic History. 
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in my method of constructing export quality indexes was to find 
a series of the average f.o.b. prices received per yard of cloth 
and pound of yarn exported. Fortunately, the "declared" values 
of exports reported in the British Trade and Navigation Accounts 
are generally accepted as being an accurate record of f.o.b. export 
receipts.2 All that was necessary to get average f.o.b. export prices 
was to divide the total declared value of cloth or yarn exported 
by the total number of yards of cloth or pounds of yarn exported. 
These series were then converted to index form. 
Movements in these indexes of unit export price reflect two 
types of changes. These are changes in the average quality of 
the mix of goods exported and changes in the prices of the various 
types of goods exported. Thus, if an index of unit export prices 
could be deflated by a composite index of the prices of the various 
types of goods exported, the result would be an index of the 
quality of the mix of different goods exported. 
To give a simple example, consider a country that exports "good" 
and "poor" cotton cloth. An examination of her trade statistics 
indicates that the average f.o.b. export price per yard of cotton 
cloth exported was $1.00 in 1815 and $2.00 in 1825. The index 
of average f.o.b. export price thus stood at 200 in 1825 (1815 = 100). 
If the price per yard of "good" cloth had risen from $1.50 in 
1815 to $3.00 in 1825 and the price per yard of "poor" cloth 
had risen from $.50 in 1815 to $1.00 in 1825, then the composite 
index of the prices of the types of cloth exported also stood at 
200 in 1825 (1815 = 100). If the index of the average f.o.b. export 
price is divided by the composite index of the prices of the types 
of cloth exported (henceforth to be known as the cotton cloth 
price index), the result will be 100 for both 1815 and 1825. The 
export quality index thus shows average export quality to have 
remained constant between 1815 and 1825. If, on the other hand, 
the prices of both "good" and "poor" cotton cloth had tripled 
instead of doubled between 1815 and 1825, the above calculation 
would have recorded a decline of one-third in average export 
quality. 
It will be noted that these examples assume that the prices 
of the different types of cloth exported moved in unison. If the 
price movements of the various types of cloth exported diverged 
considerably, then a useful cotton cloth price index could be 
constructed only with a detailed knowledge of the mix of goods 
2
 For discussion of the accuracy of the "declared" values, see A. Imlah, Economic 
Elements in the Pax Britannica, pp. 23-24. 
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exported in each year and the price movements of each type.3 
In fact, of course, no such detailed knowledge of exports and 
prices is available for the nineteenth century. It so happens, 
however, that during the period 1815-1913 the prices of the most 
important types of cotton gray cloth and cotton yarn generally 
moved in virtual unison (see Discussion A below). It follows that 
useful yarn and gray cloth price indexes can be computed from 
price series of closely specified, representative types of yarn and 
gray cloth without a detailed knowledge of the composition of 
exports. Conversely, such detailed knowledge would only result 
in a slight improvement in the accuracy of the yarn and gray 
cloth price indexes, and would in no way affect the principal 
conclusions of this appendix. 
For the period 1815-45, the price index used for cloth is based 
solely on the price of 7/8, 72 reed printing gray cloth. This type 
of cloth is generally considered to be a typical gray cloth. The 
yarn price index used for the same period is based on the prices 
of No. 100 and No. 140 mule yarn. Unfortunately, these yarns 
are far from typical. The quality index for yarn exports obtained 
for the period 1815-45 must therefore be viewed with considerable 
reserve. 
For the periods 1845-98 and 1898-1913, both the cloth and 
yarn price indexes are based on weekly price information for 
a whole group of products. Between 1845 and 1890, my price 
index for cotton cloth can be compared with another computed 
on the basis of the same data by Blaug. Slight differences arise 
between the two indexes because of a difference in sampling 
procedure and weighting. Column 1 of Table 39 contains my 
price index, and column 2 of the same table contains Blaug's 
index. (For a more detailed description of the construction of 
these price indexes, see Discussion A.) 
The price indexes for cloth that I have calculated refer only 
to gray cloth. The export figures, however, include large amounts 
of bleached, dyed, and printed cloth. Furthermore, the data 
indicate that the export prices of gray and white (plain) cloth 
and printed and dyed (colored) cloth did not move in unison 
during the periods 1815-45, 1855-71, and 1900-1913. (The 
1855-71 period differs from the other two in that the plain/colored 
export price ratio had returned to its beginning value by the 
3
 The continual changes in the mix of goods exported, by changing the weights 
in the cloth price index, would also introduce a certain amount of ambiguity 
into the results obtained. 
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end of the period.) If the changes in the plain /colored export 
price ratio were due to changes in the relative qualities of plain 
and colored cloth exported, no serious problem arises. In this 
case, average "quality" can be determined simply by dividing the 
price index of gray cloth into the index of average f.o.b. export 
prices received per yard (Assumption 1). This quality index was 
calculated for the entire period and for all subperiods. 
A careful study of the problem, however, indicates that changes 
in the plain/colored export price ratio were probably due to 
changes in the relative prices of gray cloth and finishing services. 
To take account of this phenomenon, it was necessary to adjust 
the average f.o.b. export prices in the dividend of the cloth export 
quality index. I did this by adjusting the value of colored cloth 
so as to maintain the plain/colored export price ratio that existed 
at the start of each period during which the plain/colored export 
price ratio moved (Assumption 2). For the periods 1815-45, 
1855-71, and 1900-1913, there are thus two quality indexes for 
cloth. Of these, I consider the one based on Assumption 2 to 
be the most likely result. At least for the period 1815-45, the 
Assumption 1 results must be viewed as an upper limit. (For a 
more detailed discussion of the plain/colored export price prob­
lem, see Discussion B.) 
II 
Table 38 shows estimated quality changes in British cotton cloth 
exports to all parts of the world for the period 1815-45. Column 
2 contains the results of Assumption 1 and column 3 the results 
of Assumption 2. A sharp decline in quality is recorded under 
either assumption. 
These quality changes can be put in better perspective if the 
world is divided into "high income" (HI) and "low income" (LI) 
countries. I have included the United States, British North America, 
Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, Germany, France, Switzer­
land, and the Low Countries in the HI category; All other countries 
are listed as LI. Under Assumption 1, export quality to the HI 
countries rose from 100 in 1815 to 107.7 in 1845, whereas export 
quality in the LI countries fell from 100 to 91.9. There was also 
a shift in the relative importance of the two market areas. In 
1815, the LI markets took 46.2 percent of the yardage exported. 
By 1845, this percentage had risen to 85.9. Given Assumption 
2, quality fell to 91.7 in the HI countries and to 81.7 in the 
LI countries. 
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TABLE 38

ESTIMATED QUALITY OF BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS, 1815-45

(1815 = 100) 
Cloth Quality Cloth Quality 
Year Gray Cloth Price Index 
Index 
(Assumption 1) 
Index 
(Assumption 2) 
Yarn 
Quality 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1815 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1816 103.7 87.2 85.7 101.4 
1817 84.0 94.2 91.6 108.4 
1818 78.0 109.4 107.9 87.0 
1819 79.0 101.6 96.8 88.2 
1820 63.0 116.0 108.3 89.8 
1821 61.0 112.6 106.7 89.0 
1822 58.0 108.6 102.2 83.9 
1823 56.0 106.4 97.0 83.9 
1824 58.0 100.2 92.0 72.1 
1825 . . . 65.4 
1826 42.0 121.9 110.2 71.5 
1827 40.0 122.8 110.3 70.2 
1828 39.0 122.3 107.1 65.0 
1829 35.0 123.1 105.6 59.2 
1830 34.8 126.7 108.2 65.4 
1831 35.7 112.0 99.7 71.0 
1832 34.2 100.6 92.4 71.8 
1833 35.7 97.5 89.0 72.4 
1834 37.3 94.4 86.7 73.4 
1835 40.7 92.6 86.2 64.5 
1836 40.0 93.3 86.6 56.2 
1837 31.0 107.4 96.5 60.1 
1838 33.7 92.6 83.7 60.9 
1839 34.5 90.1 80.8 54.0 
1840 29.0 98.6 87.3 58.5 
1841 29.0 95.5 83.4 64.8 
1842 25.2 96.8 84.2 73.8 
1843 25.8 88.8 77.4 66.8 
1844 26.0 89.6 78.3 66.8 
1845 24.8 92.3 80.6 56.7 
The single most important factor in this drop was the Indian 
market. Its quality index dropped from 100 to 60.9 under As­
sumption 1 and from 100 to 57.4 under Assumption 2. At the 
same time, India's share of the yardage exported rose from 0.5 
percent in 1815 to 21 percent in 1845. Without India, the worldwide 
quality index would have stood at 94.8 in 1845 under Assumption 
1 and 83.4 under Assumption 2. 
TABLE 39

ESTIMATED QUALITY OF BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS, 1845-98

Year 
1845

1846

1847

1848

1849

1850

1851

1852

1853

1854

1855

1856

1857

1858

1859

1860

1861

1862

1863

1864

1865

1866

1867

1868

1869

1870

1871

1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

1878

1879

1880

Author's

Gray Cloth

Price

Index

(1) 
100.0 
90.8 
96.6 
79.7 
87.8 
102.9 
99.1 
94.3 
99.5 
91.7 
87.0 
92.3 
105.7 
100.4 
110.9 
113.3 
111.4 
153.6 
215.1 
243.8 
194.1 
196.6 
142.8 
122.4 
130.2 
122.8 
110.4 
118.2 
115.2 
108.5 
106.5 
95.1 
99.1 
87.9 
80.6 
89.7 
(1845 = 100) 
Blaug's

Gray Cloth

Price

Index

(2) 
100.0 
89.3 
92.4 
80.2 
87.8 
100.8 
96.2 
92.4 
97.7 
90.8

97.7*

90.1 
103.8 
100.0 
106.8 
109.9 
106.9 
153.4 
211.5 
233.6 
187.8 
174.0 
136.6 
119.8 
126.7 
119.8 
106.9 
121.4 
111.5 
107.6 
103.1 
93.9 
96.2 
86.3 
80.9 
88.5 
Cloth

Quality

Index

Author's

Price

Index

(Assump­

tion 1)

(3)

100.0 
104.8 
107.2 
108.0 
95.9 
88.9 
87.5 
91.9 
91.4 
91.8 
94.0 
91.9 
83.2 
83.3 
79.3 
77.6 
76.8 
66.6 
62.0 
54.2 
69.7 
69.4 
79.8 
83.7 
81.0 
80.5 
86.2 
85.6 
85.2 
85.4 
85.9 
89.2 
83.8 
91.7 
94.8 
85.2 
Cloth

Quality

Index

Blaug's

Price

Index

(Assump­

tion 1)

(4)

100.0 
106.6 
112.1 
107.4 
95.9 
90.8 
90.1 
93.8 
93.0 
92.7 
105.3* 
94.1 
84.7 
83.6 
82.2 
80.0 
80.0 
66.7 
63.0 
56.5 
72.0 
78.4 
83.4 
85.5 
83.3 
82.5 
89.1 
83.4 
88.1 
86.2 
88.7 
90.3 
86.2 
93.4 
94.4 
86.3 
Yarn

Quality

(5) 
100.0 
104.4 
101.3 
116.9 
110.5 
90.3 
88.2 
94.9 
93.5 
96.3 
93.8 
88.2 
81.2 
86.4 
78.8 
81.4 
82.9 
65.1 
71.9 
73.4 
79.2 
79.6 
102.8 
121.3 
108.3 
105.0 
113.7 
99.0 
103.3 
102.5 
105.0 
100.6 
98.7 
106.5 
114.0 
98.7 
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TABLE 39 (Continued) 
Cloth Cloth 
Quality Quality 
Author's Blaug's Index Index 
Gray Cloth Gray Cloth Author's Blaug's Yarn 
Year Price Price Price Price Quality 
Index Index Index Index 
(Assump- (Assump­
tion 1) tion 1) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1881 91.5 89.3 82.2 84.2 99.8 
1882 90.6 87.8 85.0 87.7 102.2 
1883 83.9 81.7 88.1 90.5 106.6 
1884 83.1 80.9 85.3 87.6 106.3 
1885 79.1 77.9 84.3 85.6 107.7 
1886 78.4 76.3 79.6 81.8 109.9 
1887 80.2 77.9 79.9 81.1 108.4 
1888 81.1 79.4 77.7 79.3 105.5 
1889 83.4 82.5 74.8 75.6 101.4 
1890 83.7 82.5 76.7 77.8 106.0 
1891 79.8 . . . 81.2 . . . 106.8 
1892 72.6 . .  . 83.5 116.8 
1893 75.5 . . . 81.9 . . . 110.2 
1894 67.6 . . . 85.2 115.3 
1895 64.5 . . . 87.4 . . . 111.5 
1896 66.5 . . . 89.3 . . . 109.8 
1897 61.7 . . . 94.3 . . . 113.6 
1898 61.3 . . . 91.0 . . . 109.6 
•These results are probably caused by a misprint in Blaug's article. 
Yarn quality appears to have deteriorated even more rapidly 
than cloth quality during this period. The index of yarn quality 
stood at 56.7 in 1845 (1815 = 100). During the period, however, 
the price of high-quality yarn was apparently falling less rapidly 
than the price of low-quality yarn. If the No. 40 mule and No. 
30 water yarn prices for the period 1828-45 given by James Mann 
are used, the quality reduction from 65 in 1828 to 56.7 in 1845 
is virtually eliminated (see Discussion A). The most that can be 
said is that it is unlikely that the entire 35 percent drop in quality 
recorded between 1815 and 1828 is due to the choice of yarn 
counts in the price index. In view of the uncertainty attached 
to these results, I have not bothered to disaggregate them or 
connect them with the much more reliable results for the post-1845 
period. 
The results for the period 1845-98 are shown in Table 39. 
Column 3 contains the results of Assumption 1 using my gray 
cloth price index. Column 4 shows the results of Assumption 
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TABLE 40 
ESTIMATED QUALITY OF BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS, 1856-71 
(Assumption 2, author's price index) 1845 = 1 0 0 
1856 1859 1862 1865 1868 1871

91.9 83.4 73.1 75.3 83.4 86.2

1 using the gray cloth price index derived from Blaug's work. 
Column 5 contains the results for yarn. 
Table 40 shows the results of Assumption 2 and my gray cloth 
price index for the period 1856-71. Observe that the values for 
1856 and 1871 are identical to the Assumption 1 results for those 
years. 
All the indexes for cloth export quality once again show deterio­
ration over the 53-year period. Column 3 of Table 39 shows an 
overall decline from 100 in 1845 to 90.7 in 1898. This decline 
can be partitioned into a decline to 87.6 in the LI markets, an 
increase to 125.6 in the HI countries, and an increase from 85.9 
percent to approximately 90 percent in the yardage going to the 
LI markets. 
Once again, the Indian market exerted a strong downward pull 
TABLE 41 
ESTIMATED QUALITY OF BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS, 1898-1913 
(1898 = 100) 
Year 
Author's 
Gray Cloth 
Price Index 
Cloth 
Quality 
(Assumption 1) 
Cloth 
Quality 
(Assumption 2) 
Yarn 
Quality 
1898 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1899 100.1 101.9 101.9 96.2 
1900 115.0 98.7 98.7 89.0 
1901 113.9 100.9 101.8 96.9 
1902 109.9 102.7 103.6 97.3 
1-903 120.6 96.9 97.6 91.6 
1904 134.1 93.3 93.7 91.6 
1905 132.8 93.9 95.3 96.4 
1906 141.8 92.7 96.7 90.7 
1907 144.0 96.7 97.6 91.0 
1908 130.7 105.7 107.7 101.8 
1909 130.6 99.7 101.0 100.4 
1910 152.1 93.8 96.0 97.7 
1911 164.0 89.5 93.5 100.5 
1912 152.0 94.6 95.1 107.9 
1913 153.7 97.6 101.4 105.2 
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TABLE 42

ESTIMATED QUALITY OF BRITISH COTTON TEXTILE EXPORTS 1815-1913

Cloth Quality Cloth Quality 
Year (Assumption 1) (Assumption 2) Yarn Quality 
1815 100.0 100.0 
1845 92.3 80.6 100.0 
1885 79.0 69.0 107.7 
1890 70.6 61.7 106.0 
1898 84.0 73.3 109.6 
1913 82.0 74.3 115.3 
on average quality. The quality of cloth exported to India fell 
to 84.5 in 1898 (1845=100), while her share of total exports 
rose from 21 percent to 43.1 percent. Without India, the worldwide 
quality index would have stood at 99.8 in 1898. The yarn index 
shows a slight increase in quality over the period. The HI and 
LI countries shared about equally in this increase. In fact, both 
improved slightly more than the overall index. An increase in 
the percentage exported to the LI countries explains this phenom­
enon. 
The results for the period 1898-1913 are shown in Table 41. 
In this period, there was little or no decline in the quality of 
British cotton cloth exports. Interestingly enough, quality to the 
HI countries, especially Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, did 
somewhat less well than quality to the LI countries. There was 
also a slight increase in the percentage of cloth exports going 
to the HI countries. Yarn quality improved slightly as the result 
of a sharp improvement in HI country quality and a small decline 
in LI country quality. In addition, the percentage of yarn exports 
going to the LI countries declined from 55 percent to 36 percent. 
Results for the entire period 1815-1913 are shown in Table 
42 and Figure 6. As mentioned above, I consider the results of 
Assumption 2, shown in column 2, of Table 42, to be more accurate 
than the results of Assumption 1.4 The quality deterioration shown 
in column 2 is the result of a decline from 100 to 72.9 in LI 
country import quality and an increase from 100 to 104.6 in HI 
country import quality together with an increase from 46.2 percent 
to approximately 90 percent in the export yardage going to the 
4
 Assumption 1 implies that the quality of plain cloth deteriorated from 100 
in 1815 to 82.1 in 1845, while the quality of colored cloth increased from 100 
to 111.6. Assumption 2, of course, implies that both colored and plain cloth quality 
fell to 82.1 in 1845. 
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Figure 6. Quality Index of British Cotton Cloth Exports, 
1815-1913. 1815 = 100. 
Assumption 1; Assumption 2. 
LI countries. Without India, the quality index in column 2 would 
have gone from 100 in 1815 to 85.9 in 1913. 
The quality of yarn exports shown in column 3 increased 
considerably between 1845 and 1913. This improvement can be 
credited to a steady quality level in the LI countries, a 25 percent 
improvement in HI country quality, and a decline from 45.9 percent 
to 36.5 percent in the share going to the LI countries. 
DISCUSSION A 
Problems in the Calculation of Price Indexes 
The principal problem in obtaining the price indexes used as 
the denominators in the various quality indexes calculated in this 
appendix was a shortage of reliable price information. For the 
period 1815-45, there is really only one continuous and authori­
tative series for a closely specified type of cloth. This series is 
for 7/8, 72 reed printing gray, prepared by Alderman Neild 
of Manchester for presentation to the British Association in 1861.1 
The author's express purpose was to present a representative price 
!A. Neild, "An Account of the Prices of Printing Cloth and Upland Cotton 
from 1812 to 1860," pp. 491-97. I adjusted the values in the table according 
to the instructions given by Neild. 
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index for cotton cloth, and his claim that the cloth involved was 
in fact "typical" has never been contested. 
It is, of course, very dangerous to base an overall price index 
on a single product, particularly in a period of rapid technological 
change. There is, however, a good deal of ancillary evidence that 
gives support to Neild's series. Between 1845 and 1902, the 7/8, 
72 printers' is one of six supposedly representative types of gray 
cloth the prices of which are available on a weekly basis. Throughout 
this extensive period the price of the 7/8, 72 printers' moved 
in excellent accord with the prices of the five other types of gray 
cloth. 
There are also fragments of other price series from the pre-1845 
period. In his classic history of the British cotton manufacture, 
Edward Baines presents a price series of "second quality 74's" 
from 1814 through 1820 and of "third quality 74's" from 1821 
through 1833.2 These series usually agree within a few percentage 
points with Neild's series. By 1833, the 74 series appears to be 
a few percentage points above Neild's series. In addition, Ellison 
reports the price changes between 1815 and 1856 of an unspecified 
type of calico and an unspecified type of printers' cloth, and these 
changes are virtually identical with that reported by Neild.3 In 
view of this information, I am prepared to accept Neild's 7/8, 
72 printers' series as a reasonable surrogate for a more compre­
hensive gray cloth price index. At the very least, I believe it to 
be accurate enough to be used in determining general trends 
in export quality. 
With regard to cotton yarn, T. S. Ashton has prepared continuous 
series, covering the period 1815-45, of the prices received by 
the firm of M'Connel and Kennedy for No. 100 and No. 140 
mule yarn.4 These, of course, are very high-quality yarns and 
are far from typical. Furthermore, these series show considerable 
deviations from the prices of the more standard No. 40 mule 
and No. 30 water yarn reported by James Mann for the period 
1828-45.5 Because they are the only series available for the entire 
period, I have nevertheless used the No. 100 and No. 140 prices. 
In view of these facts, the results of this calculation must be 
scrutinized with great reserve. 
2E. Baines, Jr., History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain, p. 356. 
3
 Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, p. 61. 
4T. S. Ashton, "Some Statistics of the Industrial Revolution in Britain," pp. 
214-34. 
5
 J. A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, p. 96. 
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As has already been indicated, the situation improves consider­
ably in the period after 1845. In that year, the Economist began 
publishing the weekly prices of four different types of raw cotton, 
two types of yarn, and six different types of gray cloth. The 
prices of the same set of closely specified goods continued to 
be published until the end of the century. 
The six different types of gray cloth consisted of three different 
types of shirtings, two types of printers' cloth, and one type of 
long cloth.6 The range of their prices usually exceeded 2 to 1. 
Furthermore, the purpose of publishing this information was, of 
course, precisely to give a general view of the gray cloth price 
situation. 
I constructed a separate annual price index for each of the 
six types of cloth by drawing one weekly price per quarter for 
each type. This sampling procedure clearly makes some error 
inevitable. Nevertheless, the six indexes are remarkably well syn­
chronized. (Usually at least four, often five, and sometimes all 
six are within five percentage points of each other, even during 
the violent price fluctuations occasioned by the American Civil 
War.)7 Furthermore, for most of the period there are frequent 
changes in the rank ordering of the price index values. By the 
late 1870s, however, the most expensive type of cloth (one of 
the three shirtings) begins to be consistently a few index points 
above the rest. However, because of the high price of the first 
and because the Economist had at least occasional trouble in 
obtaining quotations on the second, I doubt that these two types 
of cloth were as important as the other four. 
I formed an overall index by the simple expedient of adding 
the six separate indexes and dividing their sum by six. This is 
equivalent to assuming that equal sums were spent on each type 
of cloth. Thus, the volume of each type of cloth assumed to be 
exported is inversely proportional to its price. 
Some check on the effects of this sampling procedure can be 
obtained by comparing my summed series with a gray cloth price 
index based on the same data calculated by Marc Blaug for the 
6The six types were: (1) 26 in., 66 reed, Printer, 29 yds., 4 lbs. 2 ozs.; (2) 
27 in., 72 reed, Printer, 29 yds., 5 lbs. 2 ozs.; (3) 39 in., 60 reed, Gold End 
Shirtings, 37 1/2 yds., 8 lbs. 4 ozs.; (4) 40 in., 66 reed, Gold End Shirtings, 
37 1/2 yds., 8 lbs. 12 ozs.; (5) 40 in., 72 reed, Gold End Shirtings, 37 1/2 
yds., 9 lbs. 8 ozs.; and (6) 39 in., 44 reed, Red End Long Cloth, 36 yds., 9 lbs. 
7
 The individual indexes are included in a mimeographed appendix available 
upon request from the author. 
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period 1845-90.8 Instead of calculating a separate price series 
for each type of cloth, Blaug summed all the weekly price quotations 
in shillings and divided by the total indicated pound weight. He 
thus obtained a series of the average price in shillings per pound 
of gray cloth, based on the assumption that an equal number 
of pieces of each type of gray cloth was produced. This procedure 
thus puts a relatively greater weight on the high-priced goods 
than does my weighting scheme. I believe my weighting scheme 
is more realistic, particularly with regard to exports. Blaug does, 
however, have the advantage of 312 observations per year as 
opposed to my 24 observations. This is of particular advantage 
during periods of considerable price fluctuations. 
Blaug's results, converted to index form, are shown in column 
2 of Table 39. They are very similar to my summed index shown 
in column 1. Some variations are, of course, to be expected, owing 
to differences in weighting, sampling procedure, and rounding, 
as well as possible computational errors by both parties. There 
is some tendency for my index to be above Blaug's. By the end 
of the comparison period, this difference seems to have settled 
into a 1 to 2 percent upward bias. Although part of this difference 
may be attributable to differences in weighting, there does seem 
to be some discrepancy due to my limited sampling procedure. 
Unfortunately, these price series begin to behave very strangely 
starting in 1898 or 1899. For the first time, there are inversions 
in the ranking of absolute prices. By 1902-3, it is difficult to put 
any faith in the series at all. The editors of the Economist clearly 
shared this opinion, for in 1903 they substituted the prices of 
a new bundle of cotton goods. When this change took place, the 
prices of the new goods were quoted back through 1898. 
This new bundle of goods consisted of two types of raw cotton, 
three types of yarn, and four types of gray cloth: one printers' 
and three different shirtings.9 These new cloth price indexes are 
quite well synchronized starting in 1902. Unfortunately, between 
1898 and 1902 they show a good deal of divergence. Thus, though 
I felt free to use the new price series to construct a gray cloth 
price index between 1902 and 1913, the period 1898-1902 pre­
8
 Blaug, "Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry during the 
Nineteenth Century," pp. 376-78. 
9The four cloths listed were: (1) 32 in., Printers', 116 yds., 16 by 16, 32s and 
50s; (2) 32 in., Shirtings, 75 yds., 19 by 19, 32s and 40s; (3) 38 in., Shirtings, 
38 yds., 18 by 16, 10 lbs.; and (4) 39 in., Shirtings, 37 1/2 yds., 16 by 15, 8 
1/4 lbs. 
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sented a serious problem. Neither series is "well behaved" during 
this period, and their summed indexes diverge noticeably. After 
studying the alternatives, I chose to stop the old series in 1898 
and to start the new series at that point. The overlap is thus 
only one year. The main reason for this choice is that the old 
price index increased rather sharply from 1898 to 1899, while 
the new index and the average export price to all ten markets 
I distinguished remained virtually constant. This particular method 
of connecting the two indexes results in a somewhat lower price 
index (i.e., a somewhat-higher-quality index) than would result 
if the whole overlap period 1898-1902 were used. As a result 
of these problems I must confess to some misgivings about the 
gray cloth price index I used for the period 1898-1913. 
As was mentioned above, starting in 1845 the Economist also 
published price series for cotton yarn. In the period 1845-1902, 
the two yarns quoted were a No. 40 mule and a No. 30 water 
twist. The advantage of this choice is that it includes yarns produced 
by two different methods. On the other hand, there is very little 
spread in counts. This does not seem to be a serious problem, 
however, because, for the period 1845-82, the Economist series 
are extremely well coordinated with the prices of very-high-quality 
yarns given by Ashton.10 The only exception to this occurred 
during the American Civil War when the prices of high-count 
yarns rose less rapidly than prices of low-count yarns. My index 
may thus slightly understate the quality of yarn exported during 
the Civil War period. In any case, the two price series given by 
the Economist are remarkably well synchronized. In 1898, they 
stood at 63.5 and 63.3, respectively (1845 = 100). 
For the period 1898-1913, the yarns described were a 32 twist, 
a 40 weft, and a 60 Egyptian twist. These prices are somewhat 
less well synchronized than those for the earlier period. In 
connecting the two series, I used the same procedure as for cloth. 
DISCUSSION B 
The Problem of Variations in the Plain/Colored

Export Price Ratio

The price indexes discussed above and in the text of Appendix 
C apply only to gray cloth. As noted in the text, however, cloth 
10
 See Ashton, "Some Statistics of the Industrial Revolution in Britain." 
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exports did not consist exclusively of gray cloth. In fact, the majority 
of all cloth exported between 1815 and 1913 was at least bleached. 
This would present no problem if the price of finishing cloth 
moved in unison with the price of gray cloth. Unfortunately, it 
is virtually impossible to investigate finishing prices directly. Some 
notion of the relative prices of gray cloth and finishing services 
can be secured by looking at the average price of various types 
of exports. The ratio of the average price of gray and white 
(plain) cloth exported over the average price of printed and dyed 
(colored) cloth exported (with 1815 = 100) changed as follows: 
1815 = 100.0; 1820 = 88.4; 1826 = 81.4; 1830 = 74.3; 1835 
= 88.2; 1840 = 79.4; and 1845 = 74.0. Between 1845 and 1856, 
this ratio remained virtually constant. During the American Civil 
War, however, it rose sharply. With 1856=100, the ratio was 
102.1 in 1859, 122.0 in 1862, 115.6 in 1865, 106.6 in 1868, and 
back to 100 in 1871. After the Civil War, the ratio remained 
virtually constant until 1900, and then rose slightly up to 1913. 
The problem here lies in determining what caused these fluctua­
tions in the plain/colored export price ratio. Unless the relatively 
more rapid fall in the price of plain cloth up to 1845 was the 
result of its quality actually deteriorating relative to the quality 
of colored cloth, merely dividing the average export price of all 
cloth by a price index for gray cloth will tend to exaggerate average 
export quality. 
One possible explanation for the decline in the plain/colored 
export price ratio during the period 1815-45 is that plain cloth 
exports tended to concentrate more and more in low-quality 
markets. Using the average quality computed for ten different 
British cotton textile markets (see text above) for 1815 and 1845, 
it is possible to explain approximately 15 percent of the decline 
in the plain /colored export price ratio by the greater concentration 
of plain cloth in low-quality markets in 1845 than in 1815. If 
the relative price of plain cloth fell for some other reason than 
a relative decline in quality, however, the markets with a heavy 
concentration of plain cloth will have their quality indexes biased 
downward. This means that the above calculation is undoubtedly 
biased upward. One way of eliminating this bias is to assume 
that, in each separate market, plain cloth quality and colored cloth 
quality moved in unison. Once the quality indexes have been 
corrected by this assumption, none of the decline in the plain/col­
ored export price ratio can be explained by the growing con­
centration of plain cloth exports in low-quality markets. 
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Some indication that part of the decline in the plain/colored 
export price ratio was really due to a relative decline in plain 
cloth quality can be obtained from the "official" export statistics. 
These figures indicate that the shift away from muslins, fustians, 
and the like toward calicoes had a greater effect on the average 
"official" value of plain than of colored cloth exported. This was 
so because almost all muslins were exported plain. Thus perhaps 
10 percent of the relative decline in plain cloth prices can be 
attributed to the general shift toward calicoes. 
This evidence suggests that only a small percentage of the decline 
in the plain/colored export price ratio can be attributed to a 
relative decline in the quality of plain cloth exports. The only 
other reasonable explanation of the observed phenomena is that 
the price of gray cloth fell more rapidly in the period after 1815 
than did the price of finishing. The most likely source of such 
a divergence in prices during this period is technological change. 
It is well known that the period 1815-45 witnessed a veritable 
revolution in gray cloth production. In addition to major improve­
ments in the preparatory processes, spinning machinery was made 
larger, more efficient, and more automatic during this period. 
More important, by 1845 British cotton weaving was dominated 
by efficient power looms. In the finishing processes, however, 
there was really only one major development, the improvement 
and widespread adoption of machine printing. Interestingly 
enough, the period of most rapid growth of machine printing ap­
pears to have been the early 1830s, the same period during which 
the plain/colored export price ratio temporarily recovered from 
74.3 to 88.2.! It is generally agreed that the rate of technological 
improvement in gray cloth production fell off after 1845.2 
The relative increase in the export price of plain cloth during 
1
 For a general description of technical developments in the finishing industry, 
see G. Turnbull, A History of the Calico Printing Industry of Great Britain. The 
evidence as to the period of most rapid spread of machine printing is unfortunately 
somewhat vague. It is clear that printing increased extremely rapidly in the 1830s. 
In 1821, 7,000,000 pieces were printed, asopposed to 8,600,000 in 1830; 16,000,000 
in 1840; and 20,000,000 in 1850 (ibid., p. 81). It is also clear that there was 
a great rush into printing after the removal of the excise on printed calicoes 
in 1831 (Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture of Great Britain, pp. 282-84). 
Although there had been a drawback on exports, the rapid growth of the industry 
undoubtedly resulted in increased mechanization and technical improvement. At 
least by 1842, the previously flourishing art of block printing was on its last 
legs (Turnbull, A History of the Calico Printing Industry of Great Britain, pp. 211-12). 
This very same period also witnessed the introduction and rapid growth of machine 
printing in the United States (see Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture, 
pp. 94-95). 
2
 This general view of technical developments is in accord with the description 
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the American Civil War cannot be attributed to changes in the 
distribution of plain and colored cloth between high- and low-
quality markets. Nor can I see any way of explaining it through 
changes in technology. Rather, the likely explanation lies in the 
acute shortage of raw cotton experienced during this period. Prices 
of cotton goods rose, not because there was a shortage of manufac­
turing capacity, but because there was a shortage of raw material. 
Price series available from the Civil War period indicate that the 
price of raw cotton rose more rapidly than the price of yarn, 
which, in turn, rose more rapidly than the price of gray cloth. 
The slight upturn in the plain /colored export price ratio between 
1900 and 1913 can possibly be attributed to two developments 
in the finishing trades: the first was the development and rapid 
adoption of the so-called vat dyes, and the other was the consoli­
dation and rationalization that took place in the industry.3 It is, 
however, difficult to draw any definite conclusions about this 
period. 
In the light of this discussion, I have, as noted in the above, 
constructed two different cloth quality indexes for the periods 
1815-45, 1855-71, and 1900-1913. The first index assumes that 
changes in the plain /colored export price ratio actually represent 
changes in the relative quality of plain and colored exports. This 
index is obtained simply by dividing the average declared export 
price by the gray cloth price index (Assumption 1). 
The other calculation assumes that changes in the plain/colored 
export price ratio do not represent relative quality changes. Instead, 
the quality of colored cloth is assumed to fluctuate in unison 
with the quality of plain cloth. I made this correction by adjusting 
the value of colored cloth so as to maintain the price ratios of 
1815, 1855, and 1898, respectively (Assumption 2).4 
Of these two indexes, I feel that the second is more accurate. 
Any downward bias it contains because of the shift to calicoes 
should be offset by the fact that some of the plain cloth exported 
was finished to the extent of being bleached. 
given by Deane and Cole (British Economic Growth, p. 192). It also accords well 
with Blaug's results ("The Productivity of Capital in the Lancashire Cotton Industry 
during the Nineteenth Century," pp. 360, 366). 
3
 See Turnbull, A History of the Calico Printing Industry of Great Britain, chaps, 
8,9. 
4
 It would, of course, be equally legitimate to adjust the price of plain cloth 
so as to maintain the price ratios of 1845, 1864, and 1913. Because this approach 
would assume a different fixed-price ratio, it would give somewhat different results 
than my method. The difference turns out to be so small, however, that it can 
be safely ignored. 
D. BRITISH EXPORTS OF 
COTTON CLOTH TO 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 
1815-1913 
The following data have been extracted from various annual 
volumes of the Trade and Navigation Accounts of the British 
Parliamentary Papers. They are based on the quantities and values 
(in current prices) declared at the time of export. They are subject 
to a number of possible types of error. First of all, some exports 
may not have been recorded. There was no incentive to under­
report, however, so this is unlikely to be a large source of error. 
Errors of collection, addition, and typography may have entered 
at several different stages. More important that these possibilities, 
however, are problems of geographical definition and re-exporta­
tion. 
Before the unification of Italy and Germany, British exports 
to these regions were listed separately for individual ports and/or 
subregions. Unfortunately, ports and subregions importing rela­
tively small amounts were usually lumped into the "other destina­
tion" category. Because I consistently ignored this category, my 
early estimates for Germany and Italy are probably somewhat 
low. What is worse, the number of ports and subregions listed 
varied from year to year. Thus, the size of the downward bias 
in my figures also varies from year to year. 
It is also certainly true that some of the cloth was re-exported 
from the declared destination. This is probably the case especially 
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with regard to Germany, particularly during the Crimean War. 
It may also have played some role with regard to the French 
figures before 1861. Although some of the cloth declared for 
export to France while the prohibition of English cotton cloth 
was in effect may have been put into the hands of smugglers, 
some was probably consigned to a free port and then re-exported. 
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fully apparent, that journalists, economists, 
and economic historians began to decry 
incompetent management as the agents of 
doom. 
The charges that were leveled — and they 
have for the most part survived until today 
without ever being called seriously into ques­
tion — were that the leaders of industry were 
"technologically backward," were unwilling 
to exploit to the fullest the increased effi­
ciency afforded by newly invented machines 
and novel processes, and that they were, in 
addition, guilty of quite irrational behavior 
when confronted with the necessity of making 
economic decisions. 
Professor Sandberg undertakes to examine 
these durable claims in light of an impres­
sive body of data that he has compiled from 
a wide variety of sources. He is led to the 
conclusion that the disastrous failure of the 
cotton textile industry cannot be blamed, in 
fact, on the technological backwardness and 
entrepreneurial ineptitude that have been 
the chief targets of critics. Rather, he finds, 
this precipitous decline in a major industry 
is attributable to international developments 
that occurred in a rapidly changing world 
and in drastically altered economic circum­
stances—developments to which all of the 
nations of the world proved subject, and over 
which none of them, not even the seemingly 
all-powerful British Empire, could exercise 
any truly effective measure of control. 
Lars G. Sandberg is professor of economics 
at the Ohio State University. 
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